Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 January 2017

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region overall but fewer explosions, compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations. It observed a civilian casualty in Dovhe and impact sites in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The SMM continued to monitor weapons withdrawal and observed weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines. The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire for repairs to essential infrastructure.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] overall in Donetsk region between the evenings of 24 and 25 January compared with the previous 24 hours, but fewer explosions (including about 228 explosions compared with 365).

During the evening of 24 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-7km north and north-west. The next day, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 3-10km west and north-north-west and about 40 shots of small-arms fire 3-4km north-west.

On the evening of 24 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard approximately 100 shots of small arms fire 3-8km south-south-west and about 105 shots of small-arms fire 4-8km south-south east.

On the evening of 24 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, 13 explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, and 11 explosions of outgoing recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds, as well as about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km north-north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for over four hours on 24 January, the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions and intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-5km north, west-south-west, west, north-west and north-north-west. The same evening, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded one illumination flare in flight from north to south followed by two undetermined explosions, all 3-4km north-north-east.

On the evening of 24 January, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined projectiles in flight from east to west followed by four undetermined projectiles in flight from west to east 3-4km east-north-east and east-south-east. Over 20 minutes the following morning, the same camera recorded 11 undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east.

On 25 January, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west, followed by 11 undetermined explosions 2-3km north-west.

On 25 January, positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km north-north-east.

On the evening of 25 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), recorded four undetermined explosions and an exchange of fire beginning with eight tracer rounds fired from east to west, followed by 196 tracer rounds fired in total (129 east to west, 66 west to east, and one south-east to north-west) and two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west, all at unknown distances to the north and north-east of the camera.

Positioned in government-controlled Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of small-arms fire 2-5km west and west-north-west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions at unknown distances to the north.

Over about 45 minutes, positioned in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as outgoing mortar fire of an unknown calibre at an unknown distance south-west and a subsequent explosion assessed as an impact at an unknown distance north-north-west, as well as heard and saw two airbursts 2km north, and heard one undetermined explosion, and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at unknown distances north and north-north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 24 and 25 January compared with the previous 24 hours (including 55 explosions compared with 231). Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) near a known training area, outside the security zone, the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as mortar fire of unknown calibre about 7km west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) near a known training area, outside the security zone, the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as rounds of artillery of unknown calibre and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun-fire, 5km north-west.

Positioned about 1.2km north of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an 82mm mortar round 1km north-north-east. Shortly after, positioned inside Novooleksandrivka, the SMM heard 11 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds,  ten shots assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) cannon (30mm) rounds, ten shots assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and approximately 500 shots of small-arms fire, all 2km south.

Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion, 4-5km south-west of its position (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in “LPR”-controlled Dovhe (23km north of Luhansk), where the SMM saw a burned-out vehicle and inside the vehicle the body of a deceased man. The SMM observed that there was no shrapnel damage and that the body of the vehicle was in one piece. There was neither significant burned residue including from tyres nor broken glass on the surface of the road around the vehicle. An “LPR” member showed the SMM a piece of metal and tangled copper wire, which he said was the remnants of an anti-tank wire-guided missile that he had removed from the car. The SMM did not observe wire in the car. At the site, a woman who said she was the wife of the deceased told the SMM that the man used the road on a daily basis and that he had been going to a shop in another village. The SMM observed an impact some 200m south of the burned-out car, which it assessed to be at least several days old and caused by an unknown weapon fired from a northerly direction. While present, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 1-2km west-north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* The SMM observed no de-mining activities or disengagement in the three areas.

While positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and an “LPR” member told the SMM that the “LPR” members were ready for disengagement.

On 25 January, positioned outside the disengagement area on the government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance south-west (but could not assess whether it was inside or outside the disengagement area). Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge, the SMM observed four impacts on the sidewalk near the road. Two of the impacts were located 5m north-west of a shed where the SMM had previously seen an IFV (BMP-1) parked on the west side of the road and two more were located an additional 15m further north-west, on both sides of the road. The SMM assessed that a weapon was fired from a westerly direction but could not assess the weapon used.

Positioned approximately 2km south-west of Zolote in “LPR”-controlled area of Zolote, inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard three explosions of artillery rounds of unknown calibre and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). At the last “LPR” checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area near “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time a sign on the wall of the checkpoint written in Russian: “According to the … Framework Agreement on Disengagement of Forces, under no circumstances are “LPR” “People’s Militia” allowed to be inside the disengagement area, only officers from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination are authorized to be present”.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske disengagement area the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicles spotted weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines: five multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near government-controlled Izhevka (66km north of Donetsk) on 24 January and three surface-to-air missile systems (two 9K33 Osa, 210mm) near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol) on 25 January.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned sites the SMM observed: three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Izhevka; three tanks (T-64, 125mm) near LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and three tanks (T-72, 125mm) exiting a training area and travelling east near LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted as missing 30 tanks (T-64B, 125mm) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), all as previously observed.

The Mission revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the relevant withdrawal lines and noted as missing 18 tanks (seven T-72 and 11 T-64) and two mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), all as previously observed.

The SMM observed the presence of an armoured combat vehicle[2] and military personnel in the security zone. In “LPR-”controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a stationary armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) parked near a building used by armed “LPR” members.

In government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed four-five military trucks and approximately 20 military personnel around a house that appeared to be occupied by Ukrainian Armed Forces and one soldier installing what appeared to be a communication antenna on a nearby tree.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians. (See SMM Daily Report 19 January.) The JCCC did not report any progress on mine clearance. While at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed a demining team. In the presence of the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative of the JCCC, several “LPR” members told the SMM that they were ready to demine the area but the SMM did not see any demining. The Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the JCCC told the SMM that demining on the government-controlled side of the bridge could be possible. However, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near the bridge, checkpoint personnel told the SMM that there were anti-tank mines on the bridge south of the last Ukrainian Armed Forces position and did not remove them.*  Both the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the JCCC told the SMM that they would proceed with co-ordination of demining on road T0519 between “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint west of Pikuzy. A “DPR” senior member told the SMM that demining the “DPR”-controlled areas would take up to three days. However, from both of these locations, the SMM was unable to proceed further due to the presence of anti-tank mines.*

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire for repairs to essential infrastructure from both sides of the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-west) for repairs to railway lines in the Horlivka neighbourhood of Mykytivka. According to both Ukrainian Armed Forces and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC, repair work on the railway line was completed at 13:30.   

In government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed branches blocking access for repair workers from Vodakanal to an area of the water system requiring maintenance located near the railway. According to an employee of Vodakanal, the branches had been placed to prevent the repair team from cutting down trees during the course of repairs and another repair worker said that the restriction to the area appeared approximately two weeks ago.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that it could not access the disengagement area from a road leading from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) into the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Due to the lack of security guarantees and the potential threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), armed men said they had no orders to let the SMM pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint west of Pikuzy, the SMM could see anti-tank mines on the road and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM on the road leading east due to the mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-The SMM could not cross the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were still mines on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint prevented the SMM from traveling on the road between government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka. The personnel said that the road had not been demined and the SMM could see anti-tank barriers. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.