Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 January 2017

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed a civilian casualty in Holubivka, and impact sites and damage to civilian houses in Irmino, Popasna, and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* For the first time in a year, the SMM could proceed north of road M03 between Debaltseve and Svitlodarsk. Video footage from the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska revealed ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area on 22 January. Along the administrative boundary line in the areas around Chonhar and Arabat Spit the SMM observed a calm situation.  In Kherson the SMM also observed improved accommodation arrangements for IDPs.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region between the evenings of 23 and 24 January to the previous 24 hours (including about 365 explosions compared with 426).

On the night of 23-24 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 7-9km north-north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) for five hours on 23 January, the SMM heard 93 undetermined explosions 5-10km north and north-west). The next day while north of Debaltseve on road M03, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces General at the JCCC and “LPR” members, the SMM heard and saw two undetermined explosions west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for over four hours on 24 January, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2-7km north-north-west and seven undetermined explosions 1-2km west-north-west along with intense heavy-machine-gun and small arms fire north-north-west and west.

On the evening of 23 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), recorded ten undetermined explosions. The camera recorded in total 277 tracer rounds in flight, starting with tracer rounds from east to west (228 from east to west, 49 from west to east and one from south-east to north-west) as well as 25 rocket-assisted projectiles (11 from east to west and 14 from west to east.

On the evening of 23 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 60 undetermined explosions and 19 impacts assessed as 120mm mortar fire 5-6km south-west of its position. On 24 January in Horlivka, for over three hours the SMM heard eight outgoing explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire 2km north, 32 explosions assessed as impacts of mortars rounds 3.5-4.5km north-north-west, 14 undetermined explosions 5-6km north-north-west, and seven explosions assessed as impacts 5-7km south-west.

On the evening of 23 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions 7-10km north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations between the evenings of 23 and 24 January compared with the previous 24 hours (including more than 231 explosions compared with 54).

On the evening of 23 January, over 3.5 hours while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nearly 200 explosions of artillery fire comprised of equal numbers of outgoing explosions and those assessed as impacts, all at distances 3-15km north, west-south-west, west, and west-north-west.

On 24 January, positioned in “LPR”-controlled, Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 10km south.

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian casualty in a hospital campus area in Holubivka where it observed a dead body covered by a white sheet on a paved pedestrian path in the middle of the campus between two buildings. When the SMM arrived, “LPR” members were examining the incident. According to them the victim was 48 years old. Approximately 10m from the body the SMM observed a fresh impact crater. The SMM also observed shrapnel. The SMM assessed the crater to be caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. A building located about 50m west of the crater had nine of its windows, facing towards the crater, broken. The SMM did not observe any other damage on the building. The SMM was directed by civilians to a spot where it observed a second fresh crater in the garden of a house around 200m north-west from the first crater. The crater was located in a snow-covered piece of garden about ten metres from the house. There was some damage to trees and a nearby fence. The SMM assessed the crater to be caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north east of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier had sustained a non-serious injury to his shoulder from shrapnel the previous night. The head of a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska confirmed that a soldier had been admitted with shrapnel-related trauma to his elbow.

The SMM observed damage to civilian infrastructure in “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk). At the first site in Tverska Street, the SMM saw a house with three broken windows and two doors facing west and a destroyed workshop in the garden, facing west. Two houses in the immediate vicinity also had broken windows, facing south-south-west. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. At a second site in Yakira Street, the SMM saw a house with four broken windows and an impact site in a field 40m west from the house. A nearby power line was also damaged and was being fixed by staff of an electric company. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from westerly direction. While in the vicinity, the SMM observed fresh tracks of military hardware the SMM was unable to identify in the snow (not yet covered by other vehicle tracks or fresh snow). On the evening of 23 January, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM had heard impact explosions in the direction of Irmino.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Popasna (69km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two fresh impacts with diameter of 1.5-2m and depth 0.5-0.8m. The impacts were close to each other (about 20m apart), located approximately 25m north of the road. The SMM was unable to assess the impacts in more detail as they were located in an unpaved surface.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* The SMM observed no de-mining activities or disengagement in the three areas.

On the evening of 22 January, the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the disengagement area and from undetermined weapons, beginning with one shot 750m south-south-east of the camera and continuing with an exchange consisting of one flash 750m south-south-east, one shot 600m south-west, seven explosions assessed as impacts of rounds 300m south-west, and one explosion assessed as an outgoing round 1.6km south. The camera also recorded violations assessed as outside the disengagement area: one explosion assessed as a mortar round (calibre unknown), one explosion assessed as an outgoing round of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm), five explosions assessed as rounds of an undetermined weapon (two outgoing, three undetermined), and five shots of an undetermined weapon.

On 24 January the SMM observed one impact of rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) on the eastern side of the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces position, and two automatic grenade launcher round impacts on both sides of it, all assessed as fired from an east-south-easterly direction. Moreover, the SMM observed one ricochet assessed as an impact of small-arms fire (possible 5.45mm) in the southern wall of a heating container. The SMM observed two houses south-east of the railway line. One house had a broken upstairs window. Another house had damage to the gate of a house. The SMM was unable to further assess the damage.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned sites the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 210mm) north of government-controlled Tsukuryne (38km west of Donetsk), and another surface-to-air missile system (9K33) south of government-controlled Novohrodivka (50km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-4) with a mounted 76mm gun near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). Aerial imagery recorded between 20 and 22 January, revealed the presence of armoured combat vehicles: three armoured vehicles and new trenches and prepared positions near Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), one near “DPR”-controlled Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk), one in areas not controlled by the Government south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, and three near government-controlled Chernenko (23km north-east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a building with a position consisting of sandbags at the rooftop and a person with a long barrelled sniper rifle.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians. (See SMM Daily Report 19 January.) The JCCC did not report any progress on mine clearance. For the first time in a year, the SMM, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces General at the JCCC and “LPR” members, could proceed for about 11km north of road M03 between Debaltseve and Svitlodarsk.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line in Kherson region on 22 and 23 January in the areas around Chonhar (167km south-east of Kherson) and Arabat Spit (205km south-east of Kherson) and observed a calm situation. In Chonhar, at the Asker encampment, the SMM noticed that out of seven tents previously seen only three were still standing. The SMM also observed that the adjacent Ukrainian Armed Forces position usually occupied by a platoon size unit located some 200m north of the Asker encampment, was abandoned and largely dismantled.

The SMM observed conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at a newly refurbished floor of the dormitory for IDPs in Kherson and spoke to four IDPs (two women and two men). They expressed satisfaction with the quality of the accommodation. The SMM observed the premises to be new, in a good condition and adequately equipped.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. Based on this information the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Due to the lack of security guarantees and the potential threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM could not travel east due to the lack of security guarantees and potential mine threats. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC on site said that anti-tank mines were still present on the road to Petrivske via Viktorivka.

• In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), armed men said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM on the road leading west due to mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint west of Pikuzy, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM on the road leading east due to mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-The SMM could not cross the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were still mines on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint prevented the SMM from traveling on the road between Popasna and government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). The personnel said that the road had not been demined. The SMM also saw a wooden barrier blocking the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel refused SMM’s access to a location allegedly holding weapons but which has not previously been visited. After calling their commander, the personnel suggested that SMM return the next day.

Conditional access:

-At a checkpoint about 1km west of government-controlled Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia (52km north of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel ordered the SMM to open the trunks of its two vehicles in order to search them. They carefully inspected the bags and tool boxes contained in both vehicles. The incident lasted for ten minutes.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.