Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations between the evenings of 20 and 21 January and the previous reporting period, and more from the evenings of 21 to 22 January. The Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region from the evening of 20 to 21 January compared with the previous reporting period and more from the evenings of 21 to 22 January. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling to an apartment building in Yasynuvata. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* It reviewed video footage from the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska which revealed ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 19 and 20 January. The SMM observed the presence of Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the Zolote disengagement area. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted four Ukrainian Armed Forces military positions near the water filtration station between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. The SMM assessed five ammunition boxes near “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi as matching the size and shape of multiple-launch rocket system rounds. The Mission noted the need for repairs to essential infrastructure near government-controlled Marinka and Novhorodske. It visited one border area currently outside of government control.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region from the evenings of 20 to 21 January to the previous reporting period, including about 60 explosions (62 in the previous reporting period). In the following 24-hour period the SMM recorded 72 explosions and 31 projectiles in Donetsk region. The majority of the aforementioned violations were observed in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata for more than five hours during the day on 21 January, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-3km west and north-west.

In the afternoon of 22 January the SMM camera in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east followed by 27 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west. While positioned in Yasynuvata for less than five hours on 22 January the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 2-7km west. Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) for about three hours on the same day, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire, including about seven minutes of continuous fire, all 2-4km north-west and five undetermined explosions and 17 bursts of small-arms fire 5km north-north-east.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 20 January the SMM heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing 122mm artillery rounds and two explosions assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar rounds, all 3-4km south-east. While in Svitlodarsk on 21 and 22 January the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing 122mm artillery rounds 4-5km south-west and south-south-west, five explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-west, and three undetermined explosions 5-7km south and south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) on the morning of 22 January the SMM recorded 15 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and their impacts 4-5km east and one undetermined explosion 3km east.

In Luhansk region from the evenings of 20 to 21 January the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations and no explosions, compared with 40 explosions in the previous reporting period. From the evenings of 21 to 22 January the SMM recorded five explosions in the Luhansk region.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) on 21 January the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 2.5km north-east.

Positioned nearly 2km north-west of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 22 January the SMM heard three explosions assessed as mortar rounds 8-10km north-east.

The SMM observed fresh damage to an apartment building in Yasynuvata. The SMM saw a broken window on the first floor of an apartment building which it assessed as having been caused by an undetermined round. The Mission noted that the round had also penetrated a wall within the apartment. Another apartment building had damage to the roof and wall. The SMM did not observe any signs of an explosion. A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a relative of the owner of the apartment told the SMM that the round had not exploded. The JCCC officer also told the Mission that the round had hit the building at about 20:40 on 21 January and had been removed by “DPR” members about three hours later.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

After midnight on 19 January the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one shot and one burst of small-arms fire 1.9km south and 1.8km south-south east, respectively, of the camera’s location. Both episodes were assessed as having occurred inside the disengagement zone.

After midnight on 20 January the camera recorded, in sequence: three shots assessed as outgoing rounds from a large calibre weapon about 800m south-south-west, consistent with the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge; one outgoing shot about 1.7km south-south-east, consistent with an “LPR”-controlled area; and three outgoing projectiles assessed as rocket-propelled-grenade rounds in flight in a northerly to southerly trajectory at an unknown distance south. Less than 20 minutes later the camera recorded near simultaneous fire from three points, consistent with previously observed Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, all impacting within about a 100m radius of an area consistent with previously observed “LPR” positions: four outgoing projectiles in flight from north to south at an unknown distance south, two outgoing projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west 1.6km south, and one burst of 30 rounds from an unknown weapon 700m south-south-west. All of the ceasefire violations described above were assessed as having occurred inside the disengagement zone.

On 21 January, inside the government-controlled side of the Zolote disengagement area, the Mission observed one camouflaged light truck (HMMWV), two camouflaged jeeps (with military licence plates) and five to six men who identified themselves as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of assigned areas, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). The SMM noted that six mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 33 towed howitzers (30 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm and three D-48, 85mm) and 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing, all as previously noted.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At sites in areas not controlled by the Government the Mission observed that five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and one multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing, as previously noted. At government-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 tanks (T-72) and six mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and two M120-15) were missing. Two of the mortars (M-120-15) were noted as missing for the first time. The Mission also observed a new weapon for the first time.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) near Stanytsia Luhanska, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck (Ural) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Near Lebedynske the SMM observed three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers attempting to launch a UAV.

Near “LRP”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed five stationary trucks carrying boxes of ammunition assessed as matching the shape and size of MLRS (BM-21) rockets and seven other trucks carrying additional boxes. The trucks were guarded by armed men.

Near government-controlled Sartana (14km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed fresh vehicle tracks assessed as belonging to self-propelled howitzers (2S1). A civilian told the Mission that “six tracked vehicles with big guns” had been seen on the night of 18-19 January.

On 21 January an SMM mini UAV recorded four military positions in government-controlled areas between Avdiivka and highway H-20, one of which appeared to be under construction. An SMM patrol observed one of the positions located on the highway, about 200m east of the Donetsk water filtration station, and noted a Ukrainian flag at the position.

The SMM monitored the condition of essential infrastructure near the contact line. On 21 January the Deputy Head of the Marinka District Administration told the SMM that the provision of gas from the local gas distribution station had not yet been restored. According to him, since June 2016 seven requests had been sent to the JCCC yet security guarantees had not been provided by “DPR” members. On 17 January the Ukrainian Armed Forces liaison officer of the JCCC had told the SMM that five requests for security guarantees regarding the gas supply in Marinka and the surrounding area had been made since July 2016.

On 22 January the SMM visited a phenol factory in government-controlled Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). The director of the factory told the Mission that the factory used dangerous chemical substances and that some of the infrastructure, including a chemical waste reservoir, was in need of repair work. The SMM noted that the reservoir was near critical water resources for the region and was located between “DPR” and Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, with about 400m separating the sides.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians (See SMM Daily Report 19 January). The JCCC did not report any progress in mine clearance. 

The SMM visited a border area currently not under the control of the Government. While at the “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) border crossing point for just over one hour the SMM saw nine trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to exit Ukraine, all with their cargo areas covered. The SMM also observed a civilian vehicle with an “LPR” plate parked in the border area.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• Due to the lack of security guarantees and the potential threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 21 January a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the Mission that it could not assist in ensuring the SMM’s safety if it travelled east from Bohdanivka towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). He also indicated that anti-tank mines were still present on the road to Petrivske via Viktorivka.
• On 21 January Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present at the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the disengagement area in the previous 24 hours and that the safety of the SMM could not be guaranteed due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO in the area. Based on this information the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 21 January at two separate Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoints located between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from proceeding. In one case they said that the area had not been demined and that further permission from Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters was required for the SMM to pass and in the other case they said that the road was closed to vehicle and pedestrian traffic. On 22 January the SMM was again told by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel that the area had not been demined and that further permission from Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters was required for the SMM to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC on all three occasions.
• On 22 January the Mission was prevented from travelling from Katerynivka to Popasna due to the presence of a barricade across the road. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that they had no orders to allow the Mission to pass but that the SMM was free to proceed by foot or remove the barricade and proceed by vehicle. Due to the presence of a mine sign on the barricade, the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• On both 21 and 22 January a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. Based on this information the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Zolote disengagement area. Due to the danger of mines the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January the SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January near government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to access the yard of a house in order to determine the model of a military vehicle in the yard. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander stopped the SMM and asked if any Russian Federation nationals were part of the patrol. The Mission refused to provide this information and was not allowed to pass the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint near government-controlled Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol) did not allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint due to the alleged presence of mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 January armed men at a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) did not allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint due to the alleged presence of mines on the road. The Mission informed the JCCC.

Conditional:

• On 21 January the SMM was delayed for nearly 20 minutes at a checkpoint near Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) after “DPR” members visually examined the trunks of the SMM vehicles before allowing the patrol to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.