Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 January 2017

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions to those recorded in the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Olenivka, and observed damage caused by shelling in Novoselivka. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* In Lopaskyne, the SMM was denied access by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel waving a gun; and in Pikuzy the SMM could not proceed as “DPR” members did not remove mines despite the presence of Russian Federation Armed Forces Major-General of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination.The Mission continued to monitor weapons’ withdrawal. The Mission facilitated and monitored repairs of essential infrastructure in Orikhove, Krasnyi Lyman and in Slovianoserbsk. The SMM observed a demonstration in Kyiv.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including 62 explosions (41 in the previous reporting period).

Positioned at noon in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 3-7km west-north-west over a period of one hour, and intermittent small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 1-5km west-north-west. Around the same time, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-west.   

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 19-20 January the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 3-6km south and south-west, one undetermined explosion 2-4km south and small-arms fire 2-3km south-east.

Positioned north-east of “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 7-10km south-south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-7km south. Positioned on the edge of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-7km north-north-west. Positioned in Sakhanka, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts of small-arms-fire at an undetermined distance west. Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion to the north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations to those recorded in the previous reporting period, including 40 explosions (58 in the previous reporting period). 

Over a period of 40 minutes in the morning positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 5km south-west and 13 shots of small-arms fire 1km west.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions assessed as artillery fire and 65 bursts of heavy machine-gun fire. The SMM assessed them to be part of a live-fire exercise outside the security zone.       

At noon, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as 82mm mortar fire, 5-6km south-south-west.

On 17 January, the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an exchange of fire between what were assessed to be Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” positions. At 19:08, the camera recorded one shot of small-arms fire, 150m south-south-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). At 19:15, the camera recorded one shot of small-arms fire, 1km south; between 19:50 to 19:55, the camera recorded multiple bursts of light-machine-gun fire, 330m south-west; and at 19:57, the camera recorded one shot of small-arms fire, 2km south-south-east (all assessed as outside of the disengagement area). Between 21:08 to 21:29, the camera recorded five shots assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire 800m south-south-west (assessed as inside of the disengagement area). From 21:38 to 21:46, the camera recorded ten undetermined explosions, 330m south-south-west; and at 21:38, the camera recorded two undetermined explosions, 1.7km south (all assessed as outside of the disengagement area). At 21:41, the camera recorded one undetermined explosion, 760m south-south-west (assessed as inside of the disengagement area). At 21:52, the camera recorded two outgoing rounds, 1.8km south-south-west and two impacts, 700m south-south-west all assessed as automatic grenade launcher fire (all assessed as inside of the disengagement area). At 23:36, the camera recorded one undetermined explosion, 1.8km south (assessed as inside of the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk). At the Donetsk Trauma Hospital the SMM spoke to a woman (51 years old) with a bandaged leg who said she had been wounded in firing at the entry-exit checkpoint in Olenivka. She said that the bus on which she had been travelling was struck by a bullet at around 08:20 as it made its way through the checkpoint, at the last booth. Medical staff said her wound was caused by explosive injuries but whether by shrapnel or a bullet could not be determined.

The SMM observed damage to civilian infrastructure in government-controlled Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) where it observed six impact sites. At the first site, in Myra Street, the SMM saw a large hole in the south-facing wall of a shed in front of the house, with damage to the iron door and windows broken. The owner showed fragments of a shell. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar fired from a south-south-easterly direction. At a second site in Myra Street, SMM observed an impact on a concrete wall of an animal coop facing south. A wall had almost completely collapsed and it had been partially repaired. SMM also observed broken windows. The owner showed fragments of a shell. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar fired from a south-south-easterly direction. At a third site in Myra Street, the SMM saw a crater covered by snow near an iron fence surrounding the house. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar fired from a south-south-easterly direction. At a fourth site in Svobody Street, SMM saw a crater covered by snow on the sidewalk, and damage to a concrete electric pole and to trees. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar but was unable to assess the direction of the fire. At a fifth site, an empty field at the eastern outskirts of the village, 50 meters south-east of the closest house, the SMM saw a crater on the ground, about 4m wide and at least 1.8m deep, partially covered by snow, assessed as caused by 152mm artillery but the SMM was unable to assess the direction of the fire. At a sixth site in Svobody Street, the SMM saw an impact on the ground between two houses that had already been covered with sand. The SMM saw damages to the two houses (broken windows) but was unable to assess the direction of the fire. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and residents (six men and three women, all middle-aged) said that shelling had taken place on 14 January.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM observed a calm situation. When arriving at the camera site, the SMM saw a “DPR” member present at the location.

On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that in early morning, the first Ukrainian Armed Forces position had come under fire. The SMM did not observe any impacts. He informed the SMM that no de-mining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours. While at the “LPR”-controlled side of the disengagement area, an armed “LPR” member said that “LPR” members had been ordered not to comment on anything to the SMM. He said in early morning the “LPR” positions on the hill had come under fire.

On the government-controlled side of the Zolote disengagement area the Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the previous 24 hours and that he had not received any information on any planned demining activities.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, the SMM observed three self-propelled howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) east of government-controlled Pylypchatyne (74km north-west of Donetsk). In government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces convoy of trucks loaded with three self-propelled artillery (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) moving west. While south of Svitlodarsk the SMM observed a mortar (120mm) on a stationary truck.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of assigned areas, the SMM observed a mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) towed by a military truck near government-controlled Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), moving west.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 15 howitzers (eight self-propelled (2S1), five towed (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), and two towed howitzers (D30, 122mm)). One howitzer (2A65) was missing as previously noted.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed that the following weapons were missing: 109 tanks (68 T-64, 15 of which were observed absent for the first time; and 41 T-72), 20 mortars (2B9) and seven anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak) near government-controlled Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), an armoured vehicle near Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-3) near Kamyshne (31km north-east of Luhansk). In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed three APCs (MTLB) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and three APCs (one BRDM-2, one BTR, and one BTR-80) in an area about 7km east of Donetsk city centre.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repair works co-ordinated by the JCCC on a section of railway line near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), part of regular maintenance work for the facilitation of both freight and civilian transport across the contact line. The SMM monitored also repair works on water wells located in the area of “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), regular maintenance work on the complimentary water pipeline to the Karbonit main pipeline.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians (See SMM Daily Report 19 January). The JCCC offered no evidence of co-ordinated mine clearance. 

“DPR” members refused to remove anti-tank and anti-personnel mines observed by the SMM to allow SMM to proceed through a checkpoint to T0519 road in Pikuzy. A Russian Federation Armed Forces Major-General of the JCCC, who was present, said that he could not facilitate the removal of the mines.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), during its stay, the SMM observed 14 civilian cars and a bus queuing to proceed toward government-controlled areas and 28 civilian cars queuing in the opposite direction. At government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 80 civilian cars and 30 pedestrians queuing to proceed into government-controlled areas as well as 20 civilian cars and four trucks with International Committee of the Red Cross logos queuing in the opposite direction. At 15:40 the SMM observed 14 trucks marked with “Rinat Akhmetov Aid” and 20 civilian cars queuing towards non-government-controlled area. At government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 110 civilian vehicles and at least 200 pedestrians queuing to cross toward non-government-controlled areas, while 105 civilian vehicles, one bus and approximately 150 pedestrians were queuing in the opposite direction. In government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), at 09:00, the SMM observed 64 civilian vehicles and 20 pedestrians travelling towards non-government-controlled areas while 251 civilian vehicles and 20 pedestrians were heading in the opposite direction. In “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), at 09:35, the SMM observed 43 civilian vehicles travelling to non-government-controlled areas, and seven civilian vehicles and five buses (approximately 20 passengers in each) heading in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored a march in central Kyiv marking the third anniversary of what the participants called the “active phase” of the Maidan protests. About 100 people (90 per cent men, mostly young and middle aged) gathered on Independence Square. The SMM observed red-and-black flags emblazoned with “OUN” (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), blue and yellow flags (not national flags), and others with skulls and “Bank Rebellion” written on them. Some participants held signs with “White Hammer” and “Warrior Hammer” written on them. Marchers walked to Mykhaila Нrushevskoho Street, where the SMM saw about 100 National Guards and 50 police officers. One marcher attempted to set tyres on fire but was stopped by riot police. Soon after, riot police forcibly entered the crowd and seized tyres. Protestors then walked back to Independence Square and dispersed peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member said he could not guarantee the safety of the SMM to travel west from Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). Due to the lack of security guarantees and the potential threat from mines, the SMM could not travel west. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in “LPR” side of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM asked an armed “LPR” member if any demining activities had taken place since its last visit the previous day, whereupon he advised the SMM to contact “LPR” members in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), as armed “LPR” members at checkpoints were not authorized to give such information. Without any official confirmation on the demining of the adjacent roads and areas of the main road to government-controlled areas, the SMM decided not to proceed further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM attempted to travel south-east along a residential road towards the railway tracks. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no de-mining activities had taken place in the disengagement area in the previous 24 hours and that the safety of the SMM could not be guaranteed due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO in the area. Based on this information the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint located between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from proceeding saying that the area had not been de-mined and that further permission from Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters was required for the SMM to pass. The SMM also observed a barricade 500 meters further up the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in the disengagement area in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), an Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no de-mining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours and that with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO. Based on this information the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members in Pikuzy denied the SMM access to the T0519 road in the direction of Mariupol and refused to remove anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, which the SMM observed at the checkpoint. The Russian Federation Armed Forces Major-General of the JCCC, who was also present, said that he could not facilitate the SMM’s freedom of movement.
• In government-controlled Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel standing at the entrance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint raised his hands making gestures and trying to prevent the SMM from proceeding further. Seconds later, he raised a pistol into the air, in what the SMM assessed was an attempt to scare off the SMM. The SMM immediately turned the cars to a safe distance, approximately 90m from the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. He then approached the SMM without carrying any weapons. He told the SMM that access would not be granted and refused to identify himself and his rank. The incident lasted 15 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional:

• Armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM at an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and demanded that three SMM members exit their vehicle. They questioned the SMM members on how long they have been working for the Mission and asked one of them what her previous job had been. After answering these questions, the SMM was allowed to proceed after a 20-minute delay.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.