Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded an increase in the overall number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, noting, however, a similar number involving mortar, artillery and tank fire compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, but a similar number of explosions. The SMM assessed an impact site in Debaltseve. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines and continued to monitor weapons withdrawal. The SMM monitored repair of electricity lines in Debaltseve and resumption of water supply from Artema pumping station in areas of Luhansk region. The Mission visited one border crossing point currently not under government control. The SMM monitored the situation of IDPs in Ivano-Frankivsk.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including around 365 explosions, compared with 350 in the previous reporting period. The SMM noted a similar number of explosions assessed as caused by artillery, mortars or tanks (163 compared with 179).

On the night of 12-13 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 87 explosions assessed as artillery rounds (66 assessed as caused by 122mm impacts, 20 as outgoing 122mm rounds, and one as outgoing of unknown calibre) 2-8km north-east, south-east and south. The SMM also heard 43 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (21 assessed as 120mm impacts, six assessed as outgoing 120mm rounds, 16 assessed as 82mm impacts), 25 explosions assessed as outgoing tank rounds, 28 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry-fighting-vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, 44 shots assessed as IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire (30mm), two bursts of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) and intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east and south.

During the day on 13 January, in the same location, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-east.

On the night of 12-13 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 99 undetermined explosions 1.5-8km north-west and north-north-west.

On the evening of 12 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions, 7-12km south-west and west. During the day on 13 January from the same location, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an impact of a round from an undetermined weapon 5-7km south-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the evening of 12 January, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-west.

On 13 January, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-5km east and south east, as well as nine undetermined explosions 2-4km west and north-north-west. The same day, within six minutes, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded three undetermined explosions 5-6km north-north-east of the camera’s location.

On 13 January, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 29 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and seven bursts of small-arms fire, 2-3km west-south-west; and 27 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km north-north-west.

On the same day, the SMM camera at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded two illumination flares 7-10km north-east.

On 13 January positioned in “DPR”-controlled Chystiakove (formerly Torez, 62km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west.

On 13 January, positioned in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (unknown calibre) and 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 5-6km north-north-east.

On the evening of 12 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (16km east of Mariupol) recorded one tracer round in flight from east to west, which caused an explosion assessed as an impact, at an unknown distance north of the camera, followed by an exchange consisting of two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west and ten tracer rounds in flight (five from east to west and five from west to east), also at unknown distances north of the camera.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations overall than in the previous reporting period, but a similar number of explosions (130 compared with 135 the day before, of which 70 were assessed as training -related). On the evening of 12 January, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions assessed as artillery rounds 15km west and 90 explosions of artillery rounds, in sequence: 45 assessed as outgoing 5-10km west-south-west; 25 assessed as impacts 20km south-west; eight assessed as impacts 10-15km west-north-west; and 12 assessed as outgoing 5-10km west-north-west.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km south-west.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun-fire 5-8km south-west.

Positioned at an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km west-north-west.

The Mission assessed an impact site in Debaltseve. A Russian Federation officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM about an impact on Krupskoi Street, where the SMM saw a fresh crater next to a small shed between two wooden fences. The crater was 50cm deep and approximately 200cm in diameter. There was shrapnel damage on the shed, wooden fences, and a nearby tree. Two windows of the house behind the shed were broken. The SMM assessed that the impact was caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The Mission observed a calm situation at the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 2-7km west, west-north-west and north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM observed artillery in violation of the respective withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vidrodzhennia (58km north-east of Donetsk), and one self-propelled howitzer on a flatbed truck travelling north on road P22 approximately 4km south of Shyrokyi (38km north-east of Luhansk). Approximately 5km south-south-east of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw three covered self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm, see SMM Daily Report 13 January 2017).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed three tanks (T-64, 125mm) in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (9P140 Uragan, 220mm); eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), and 21 towed howitzers (six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 15 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm).

The SMM noted as missing from such areas 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya,: one missing as of 23 March 2016, seven missing as of 22 July 2016, 12 missing as of 25 November), eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B: one missing as of 14 February 2016, two missing as of 11 March, five missing as of 11 August), and 36 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B: eight missing as of 3 April 2016, six missing as of 21 July, one missing as of 29 July, 12 missing as of 19 August, six missing as of 12 October, three missing as of 13 December). The SMM observed that one site was abandoned, as first noted on 19 August 2016.

The Mission saw an armoured personnel carrier and an armoured combat vehicle [2] as well as trucks in the security zone. On road E58 between the government-controlled areas of Lebedynske and Sopyne (16km north-east and 16km east of Mariupol, respectively) the SMM observed one armoured combat vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) travelling east. Approximately 1.5km south-west of “DPR”-controlled Patriotychne (35km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw one armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) travelling east. In “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a military-type bus with approximately 20 non-civilian passengers on board travelling east. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two military-type trucks with a sign reading “Personnel” in the window, travelling east on road T0504 in the direction of “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk).

Following the completion of repairs of the pipeline at the Petrivka water pumping station (see SMM Daily Report 12 January 2017), a representative of Popasna Vodakanal in Artema informed the SMM that water supply to areas on both sides of the contact line had been fully restored. A representative of Luhansk Voda told the SMM that the water supply in government-controlled areas had been restored on 12 January at 22:00 and that as of 02:00 on 13 January, water supply returned in “LPR”-controlled areas of Luhansk city, Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), Obozne (18km north of Luhansk), and Stukalova Balka (9km north of Luhansk) through the repaired pipeline. In Vesela Hora, a female resident told the SMM that water had been restored the night before, after the village had been without main water supply since the end of December.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of critical infrastructure. In Debaltseve, the SMM observed workers repairing a power line. The DTEK repair team told the SMM that power would be restored the same day. In “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke to a repair team on site from Luhansk Voda, who told the SMM that they had checked the boreholes between the pumping station and the Sieverski Donets river as part of regular maintenance of the water distribution system.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians, including between government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk), and “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk) and Mariupol; the H20 near Yasynuvata; the M03 between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve; and the road bridge at Shchastia.

The Mission visited one border area currently not under control of the government. At the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk the SMM observed, over a period of about an hour: ten civilian cars (eight Russian licence plates and two Ukrainian licence plates) leaving Ukraine and six civilian vehicles, including one bus, entering Ukraine (three Ukrainian licence plates, one Russian licence plate, one Georgian plate, and one “DPR” plate).   

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Uzhgorod, Zakarpattia region (181km west of Ivano-Frankivsk).The SMM met separately with two female IDPs, who said that heating in their hotel had been turned off at the onset of winter. Hotel employees were wearing winter clothing indoors.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present told the SMM that no demining had been taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC headquarters.
• The SMM was unable to travel south-east into Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using a secondary road east of government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk),  as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the Mission due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC headquarters.
• An armed “DPR” member in Petrivske could not ensure safety for the SMM to travel west from the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint prevented the SMM from travelling between Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), saying that anti-tank obstacles were in place on the order of higher command. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member escorted the SMM while monitors accessed the SMM camera.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.