Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar overall number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region but more mortar and artillery explosions compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, with half the number of explosions assessed as live-fire exercises. The SMM assessed impacts sites in Kalynove, Molodizhne and Stanytsia Luhanska, and followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* The SMM monitored the restart of water pumping operations in Artema, and the water supply situation in Avdiivka. The Mission visited two border crossing points currently not under government control.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region, including around 350 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (320 explosions). More of those explosions (179 compared with 70) were assessed as caused by rounds of artillery and mortar.  

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the evening of 11 January the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 5-8km north-west. During the same evening  the SMM camera at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded one undetermined projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, followed by 16 undetermined explosions, all 4-6km north-east. In the early afternoon of the following day the same camera recorded 23 airbursts and one undetermined explosion, all 7-10km north-east.

On the evening of 11 January the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (16km north of Donetsk) recorded 16 undetermined explosions 4-6km east-south-east. During the following day, positioned in Avdiivka for almost four hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 1-2km south. Positioned in government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard six explosions assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south. In the early afternoon the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded in sequence, within 10 minutes,: one undetermined explosion, 55 projectiles (53 from north to south, and two from south to north), one undetermined explosion, three airbursts and one undetermined explosion, all 3-6km east-south-east.

On the evening of 11 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 82 explosions and about 270 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 2-5km east-south-east and south-east. Of those explosions, 51 were assessed as the impacts of mortar rounds, 17 were assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, and 14 were undetermined explosions. During the following day, the SMM heard 12 explosions, two of which were assessed as the impact of artillery rounds, all 2-6km south-east.

On the evening of 11 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 39 undetermined explosions, and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 6-10km north-west.

On the same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the Mission heard 90 explosions assessed as artillery rounds, 24 explosions assessed as mortar rounds (82mm and 120mm), and six undetermined explosions, all 5-7km north-west and south-west.

On the evening of 11 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km north-east of Mariupol), recorded nine tracer rounds in flight from west to east and one undetermined explosion, followed by two tracer rounds (one from east to west and another from south-south-east to north-north-west), at undetermined distances north-east of the camera.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 135 explosions, compared with 65 in the previous reporting period, while 70 of those were assessed as live-fire exercises. Positioned in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5km south. Positioned in government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 4-5km south-east. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 40 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 20-25km south-south-west, which probably originated from a known live-fire training area (outside the security zone). Positioned south of “LPR”-controlled Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as artillery rounds and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km east-south-east, assessed as a live-fire exercise at a known training area (outside the security zone) .

The Mission observed impact sites in this region, too.  In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove the SMM observed a fresh crater in a field10m from a road (25-30m from a residential area), and assessed it had been caused by a recoilless gun (SPG) round fired from a south-westerly direction. Near a checkpoint near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a fresh crater 1m from a road (2km away from an inhabited house) and assessed it had been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction.

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian casualty. At a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) a man (aged 57) told the SMM that he had sustained shrapnel injuries to his left leg while sleeping in his apartment in government controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the previous night. The SMM saw his leg bandages had been stained with blood. Medical staff at the hospital said the man had been admitted to the hospital and immediately taken to surgery.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The Mission observed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel fortifying their southernmost position near the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM saw a large blood stain on the ground near the position. The commander told the SMM that one soldier had been killed by sniper fire during the previous night. Near an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed four fresh craters on the road and assessed they had been caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher (AGS): one crater was located 30m north of checkpoint, the second 40m north of the checkpoint, the third100m north of the checkpoint, and the fourth 100m south of the checkpoint near a parking lot. The SMM also saw an unexploded rocket-propelled grenade stuck in sandbags 20m east of the checkpoint. Subsequently the SMM saw a demining team arrive and heard an explosion, which an “LPR” member said was a controlled detonation. People were asked to move some distance away during the detonation.

Positioned near an “LPR” checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and ten explosions assessed as automatic-grenade launcher (AGS) fire 10km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line the SMM observed three covered self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) 5km south-south-east of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed nine tanks (T-64).

The Mission revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the relevant withdrawal line, and verified that all weapons previously observed as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM also revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the relevant withdrawal line. Three tanks were missing: two (T-64 and T-72) were first noted as absent on 13 December 2016 and one (T-64) absent for the first time.

The Mission saw an armoured personnel carrier (Saxon) [2] in the security zone near government-controlled Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), together with five military trucks heading south-east.

The SMM observed, for the first time, two concrete obstacles with mine hazard signs (green boards with green script) on them in the middle of a road near government-controlled Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission monitored the restart of water pumping operations, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk). A representative of Popasna Vodakanal informed the SMM that repairs of the pipeline the Petrivka water pumping station had been completed (see SMM Daily Report 12 January 2017). At 10:00, the SMM observed a gauge inside the station that indicated water pressure had returned after engineers turned the pump on.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In Avdiivka the SMM observed the water supply had been cut. A woman (in her thirties) told the SMM that there had been no water supply since 19:00 11 January due to shelling. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC in Avdiivka stated that the electricity supply to the Donetsk water filtration station had been damaged by shelling previous night.

The Mission visited two border areas currently not under control of the government. At the border crossing point in Novoazovsk the SMM observed, over a period of about 20 minutes: ten civilian cars and two commercial trucks (all Ukrainian licence plates) leaving Ukraine. Positioned at the same location the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-7km north. At the Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) border crossing point the SMM, over 25 minutes, saw one pedestrian (woman aged 55) leave Ukraine. 

On 11 January the SMM visited two border crossing points in Vinnytsia region along the Transdniestrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border. The SMM noted a calm situation at the Bolhan border crossing point (208km east of Chernivtsi) and Studena Border Guard Station (217km east of Chernivtsi).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present told the SMM that no demining had been taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel south-east into Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using a secondary road east of government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk),  as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the Mission due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Due to the residual threat of mines and UXO, the SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side. An armed “LPR” member said there had been no further demining activities on these routes. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “DPR” member in Petrivske could not ensure safety for the SMM to travel west from the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions, the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and Popasna due to the presence of anti-tank obstacles and mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to proceed on the road leading north from “DPR”-controlled Tavrycheske (35km north-east of Mariupol) as armed men told the SMM that the area was contaminated with UXO and was often shelled. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member escorted the SMM while monitors accessed the SMM camera.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve an armed woman delayed the SMM for 27 minutes, before it was allowed to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from passing. The SMM informed the JCCC and after 31 minutes the SMM was allowed to pass.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a heavy weapons holding area denied access to the site. The SMM informed the JCCC and after about one hour the SMM was allowed to enter. Access was granted for the first time since 8 November 2016.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.