Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed impact sites and damage to civilian homes in Krynychne. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, but its access remained restricted.* The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM observed unexploded ordnance on the road near an entry-exit checkpoint at the contact line. The SMM monitored repairs to a railway line that crosses the contact line in Luhansk region. The Mission monitored one border crossing point currently not under government control. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on both sides of the contact line.*

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, including about 144 explosions (compared with 70 explosions), mostly in the area of the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle.

On the evening of 3 January, the SMM camera in Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city) recorded an exchange of fire that included 93 undetermined explosions, 15 undetermined projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, three undetermined projectiles from south-east to north-west, and four illumination flares, beginning with one illumination flare and one undetermined projectile in flight from south-east to north-west, all 6-10km north-east from the camera.

On 4 January, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for more than five hours, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, 35 shots of small-arms fire and uncountable, overlapping shots of small-arms fire for about an hour, all 1-3km west or north-west.

On 4 January, positioned at Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west and one undetermined explosion 1km south.

On the evening of 3 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-10km south-east, two bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire and about 30 bursts of small-arms fire 2-5km south-east. On 4 January, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5-10km south-east, two bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire and about ten bursts of small-arms fire 2-7km south-east.

During the evening hours of 3 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 5km south-west and saw one illumination flare in flight from north-west to south-east 4-5km to the west.

On 4 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 6-10km north-west.

During the evening hours of 3 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded three rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east followed by one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from south to north, 16 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, one illumination flare in flight from east to west, and two undetermined explosions, all at unknown distances north-east. 

On 4 January, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and ten bursts and four single shots of small-arms fire at unknown distances to the south or south-south-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, including 48 explosions (compared with two explosions). For over 30 minutes on 4 January, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), for over about 30 minutes the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions more than 10km west.

The SMM observed impact sites and damage to residential areas. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) led the SMM to damaged houses and impact sites in government-controlled Krynychne (67km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM observed broken windows on three houses on Krynychne Street. The Mission observed three craters, all approximately 1m in diameter, in a field nearby and assessed that they were caused by 122mm artillery shells and that the direction of fire was from the east-south-east. Approximately 300m south-east, the SMM observed a house with two broken windows and a crater located 5m away from the house, approximately 1m in diameter. The trees around the crater were shredded and one had been cut in half. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage here were also caused by 122mm artillery shells and that the direction of fire was from the east-south-east. The SMM observed that another house had two broken windows. The elderly man and woman living in the house told the SMM that the shelling had happened the night of 22-23 December. The SMM spoke with Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel who told the SMM that they were living in houses in the settlement and that shelling had taken place on 22-23 December.  A Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer of the JCCC led the SMM to another crater in a field approximately 80m south of the road, which was about 5m in diameter with a large amount of earth thrown up around the crater. The SMM assessed that it was caused by high-calibre artillery fired from the east-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 2 January, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one flash assessed as an outgoing explosion of an undetermined weapon about 200m south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and four minutes later, one flash assessed as an impact from the round of an undetermined weapon about 300m south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 4 January, approximately 100m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position between the last respective government and “LPR” checkpoints north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed the remnants of what it assessed to be part of a rocket-propelled grenade. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces position north of the bridge, the SMM saw fresh bullet holes in tyres near concrete blocks and noted that the camouflage covering the concrete blocks as well as the tyres appeared to have been recently burnt.

Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and “LPR” members separately told the SMM that there had been exchanges of fire in the vicinity of Stanytsia Luhanska over five hours during the night of 3-4 January.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Zolote disengagement area, and noted no demining activities or fencing off of mines.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Petrivske disengagement area, and no demining activities or fencing off of mines. Armed “DPR” members insisted on escorting the Mission to the SMM camera location.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of storage sites, the SMM saw three tanks in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).  In government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw two tanks (T-72) being towed north on flatbed trucks travelling on Belousova Street.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six pieces of towed artillery (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), and 21 self-propelled howitzers (12 - 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 9 - 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm).

The SMM noted as missing 16 anti-tank guns (MT-12, five missing as of 19 July 2016, one missing as of 19 April 2016, ten missing as of 3 November 2016), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1, all missing as of 3 March 2016), seven towed howitzers (six D-20, 152mm, all missing as of 10 November 2016 and one 2A65, missing as of 15 February 2016).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one stationary infantry fight vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) on the northern edge of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), one stationary IFV (BMP-2) north-east of Popasna, two anti-tank guns (likely ZiS-3, 76mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) fitted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Krynychne.  The SMM also saw three stationary APCs (2 MT-LB, 1 MT-LBu) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the vicinity of an entry-exit checkpoint along the contact line. Between the entry-exit government-checkpoint in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and the entry-exit “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed UXO, marked by a plastic drum and branch, assessed as a piece of unexploded shoulder-launched ammunition. The UXO was located approximately 600m south-west of the “DPR” checkpoint on frozen tyre tracks in the snow in middle of the road. The SMM spoke with a civilian, who told the SMM about the UXO and said he had placed the improvised markings near the UXO to make drivers and pedestrians aware of the danger. At the “DPR” checkpoint during the morning hours, the SMM observed more than 95 vehicles, including one bus, queuing to enter government-controlled areas and two cars waiting to cross into non-government controlled areas.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of a railway track that crosses the contact line in government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited one border area currently not under control of the government. At the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 21 passenger vehicles (18 with Ukrainian licence plates and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and three buses (all with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. In 65 minutes, the SMM observed 16 pedestrians exit Ukraine and 45 pedestrians, six passenger vehicles and two trucks entering Ukraine. An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that vehicles with “LPR” plates are permitted by “LPR” to cross into the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel into the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using secondary roads on the government-controlled side as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC told the SMM they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the possible presence of mines in those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side, as an armed “LPR” member said there had been no further demining activities in these areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM was unable to travel west toward the disengagement area, as an armed man told the SMM that no demining had been conducted. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM was unable to travel east toward the disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had been conducted and he could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the presence of mines.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint did not allow the SMM to travel between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) from both directions saying the area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel south from the Shchastia bridge, as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), three armed “LPR” members told the SMM that they could not access the area. An armed “commander” arrived then and granted the SMM access to the area. After proceeding, another armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM and told it to leave the area immediately. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member escorted the SMM while it accessed the SMM camera.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.