Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 December 2016

Fewer ceasefire violations were recorded in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM was restricted in its movement in the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.* The SMM monitored repair works to essential infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, in Orikhove, Zolote and Krasnyi Lyman. The SMM monitored the Novoazovsk border crossing point, an area currently not under government control.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 159 explosions compared with about 300 in the previous reporting period.[1]

During the night of 12-13 December, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded exchanges beginning with one explosion and 28 tracer rounds in flight from south to north and four undetermined projectiles (two in flight from north to south and two from south to north), all 4-6km east and south-east of the camera. One airburst was recorded 2-3km east. The camera also recorded seven undetermined explosions in areas 6-10km south-east. On the afternoon of 13 December the camera recorded nine explosions assessed as impacts 4-5km south-east of the camera. The camera also recorded 11 undetermined projectiles in flight from west to east 2-3km east.

On the evening and night of 12 December the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded ten undetermined explosions 6-10km north-east. The camera also recorded 62 undetermined projectiles (37 in flight from north to south, 20 from south to north, three from south-west to north-east and two from east to west), 101 tracer rounds of which 81 were in flight from south to north and 20 from north to south, all 5-12km north-east of the camera. On 13 December the same camera recorded two airbursts 5-7km north-east and three undetermined projectiles (one in flight from west to east and two from south-west to north-east), all 7-10km north-east of the camera.

On the night of 12-13 December, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 50 tracer rounds assessed as small-arms fire in the following sequence: nine rounds from north-west to south-east, 12 from south-east to north-west, seven from north to north-east, two from north-east to north and 20 from north to north-east.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 12 December, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 8km south-west and heard and saw bursts of tracer fire assessed as from an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) or an anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) 5km south-east.

While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 60 undetermined explosions, 57 of which were 5-10km north-west and the remainder, 6-10km west. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed to be impacts 5-6km west.

Positioned near government-controlled Vilne (70km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 5km east.

In Luhansk region the SMM observed more ceasefire violations, including 27 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period. On the night of 12 December, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within 20 minutes, 20 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-5km north-west and 20 impacts 10km west.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two fresh impacts, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, and saw three mortar fins. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier said the checkpoint had been shelled on the night of 12 December but no one had been injured.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 6-8km south-west and west, outside the disengagement area. An armed “DPR” member in Petrivske told the SMM that a checkpoint on the northern edge of the village would no longer be used (SMM Daily Report, 13 December). Later, the SMM saw two armed “DPR” members positioned at the checkpoint.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed five towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and 15 trucks stationary next to a road near government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed five howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on trucks heading east in government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm). The SMM observed 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and five towed howitzers (2A36) absent for the first time.  One towed howitzer (2A36) was observed absent, as first noted on 29 July 2016. Two sites continued to be abandoned, one as first observed on 14 October, its two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) missing. A second site, first observed abandoned on 19 August 2016, continued to be so with all 14 towed howitzers (eight 2A65, Msta-B, 152 mm and six towed howitzers (2A36) absent.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited a location and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the following armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone: nine armoured vehicles (MT-LB) stationary near government-controlled Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM monitored repair works on a section of Shypilovo-Sentianivka railway line near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). In Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM monitored as the Popasna water company repaired a pipeline that had been damaged in shelling. The SMM’s monitoring enabled repairs to water wells near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) carried out by the Luhansk water company.

The SMM monitored the Ukraine-Russian Federation border in areas not controlled by the Government. At the Novoazovsk border crossing point (101km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed, in the course of 30 minutes, five cars and two trucks enter Ukraine and ten cars and three trucks exit. All had Ukrainian licence plates.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not travel on the road between government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC said they could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM as they did not control the road. Mines were visible on the road. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC said they did not know when mines would be removed.
• An armed “DPR” member in Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that he could not guarantee security for the SMM if it travelled west from the village. The SMM could not travel further and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk) as armed “LPR” members said they could not guarantee the safety of the SMM.
• The SMM observed a sign warning of the presence of mines near an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). Due to the threat from mines, the SMM could not access the road toward the railway bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM observed that the road west of Prince Ihor monument (on the edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area) was blocked by anti-tank obstacles preventing further travel. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and denied further travel towards government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM required the permission of Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters to be allowed to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Anti-tank obstacles on the road prevented the SMM from travelling between government-controlled Popasna and government-controlled Katerynivka. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) in either direction as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines in the area and an “LPR” member said no demining had taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander denied the SMM further travel toward Troitske and threatened to assault a monitor. The SMM informed the JCCC and left 15 minutes later.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces at a checkpoint near Troitske denied the SMM access to the town, citing fighting in the area. The SMM did not hear fighting. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 45 minutes the SMM left the location.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound near Donske (57km south of Donetsk), where a visit had been co-ordinated with the JCCC. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member denied the SMM access to a compound in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Rozkvit (47km north-east of Luhansk) and asked about the nationalities of patrol members, which the SMM refused to provide. After 27 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.