Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 12 December 2016
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the period between the evenings of 10 and 11 December. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling in Sakhanka and Popasna. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where no further progress was noted. The SMM was restricted in its access to those areas, as no demining activity had taken place.* The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons on both sides of the contact line, and noted weapons missing from assigned areas. It followed up on reports of water shortages near Luhansk city. The SMM monitored one border area currently outside government control.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including nearly 300 explosions, compared with the period between the evenings of 10 and 11 December (about 100 explosions) [1]. Of those explosions, more than 250 were recorded during the night of 11-12 December.
During the night of 11-12 December, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 184 undetermined explosions 4-6 and 7-10km north-west.
During the same night the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 25 undetermined explosions, 49 undetermined projectiles (35 in flight from westerly to easterly directions, nine from easterly to westerly direction and five from southerly to northerly directions), and 25 tracer rounds (15 from westerly to easterly directions and ten from south to north), beginning with one undetermined explosion and ten tracer rounds from south-west to north-east, and one projectile from south-west to north-east, all 3-5km south-east of the camera. The camera also recorded two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP) travelling east on a road E-50 2.7km south of the camera location (government-controlled). They stopped and fired 16 rocket-assisted projectiles east-north-east, before heading back west. On the afternoon of 12 December the same camera recorded one airburst, one explosion assessed as the impact of a round from an unknown weapon and 11 undetermined explosions, all 2-3km east-south-east.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 112 undetermined explosions at locations 1-5km between south-west and west. The most intense ceasefire violations were observed between 13:12 and 13:23, when the SMM recorded 69 undetermined explosions 1-4km west.
During the night of 11 December while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds and three explosions as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds and nine undetermined explosions, all 6-7km north-west; and ten undetermined explosions 7-8km west. During the same night while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as the impacts of 82mm mortar rounds and 15 undetermined explosions, all 4-6km south-south-east.
During the evening of 11 December the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded an exchange of bursts of tracer rounds, starting with two illumination flares in flight from west to east and six bursts of tracer rounds from south-west to north-east, followed by 75 bursts of tracer rounds (46 from west to east, six from north-east to south-west, three from south to north, 20 from south-east to north-west), all at an undetermined distance north and north-east of the camera. The following day, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from an unknown weapon south-south-west and two undetermined explosions west, all at undetermined distances. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard nine explosions as the impacts of rounds from unknown weapons 500m north-west.
In Luhansk region the SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations, including 14 explosions, compared with the period between the evenings of 10 and 11 December (about 100 explosions). Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 14 explosions (eight of which were assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and six of which were assessed as the impacts of mortar rounds), all 5-6km north-west.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka the SMM accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), “DPR” members and mass media, observed five fresh impacts and assessed four to be caused by 122mm artillery rounds and the other by an 82mm mortar round, all probably fired from directions between west-north-west and north-west. At the first site, the SMM saw a crater in soil 20m from a school building, shrapnel damage to a wall and metal door, and broken windows on the first and second floors of the building. At the second there was a large hole on the north-west corner wall of the school building and damage to its windows. At the third the SMM saw the collapsed ceiling of an inhabited house. At the fourth the Mission observed a crater in an agricultural field near the house and the school. At the fifth there was shrapnel damage to metal doors of a garage. The director of the school told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the previous morning.
In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and mass media, observed a fresh crater in a field 75m from a government checkpoint and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. As a result of non-compliance with the provisions of the TCG’s decision, the SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.
During the night of 8-9 December the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded 11 small flashes assessed as single shots of small-arms fire, four assessed as inside the disengagement area. At 10:29 on 12 December, positioned near a government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard one shot of small-arms fire 500m west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no disengagement would take place that day.
In Zolote disengagement area the SMM noted a calm situation.
At 11:20, positioned 2km north-north-east of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM heard five single shots 3km west-south-west but was not able to determine whether they occurred inside the disengagement area. The SMM noted that a “DPR” checkpoint on the northern edge of Petrivske was unstaffed and open but concrete blocks remained there. An unarmed “DPR” member told the SMM that there would be no longer any checkpoint there. (See SMM Daily Report 12 December 2016)
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned sites the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) each loaded on a flat-bed truck heading south near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk); one stationary surface-to-air-missile system (9K37) west of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk). In “LPR”-controlled Yurivka (27km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed one stationary tank (T-72) without a gun barrel in the yard of a factory. An unarmed guard at the entrance gate denied the SMM access to the factory*.
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), while six remained absent (as first noted on 12 October 2016).
The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted as absent: 12 tanks (T-72) (two as first noted on 5 March and ten on 10 November 2016) and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) (as first noted on 10 November 2016).
In addition to those referred to above, seen near Avdiivka, the SMM observed other armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw three armoured vehicle near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk). The SMM also saw what it assessed to be a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-4) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk).
The SMM followed up on reports of water shortages near Luhansk city. (See SMM Daily Report 8 December 2016) In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora and Obozne (16 and 18km north of Luhansk, respectively) two shopkeepers separately told the SMM that the villages had been without water from 4 to 10 December but that water supply had been restored two days before. According to three employees of the Raivka water pumping station (“LPR”-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the station no longer received water from government-controlled Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) but instead from government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Vrubivskyi (22km south-west of Luhansk) two residents (women in their late forties) stated that the village had no water supply since 1 December and that they used wells.
The SMM monitored the Ukraine-Russian Federation border in areas currently not controlled by the Government. While the SMM was present in “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 83km south of Luhansk) for one hour, the SMM noted a calm situation.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.
Denial of access:
- The SMM observed a mine hazard sign south-east of an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, preventing it from proceeding east towards a summer- cottage area (inside the disengagement area). Armed men told the SMM that they were not able to guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side. Armed “LPR” members said they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the threat from mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM noted that no demining had taken place on the road west towards the disengagement area. The threat of mines and the absence of security guarantees prevented the SMM from using the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- On two separate occasions the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna (64 and 69km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) from both sides. Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers at a checkpoint in Popasna told the SMM that they had received orders not allow the SMM to pass. In Katerynivka the SMM saw anti-tank obstacles and mine hazard signs on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) in either direction. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said the area was mined. Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that they could not guarantee its safety due to the threat of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “LPR”-controlled Yurivka the SMM observed a tank parked in the yard of factory but an unnamed guard denied access to the factory. The SMM informed the JCCC.
Delay:
- At a “DPR” checkpoint south-west of Donetsk city armed men delayed the SMM for more than one hour and a half. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.