Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 7 December 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of explosions in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, but fewer ceasefire violations over all. In Luhansk region, the SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on a report of a civilian casualty in Novooleksandrivka. It continued to monitor the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its movement in the three areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The Mission noted long queues of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored repair works. The SMM followed up reports of water shortages in Luhansk region. It continued to observe peaceful protests in Kyiv.

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 226 explosions, compared with 250 explosions in the previous reporting period, mostly in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area and around Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 6-7 December, the SMM heard 54 undetermined explosions 8-10km west-north-west. On the same night, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions and six illumination flares in flight from east to west, all 4-6km south-east of the camera. During the day on 7 December the same camera recorded an exchange of fire beginning with one airburst and followed by 15 undetermined explosions, seven undetermined projectiles (all in flight from north to south, or north-west to south-east), and 30 tracer rounds (split evenly between north-to-south and south-to-north directions of fire), all 4-6km east-south-east and south-east of the camera. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, of which ten were 3-5km north and one was 4-5km west-south-west.

On 6 December, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) during a period of 3.5 hours, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north-west. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) during a period of five hours, the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions 2-3km east, five undetermined explosions 3-4km south, and 30 bursts of small-arms fire 2-4km south and south-south-west.

During a period of just over an hour, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, 23 tracer rounds assessed as anti-aircraft cannon fire (unknown calibre), three illumination flares, 14 tracer rounds (all in flight from south to north), four undetermined explosions, and one undetermined projectile in flight from north to south, all 8-10km north-east of the camera.

Positioned on the northern outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) during a period of 15 minutes, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds approximately 2km south and ten undetermined explosions at an unknown distance to the south. It also heard and saw three airbursts 1km south.

Positioned 1.6km north-east of “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) during a period of 15 minutes, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions (six north-west and four south-east), all at unknown distances.

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. In the afternoon hours of 6 December, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) during a period of 50 minutes, the SMM heard 53 explosions assessed as undetermined artillery fire (unknown calibre) 10-20km west-south-west.

The SMM followed up a report from residents of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) regarding a civilian casualty. The SMM visited a man (aged 65-70) in his house in the village and observed a 1-2cm wound on his left hip. He said it had been caused by shrapnel from a projectile that had struck the roof of the house on the afternoon of 6 December. The SMM observed that the north-facing side of the roof was slightly dented and a north-facing window was shattered and had three holes, but the SMM could not assess the cause of the damage. Near the house’s gate, the SMM observed a copper wire over one metre long and partly covered by snow, lying along an east-west axis, and assessed to be from an anti-tank guided missile weapon.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

On the evening of 5 December the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded two flashes assessed as small-arms fire within the disengagement area, 1.6-1.8km south-south-east and south. On 7 December a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that no disengagement or demining would take place that day.

In the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

During the night of 6-7 December, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded one illumination flare 1-2km at an undetermined direction from the camera. The SMM could not assess whether it was in the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, on 6 December in “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed four weapons assessed as probably anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by trucks traveling west from Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk). On 7 November, north of government-controlled Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed three anti-tank guided missile systems (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm), each mounted on a separate armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM-2) parked on the roadside.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed one tank (T-64, 125mm) loaded on a transporter, which was stationary near “LPR”-controlled Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a government-controlled holding area where it had previously observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification, but found that the area continued to be abandoned. Eighteen self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), first observed missing on 18 December 2015, were still absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone. At an “LPR” checkpoint near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an APC (BTR-80) traveling east with eight armed persons on board. Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 7 December the presence of two ACVs near government-controlled Syze (23km north-east of Luhansk), one ACV near government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), and one ACV near Molodizhne, all of an undetermined type.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of explosive devices. On 6 December the SMM observed a signal flare attached to a tree one metre from the side of a road in Novooleksandrivka (see SMM Daily Report 21 November 2016). The flare was connected to a white wire, which the SMM assessed as the trigger device for a booby trap. The SMM observed a second signal flare in the forest about 30 metres away from the road.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM observed six workers from a water supply company completing the repair of a water pipe near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and saw water flowing when the workers re-opened the pipe.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. It followed up on reports of water shortages near Luhansk city (see SMM Daily Report 7 December 2016). On 6 December four civilian women (aged 40-45) in the Krasnyi Yar and Velyka Verhunka suburbs of Luhansk city told the SMM that water shortages were affecting the local population. On 7 December two civilians (aged 65-70) in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) told the SMM that the village had been without water since 4 December. Two women (aged 60-70) in “LPR”-controlled Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that, although water in their settlement was running, people in some neighbourhoods were experiencing low water pressure.

Two civilians (one woman aged 40-50 and one man aged 60-70) in Yasynuvata told the SMM that the town’s water supply had been interrupted in the morning. At the railway station, the SMM confirmed that running water was not available.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed 255 civilian vehicles and about 350 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and no queues to travel in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 125 civilian vehicles and 60 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas in the morning. In the afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 50 civilian vehicles queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 6 December, while on the wooden ramps linking damaged sections of the bridge, the SMM observed a civilian man (aged about 65) slip and fall, but he did not sustain any apparent injuries or require medical help. A portion of the ramp’s railing broke during the incident. On 7 December the SMM observed that make-shift repairs with wood and nails had been conducted to the broken section of the railing. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, prior to its opening, the SMM observed more than 50 civilian cars and two minibuses in the parking lot, as well as 500-600 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas. Later in the morning, at the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed around 90 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas.

At the “LPR” checkpoint, the SMM observed International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff install three prefabricated shelters with heating devices for the use of civilians crossing the bridge. ICRC staff informed the SMM that the shelters could hold up to 100 people. In the early afternoon, at a time when relatively few people were crossing the checkpoint, the SMM observed approximately ten people inside the shelters.

Outside the parliament building in Kyiv the SMM observed a protest of up to 3,000 people (almost all men aged over 50 years old) and spoke with several of them, who said they were veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. They said they were demanding full implementation of the provisions of the law on social benefits for veterans. About 450 law enforcement officials secured the area and the protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member did not permit the SMM to travel in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) without an escort. Further, the SMM was unable to travel west from Petrivske due to the lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area as armed “LPR” members said they could not guarantee the SMM’s security in the adjacent fields and roads due to the possible presence of mines and/or unexploded ordnance. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint north of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) informed the SMM that mines were still present on the bridge. At an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, an armed man informed the SMM that no demining had taken place on the road leading to the bridge. The SMM observed barbed wire blocking the road. As a result, the SMM could not proceed to the bridge from either the north or the south. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel from government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of anti-tank barriers at a checkpoint along the road. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint informed the SMM that they had no orders to allow the SMM to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint near government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) prevented the SMM from passing the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 6 December, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area after the SMM declined to show national passports.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.