Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 28 November 2016
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the evening of 27 and 28 November. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the evening of 27 and 28 November, with the majority having been recorded in areas along the contact line in the western part of the region. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM also faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in other areas. The Mission monitored a border area under government control in Luhansk region. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and firing on both sides of the contact line. The SMM observed long queues at the entry-exit checkpoints near Stanytsia Luhanska during the morning hours. In Kyiv the SMM continued to monitor a public gathering in front of the National Bank of Ukraine.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region including some 100 explosions, compared with about 300 explosions in the period between the evening of 27 and 28 November.
During the day positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) for three hours, the SMM heard one burst of small-arms fire.
During the evening of 27 November the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions and 12 undetermined projectiles (ten in flight from west to east, one from north to south, and one south to north) starting with one undetermined projectile in flight from west to east, all 2-5km east-south-east. During the day on 28 November, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 3-8km west-south-west, west and north-north-west, and 21 explosions assessed as outgoing 2-4km north-north-west. During the early evening the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded three airbursts, four undetermined explosions and eight explosions assessed as the impacts of rocket-assisted projectiles, beginning with one undetermined explosion, all 4-6km east-south-east. It also recorded 29 rocket-assisted projectiles (23 in flight from south-west to north-east, two from north-east to south-west, two from north to south, two from south-east to north-west).
On the night of 27 November while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard nine explosions 5-6km west-south-west assessed as the impacts of mortar rounds (120mm).
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km south-south-east and south.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the evening of 27 and 28 November, with the majority having been recorded in areas along the contact line in in the western part of the region.
Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km north, and two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (unknown calibre) 2-5km west. While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (former Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) over 70 minutes in the afternoon the SMM heard 347 explosions 10km south-west, most of which were assessed as impacts and outgoing rounds (undetermined proportion) of artillery.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. Near “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two fresh craters assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds on the southern bank of the river, and seven fresh craters assessed as caused by rocket-propelled grenades in the same area. Several of the craters still had remnants of grenades inside them. About 20m from an “LPR” position on the southern bank of the river the SMM also observed fresh remnants of grenade and mortar rounds. Armed men told the SMM that shelling had occurred the night before. The SMM observed two unexploded 122mm artillery rounds about 35-40m from the position, as had already been observed several months ago.
On the opposite, northern side of the river, in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed traces of bullet impacts (at least some of which seemed to be fresh) on the southern side of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. The SMM also observed hundreds of empty 7.62mm cartridges on the ground by the checkpoint. The SMM saw the traces of at least 45 bullet impacts (7.62mm) on and around the south-facing walls of a small supermarket located about 30m north of the checkpoint. The SMM observed four more impacts within 4-30m of two houses and assessed them as having been caused by under-barrel (GP-25, 40mm) or automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17 or AGS-30, 30mm) fire. The SMM saw a fresh 82mm unexploded mortar round in the middle of a road in Lobacheve. Local residents told the SMM that fighting had taken place from the afternoon of 27 November until that same night.
In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM visited three impact sites. On Kirova street the SMM observed an impact site in a driveway four metres from a house and noted that a brick dog kennel had been destroyed by shrapnel and that shrapnel had also penetrated a gas pipeline and cut two power lines. The SMM assessed that the damaged was caused by a 120mm mortar fired from a north-westerly direction. Also on Kirova street the SMM visited another house that had broken windows and damage to plastic siding panels. It observed an impact site located in a field 20m from the house which it assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. On Akhmatova Street the SMM saw an impact site 15m from a house. The windows on the north-western wall of the house were shattered. The SMM also saw shrapnel had penetrated a metal fence, damaged a gas pipe and severed power lines. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The Mission’s access to most of these areas remained restricted. Contrary to the TCG’s decision, the SMM did not note any signs of further disengagement or any demining activity in the three areas during the reporting period.
The SMM did not note any signs of disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska area. The SMM observed the fresh bullet hole (5.45mm) in the north-facing side of a wooden ammunition box on the north side of the “LPR” northernmost forward position on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Both Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” members separately told the SMM that they had been under fire from the other side during the previous night.
The SMM twice crossed the main Zolote-Pervomaisk route in the disengagement area from north to south and back, and observed a calm situation.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 8-10km south-south-west, and another one 8-10km north-west (both assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance north-north-west, two single shots of small-arms fire at an unknown distance west, and eight undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an unknown distance west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
In violation of withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: ten stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk); one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 210mm) moving north in Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk); and one stationary self-propelled surface-to-air missile/anti-aircraft gun system (2S6 Tunguska) in Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted as missing 20 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), (12 noted as missing as of 8 July, seven as of 9 September and one for the first time). The SMM noted that five sites continued to be abandoned (three noted as abandoned as of 3 July, one as of 24 September and one as of 28 October 2016) with 51 missing towed howitzers (33 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 18 2A36 Giatsint, 152mm).
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] Near “LPR”-controlled Brianka (49km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a truck carrying one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) heading east. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (one BRDM-2 and one BTR-60 or BTR-70) (all outside the disengagement area) on 24 November, and one IFV(one BMP-1) (outside the disengagement area) and one IFV (BRM-1K) (inside the disengagement area) on 25 November.
The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 07:30 at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed more than 1,100 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas while at 12:30 about 250 people were waiting to travel in the same direction. At 15:00 25 people were still waiting to travel in the same direction. At 09:15 at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 150 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and about 100 waiting to travel in the opposite direction.
The SMM monitored repairs to essential infrastructure co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM monitored the repair of power lines conducted by a water supply company in areas between government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka.
The SMM monitored a border area under government control in Luhansk region. On 28 November the SMM monitored the border crossing point in Prosiane (117km north of Luhansk). The SMM observed one bus with a sign indicating a Lysychansk-Moscow route entering Ukraine. The border guard on duty informed the SMM that 300-400 pedestrians and 30-40 cars and ten buses in total had cross out and into Ukraine daily.
In Kyiv the SMM monitored a public gathering of about 2,000 people in front of the National Bank of Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 25 November 2016). The event passed off peacefully and was overseen by some 40 law enforcement officers.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- The SMM was not able to proceed further towards the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from the parking lot east of an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the presence of a mine hazard sign. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At the “LPR” checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote/Pervomaisk disengagement area the SMM was not able to access fields and areas other than the roads located in the disengagement area, as the “LPR” member did not guarantee the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or unexploded ordnance in those areas.
- The SMM was unable to travel from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) to Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of an anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”) and a red mine hazard sign on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was not able to travel further westwards from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to lack of security guarantees. An armed man present stated that no demining activity had taken place.
- In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM could not proceed eastwards on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer present did not guarantee the security of the SMM due to the presence of mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At a “DPR” checkpoint in Yasynuvata, an armed man did not allow the SMM to proceed further south, citing safety reasons. The SMM had to take an alternate road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Three armed “LPR” members prevented the SMM from entering a compound on the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not proceed across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), from either side. At a checkpoint the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint did not guarantee the security of the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- At a heavy weapon holding area, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, having delayed the SMM for 30 minutes, did not allow the SMM to write down the serial numbers of weapons present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. * Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.