Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 15 November 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, most of which were concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata Donetsk airport area and areas north-east and east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in all three areas.*. The Mission observed long queues at the entry-exit checkpoints near Stanytsia Luhanska during the morning hours. In Kyiv, the Mission observed peaceful public gatherings around the National Bank of Ukraine and the Parliament with a total of some 5,000 people attending, overseen by some 2,000 law enforcement officers.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including nearly 190 explosions, compared with about 160 during the previous reporting period. Of these explosions more than 130 were recorded in areas north-east and east of Mariupol and more than 50 were recorded the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area.

On the evening of 14 November, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 8-10km north and west-north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for six and a half hours during the day on 15 November, the SMM heard 41 undetermined explosions and sporadic bursts and shots of small-arms fire 2-5km south-west, west and north-north-west.  Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for four hours during the day the SMM heard six explosions, including one assessed as caused by an outgoing 122mm artillery round, two assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds and two assessed as the impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, all 2-4km east and south-east.  

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 14 November, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 14 November, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an outgoing 82mm mortar round 5-7km west-south-west.

During the night of 14 November the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north-east, recorded 13 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance and direction. In the early evening of 15 November the camera recorded 32 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north-east.

During the day of 15 November positioned at two different locations in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard and saw five air bursts at an undetermined distance south-east, and heard 31 undetermined explosions, 13 explosions assessed as rounds outgoing from unknown weapons followed by as many explosions assessed as the impacts at undetermined distance ranging from north-east to south-east. Positioned 3.5km east of “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM, within 15 minutes heard five undetermined explosions accompanied by more than 350 bursts of automatic-grenade-launchers, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-north-east. In the early afternoon, positioned in the same village the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance west.      

The SMM did not record any ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with more than 200, including 57 explosions, during the previous reporting period.

The SMM followed up on reports of firing incidents. In “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed fresh holes to the roof, the metal gate and the north-west facing wall of an inhabited house located close to an “LPR” checkpoint. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by anti-aircraft gun (23mm) rounds. A resident told the SMM that shooting had occurred on 14 November. The SMM also saw seven fresh impacts on the north-west side of the concrete block of the checkpoint. In “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM also saw six fresh holes on the north-west side of the concrete block at an “LPR” checkpoint. The SMM assessed that at least three impacts had been caused by rounds from a 73mm cannon.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. Contrary to the requirement of the TCG’s decision, the SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

The SMM noted a calm situation in all three areas and did not observe any ceasefire violations or signs of fresh ceasefire violations. In and around the disengagement area near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on numerous occasions on both sides of the contact line.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area the SMM observed staff of the State Emergency Service rebuilding a tent for first aid on the roadside of Zolote/Pervomaisk crossing route (closed to civilians).

In the Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) disengagement area a “DPR” member present did not guarantee safety and security of the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) in Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk); and four towed howitzers (2A65, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside storage areas, the SMM observed two multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in government-controlled Novotroitske (57 km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. At Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed: 12 MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and four mortars (2B11, 120mm). The SMM noted three areas as abandoned for the first time, with missing following weapons: 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) (all observed missing for the first time); 14 towed howitzers (2A65, 152mm) (six observed missing for the first time, one observed missing as of 14 February, two as of 11 March, and five as of 11 August); 12 towed howitzers (D-30,122mm) (all observed missing as of 3 July); and six mortars (2B11, 120mm) (all observed missing as of 3 July). Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area,* although from the outside the SMM could see two stationary anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by armoured personnel carriers (APC; MT-LB).

At “DPR” holding areas, the SMM observed: 13 towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) and nine mortars (PM-38, 120mm). The SMM noted as missing: six mortars (PM-38, 120mm) (one noted as of 14 September, three as of 27 September, and two as of 19 October); and three towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) (one noted as missing for the first time and two as of 19 October).

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponds with the withdrawal lines. The SMM observed that 18 tanks (T-64) were missing: seven were noted as missing for the first time, one as of 4 April; and eight as of 18 July and two as of 12 October. The SMM also observed new weapons not previously recorded.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; one BMP-1 and one BRM-1K) near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 07:00 the SMM observed about 150 cars and 20 buses full of passengers parked near an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At 07:30, just before the opening time of the checkpoint, the SMM observed a queue of about 1,500 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge at 08:45, the SMM counted approximately 400 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM did not notice any improvement to the broken slats and damaged handrails of the steep wooden ramp over the broken section of the bridge. The SMM noted that rain and snow made the ramp slippery and difficult to cross, especially for elderly and people with disabilities.

The SMM monitors the situation of internally displaced persons (IDP). The head of the social protection department of the district administration in government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the number of registered IDPs decreased from some 23,000 in June 2016 to currently 4,484 in the district. According to the interlocutor, the sharp decrease was a result of changes to regulation for IDP’s registration and residence verification instituted by the Government in June 2016.

The SMM followed up on reports that a Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate in

Mariupol had been damaged by an arson attack in the early morning of 6 November. The SMM observed damage to the building (burned-out parts of internal walls) and assessed that the fire had originated from as electric cables: the fire damage to the wall had a symmetrical pattern with a burn line along the electrical cable; and there was no fire damage to the exterior wall near the broken windows.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed public gatherings with a total of some 5,000 people attending, overseen by some 2,000 law enforcement forces. At 09:30 the SMM observed that about 1,000 people (men and women, mostly aged between 50 and 70) started marching from the Independence Square to the National Bank of Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 15 November 2016). The SMM saw that people gathered – about 20 per cent of them carrying flags of the For Life and 5.10 political parties – in front of the bank, having passed through metal detectors temporarily set up by the law enforcement forces. Speakers accused the bank of corruption and of what they said was a severe economic situation of the country. About 600 police and National Guard officers were present at the scene. At 10:00 the SMM saw 150 young men dressed in sportswear on the sidewalk leading to European Square, and 100 law enforcement officers on the Independence Square (neighbouring European Square). At 10:30 around the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) including on the Constitution Square and along Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM saw that around 2,000 people (men and women, mostly elderly) gathered, many of them waving flags of various organizations: Financial Maidan, Currency Credits from Odessa and Union of Deceived Depositors. Around 800 law enforcement officers created a security cordon around the premises of the Parliament and searched all individuals entering the area. The SMM also observed some 1,000 people moving between the bank, the Parliament and the Independence Square. At 11:00 the SMM saw about 200 people (mostly men aged between 20 and 45) – 50 of them wearing military-style clothes – gathering at a police cordon on Shovkovychna street. The SMM observed some of the participants holding banners stating their protest against what they said were incomplete electronic declarations of assets by public officials, and about 200 police and National Guard officers present nearby. All participants in the abovementioned gatherings started dispersing peacefully around 15:30.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At five different locations in government-controlled areas north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted.  The SMM was unable to access the railway bridge through three separate routes (Donetska, Lomonosov street, Moskva-Donbas streets). The presence of mines prevented the SMM from passing Yubileina street to north-west. The SMM was not able to access areas east and west of the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the bridge other than the pedestrian crossing route as demining had not yet conducted in the area. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that fields and areas other than roads located in the disengagement area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM was therefore not able to access the area fully. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to travel further west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) as an armed “DPR” member present did not guarantee the security of the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions, the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and government-controlled Popasna (64 and 69km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) from both sides. Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers at a checkpoint in Popasna told the SMM that they had received orders not to allow the SMM to pass. In Katerynivka the SMM saw road obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) and mine signs on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a T-junction 2km south of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) armed men stopped the SMM and told to leave the area within two minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a heavy weapons holding area, citing the absence of their superior. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• South of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) armed “LPR” members escorted the SMM during its observation. An “LPR” member told the SMM that it would be accompanied by “security” “to prevent commuters from venting their anger at the SMM”.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.   

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.