Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 11 November 2016

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and an increase in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of shelling in Marinka and of a civilian casualty in Verkhnotoretske. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske, and faced restriction of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. In Donetsk region, the Mission visited three border areas currently not under government control. The SMM monitored a public gathering in Kyiv.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including approximately 270 explosions compared with 870 during the previous reporting period. At least 114 explosions were recorded in the Yasynuvata-Avdiivka-Donetsk airport area and nearly 70 in areas west of Horlivka.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city the SMM recorded 15 undetermined explosions 6-10km west and north-west on the evening and night of 10 November. On the same night, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded 19 undetermined explosions, 16 projectiles in flight from south to north and 22 in flight from north to south, all 4-5km south-east.

Positioned in “DPR-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day on 11 November, the SMM heard 83 undetermined explosions 2-6km west-south-west and west. Shortly before and after noon, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard three explosions assessed as impacts of 82 and 120mm mortar rounds, 3-4km south-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka on the evening of 10 November and during the day on 11 November, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-10km west and south-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 2-3km south and eight undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 6-10km north-west and seven undetermined explosions 3-5km south.

Positioned 1km north of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at undetermined distances north-east, ten undetermined explosions 10km south, and four undetermined explosions, an intense exchange of fire (including uncountable rounds of small-arms, heavy-machine-gun and automatic-grenade-launcher fire) as well as numerous more undetermined, uncountable explosions at an unknown distance south-south-east.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, including 527 explosions compared with approximately 225 during the previous reporting period, mainly in western Luhansk region.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) on the morning of 11 November, the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions 3km west.

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard approximately 410 explosions assessed as mostly outgoing (but also some impacts) artillery rounds and approximately 80 explosions assessed as mostly impacts of multiple-launch-rocket-system (MLRS) rounds (and also some outgoing), all 10km west-south-west.

While in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city at 01:30 on 11 November the SMM heard an explosion 1km south-west. Later that morning the SMM followed up on the explosion and observed a 70-80cm hole in a metallic pylon with a red star on top of it, located between the ramps leading to the Luhansk central railway station. The perimeter of the hole was still surrounded by black powder.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and a civilian casualty. The SMM met a man (49 years old) in intensive care in a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk). The man had bandages on his head, right hand and legs. He told the SMM that his left leg had a hole in it and that his right leg was broken. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had received emergency surgery upon arriving at the hospital on 9 November. A man, who said he was driving behind the victim at the time of the incident, told the SMM that the incident occurred on 9 November when a shell impacted close to the victim’s car while he was driving near government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a fresh crater approximately 15m from a fire station. The SMM assessed that it had been likely caused by fire from a north-easterly direction and assessed a piece of shrapnel provided by the employees at the fire station as likely belonging to a 120mm or larger calibre shell. The SMM noted that several windows of the fire station were broken.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. Contrary to the requirement of the TCG’s decision, the SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had not received orders to disengage. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position the SMM observed makeshift shelters. Just south of the bridge the SMM observed “LPR” prefabricated containers next to the checkpoint being reinforced with concrete blocks.

Following an incident on 10 November when a group of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that they would be using an SMM observation point just outside of the Zolote/Pervomaisk disengagement area for their own purposes (see SMM Daily Report 11 November), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk) assured the SMM on the afternoon of 11 November that measures would be taken to resolve the situation and hold those involved in the incident responsible. On the morning of 11 November, at the same observation point, the SMM observed the presence of three armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside the observation point.

The SMM noted a calm situation in the Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. At Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines the SMM observed 12 MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm, noted as present for the first time). The SMM noted 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) missing for the first time, and 30 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), three towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm), and 17 MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) previously noted as missing. The SMM found that one site continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 12 March 2016.

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations correspond with the withdrawal lines. The SMM observed that nine tanks (T-64) were missing, as first noted on 8 October 2016. The SMM also observed as present new weapons not previously recorded.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), one armoured combat vehicle (BTR) near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk), and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Zhelanne Pershe (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Near government-controlled Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk) the SMM observed tracks from tracked vehicles and found empty wooden crates marked as BM-21 missiles.

A woman in Marinka told the SMM that without satellite television, residents of Marinka could only receive programmes broadcast from “DPR”-controlled areas and the Russian Federation. This had been reported to the SMM by other residents previously as well.

The SMM noted a calm situation at three border areas currently not under government control. The SMM was present at the Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) border crossing point for over 30 minutes where it observed one commercial truck (with a Russian Federation licence plate) entering Ukraine with its storage area covered. Travelling in the opposite direction, the SMM observed a large bus with a sign, “Children programme of Donbas”, and with dark tinted windows passing through the border crossing point without stopping. The bus was escorted by a “DPR” “police” car with flashing blue lights. At the Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) border crossing point, the SMM observed for the first time two new, red mine hazard signs with white lettering in English and Russian. The SMM was present at the Uspenka border crossing point for nearly 35 minutes and at the Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) border crossing point for 20 minutes.

In Kyiv the SMM monitored a public gathering outside the National Bank of Ukraine. Approximately 1,800 people (70 per cent elderly, both men and women) were demonstrating against alleged corruption in the Ukrainian banking sector. Up to 80-90 law enforcement officials were present at the site. The protest remained peaceful.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to travel from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske to government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO.
• The SMM was unable to proceed into an area near Donetska street north of the bridge and, separately, to travel towards the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska due to the lack of guarantees from the Ukrainian Armed Forces that the area had been cleared of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions, south of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, an SMM patrol was stopped from traveling toward the railway bridge by armed men who told the SMM that the area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) blocked the SMM from proceeding towards an “LPR” observation point on the top of a hill south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. An armed man told the SMM that that area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM from using the road between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC                                                                                                                                                                                             [1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 [2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.