Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 9 November 2016

This report is for media and the general public. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Toretsk, Marinka and Zoria. It observed damage caused by shelling in Marinka, Irmino, and Novotoshkivske. In Verkhnoshyrokivske shelling occurred near the SMM. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and faced restriction of its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination. In Luhansk region, the Mission visited two border areas currently not under government control and one border area under government control.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region [1], including more than 2,000 explosions, compared with at least 1,450 in the previous reporting period. High numbers of ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk city area, north-east of Donetsk, as well as east and north-east of Mariupol.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre during the night of 8-9 November the SMM heard 295 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 8 November, the SMM heard 71 explosions (64 undetermined and seven assessed as impacts of artillery fire) 2-5km south-east and south-south-east. The following day the SMM heard 58 explosions (46 assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and 12 undetermined), 2-4km south-east and south-south-east.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 8 November the SMM heard 186 explosions (102 undetermined, 18 assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds and 66 as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds) 4-10km west-south-west and west. The following day the SMM heard 80 undetermined explosions and 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons 3-10km west, west-north-west and north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west. Positioned south of the town the SMM heard, within 90 minutes, 209 undetermined explosions 6-12km north-west and north-north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) between 09:10 and 15:00, the SMM heard more than 400 undetermined explosions, more than 500 bursts of anti-aircraft cannon, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 1-6km south-west, west-south-west, west, and west-north-west. Furthermore, the SMM heard seven instances of uncountable, overlapping, undetermined explosions 2-4km west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) during the day the SMM heard 91 explosions (69 undetermined; 17 assessed as outgoing mortar and infantry-fighting-vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon fire; and five as impacts of rounds from various weapons) 1-5km east and south-east. The SMM camera recorded within two hours during the day, an exchange starting with one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from north to south. The camera also recorded 116 undetermined explosions, 32 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from north to south and six rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from south to north, all 3-6km south-east.

The situation east and north-east of Mariupol remained volatile. Positioned at a “DPR” checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard, within one hour, 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons, less than 500m east, followed by 12 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery fire at an undetermined distance south-south-west. It saw three impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons and heard another 16 explosions (five undetermined and 11 assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons) 50-100m east and south-east.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded on 9 November an exchange of fire that started with seven direct tracer bursts in flight from west to east, followed by another exchange of fire, including 50 direct tracer bursts in flight from east to west and more than 340 in flight from west to east. The camera also recorded 140 tracer rounds of direct fire in flight from west to east and 36 in flight from east to west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more than 700 explosions compared with 57 in the previous reporting period. Most were observed in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), where the SMM heard, within one hour in the evening of 8 November, over 300 explosions assessed as both impacts and outgoing artillery fire 10-15km south-south-west; with an intensity of fire from five to 30 explosions per minute. The same evening the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery fire 3-4km west and four explosions assessed as impacts of artillery  rounds 2-3km west, as well as 17 undetermined explosions 10-20km west. The following day the SMM heard, within 90 minutes, an intense exchange of fire with more than 350 explosions assessed as both impacts and outgoing artillery fire 15-20km west-south-west.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within two hours, 38 explosions (36 undetermined and two assessed as outgoing fire from undetermined weapons) 5-10km west-south-west and west. Positioned in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard about 40 explosions (ten undetermined, ten assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and 20 as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds) 3-10km south-east and south.

Positioned near government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within one hour, at least 35 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-south-west.  Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 26 explosions (20 assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and six as outgoing mortar and artillery fire) 5km south.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. Both the police in government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) and medical staff at a hospital in Toretsk said that a 30-year old man had died on 8 November from shrapnel wounds, when an artillery shell exploded in his yard in government-controlled Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw a 63-year-old man with wounds on his head. The man said he was in the garden of his house in Marinka on 5 November, when he had seen a flash and fallen unconscious.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling damage in residential areas. In Marinka the Mission observed damage to a five-storey apartment building on Voroshilova Street from shelling which allegedly occurred on 8 November. The SMM noted damage on the east-facing wall of the building and broken windows on all five floors. The Mission saw that repairs were being conducted. The SMM noted damages to the walls and furniture inside a first floor apartment. It assessed the fire to be from an undetermined weapon from an easterly direction. The Mission also observed damage on the west-facing side of the same apartment building, including small craters on the sidewalk – about 8m from the building – as well as broken windows and two damaged trees nearby. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire or type of ammunition as the area had been cleaned.  

In government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk) Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) showed the SMM a site where shelling had allegedly occurred on 7 November. Due to security considerations the SMM could not reach the site that was 50-60m from the asphalt road.

In “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk), about 2.5km south of the village centre, following up on reports by the JCCC of shelling on 8 November, the SMM observed a fresh crater in a field several meters from a house, assessed as caused by a 122m artillery round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Two houses on both sides of the impact site had been damaged. The Mission noted broken windows, and shrapnel holes in the north-facing walls and in a water tank. The SMM also noted one severed and two slightly damaged power lines nearby. No casualties were reported. At another site, 300m away, the SMM noted a two-storey house, whose roof and entire second floor had been destroyed by an explosion. Two residents (a man in his twenties and a woman in her fifties) said that they had been in the house at the time of the explosion and were still in shock. The SMM observed steel bars on the second floor completely distorted, and large cracks on the internal and external walls. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by artillery fire from a north-north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. Contrary to the requirement of the TCG’s decision, the SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM saw a truck unloading big concrete blocks.

The SMM crossed between government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) on the main route through the disengagement area. On the government-controlled side of the disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the area had been calm for the previous 24 hours, an assessment echoed on the southern side by unarmed “LPR” members. Positioned for four hours on the southern side the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 10km south-west outside the disengagement area.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske a senior armed “DPR” member told the SMM that he was not aware of any plans for demining in the disengagement area. Due to lack of security guarantees and the presence of mines, the SMM could not to proceed west towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk).*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw in government-controlled areas, 12 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) – six in Zhelanne and six in Novozhelanne (36 and 34km north-west of Donetsk, respectively). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 7 November of three probable multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) approximately 3km south of government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage areas, the SMM saw what it assessed as two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in government-controlled Novotroitske (57km north-west of Donetsk), and four tanks (T-72) – three transported on flatbed trucks near government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and one transported on a flatbed truck near “LPR”-controlled Yurivka (27km west of Luhansk), heading towards Luhansk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed five MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and six towed howitzers (2A36/Giatsint-B, 152mm) present. The SMM noted as missing seven MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm), six of which the SMM saw on a parallel road outside the site; and one towed howitzer (2A36/Giatsint-B, 152mm), first noted missing on 29 July.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal line, and noted as missing: ten tanks (T-64), first noted missing on 2 January; four anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) and six mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) as first noted missing on 23 June.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone [2]. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-1) in Nyzhnia Vilkhova (27km north-east of Luhansk), first stationary then moving south; one stationary IFV (BMP-1) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); as well as one IFV (BMP-1) and one armoured personnel carrier (BRDM-2) parked in the yard of a civilian house in Stanytsia Luhanska. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted two IFVs (BMP) in government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) on 4 November.  Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured vehicles next to a tree line in an area approximately 7km south-west of government-controlled Bohdanivka on 7 November.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the JCCC’s headquarters in Soledar (government-controlled, 79km north of Donetsk) the SMM followed up on reports that 21 civilian vehicles had been stranded between the government checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka on the evening of 8 November and exposed to shelling. The representatives of the Armed forces of Ukraine and of the Russian Federation said they had tried to facilitate a cessation of fire but could not evacuate the civilians due to ongoing shelling. On 9 November the SMM continued to observe long lines of as many as 115 vehicles and 300 pedestrians queuing to cross at the government checkpoint in Maiorsk.

At 08:00 at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed 700-800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 600-700 people queuing to walk in the opposite direction. At 12:30, the SMM observed approximately 500 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 500 waiting to walk in the opposite direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that there was currently a power cut in a large part of Stanytsia Luhanska, including at the government checkpoint, and they were using generators to run the system for processing documents at the checkpoint. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed, at 07:30, about 400 pedestrians queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and no queue in the opposite direction.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the water pumping station  near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), and works at the water pumping station near “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM noted a calm situation. The SMM observed, during 45 minutes, ten passenger cars, two minivans, one bus, and seven closed cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine, and eight passenger cars (seven with Ukrainian licence plates) and two trucks with Ukrainian licence plates (one loaded with timber and another was covered) entering Ukraine. During its 30-minute stay at the border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM also visited a border area under government control and noted a calm situation at the border crossing point in Prosiane (117km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward an area with summer houses due to the presence of mines. An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that the road had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that he could not guarantee the safety and security of the SMM throughout the disengagement area, except for the main crossing route, due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC. 
• The presence of concrete blocks, tree branches and a mine hazard sign prevented the SMM from proceeding further from government-controlled Zolote-3 towards the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Due to lack of security guarantees and the presence of mines, the SMM could not proceed from Petrivske west towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM observed mines and mine hazard signs, and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and armed “LPR” members, on each side respectively, said the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.       
• The SMM could not proceed from government-controlled Popasna towards government-controlled Katerynivka (69km west of Luhansk) due to a roadblock. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel also told the SMM that the area was mined. The SMM informed the JCCC. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.