Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 November 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling in government-controlled Vynohradne. It continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its movement in the three areas.* The SMM monitored the withdrawal of weapons. The Mission observed military presence in areas frequented by civilians. The SMM monitored gatherings outside courts in Kyiv and Odessa.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region with 585 explosions compared with 430 in the previous reporting period.[1]

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 3-4 November the SMM heard 220 explosions 8-10km south-west in a two-hour period.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 3-4 November, the SMM heard nine explosions, seven of which were assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds 5-6km south and two as outgoing automatic grenade launcher rounds 4km south-east. The SMM also recorded bursts of heavy machine-gun 4km south and small-arms fire 5km north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 3-4 November the SMM heard 72 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west.

On the evening and night of 3-4 November, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 88 explosions assessed as impacts and 15 undetermined explosions north-east. The camera also recorded an exchange of fire involving 194 tracer rounds assessed as anti-aircraft fire (ZU-23-2, 23mm) from south-west to north-east, 37 tracers fired from east to west, 28 cannon tracers fired from east to west and eight bursts of tracers fired from south to north.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 92 undetermined explosions – including 44 in a 20-minute period – in areas 2-5km north-west and west and 3-5km south-west. The SMM also observed periods of uncountable overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire that lasted over 20 minutes in total. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (16km north of Donetsk) the SMM recorded two explosions 2-4km south-east and small-arms fire over a four-hour period.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 41 explosions 15-20km west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (20km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions north-west and west. Positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM recorded 14 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds north-west of the SMM’s position and as many impacts a short time later east of the SMM’s position, and three undetermined explosions north-west.

Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed 303 relatively fresh impacts caused by undetermined weapons on open ground in the area of government-controlled Vodiane, “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka (20, 23 and 24km respectively north-east of Mariupol), which were not observed on 15 October.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 13 undetermined explosions compared with 36 in the previous reporting period, all of which were heard when the SMM was positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) during the afternoon.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and damage to civilian infrastructure. In government-controlled Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol) the SMM observed relatively fresh impacts and saw damage to nearby houses and a restaurant (see SMM Daily Report 4 November). Damage included shrapnel penetration to walls and roofs and shattered windows on the north, east and west-facing sides. The SMM observed an impact in the backyard of a house, and saw shrapnel damage to a nearby metal fence. This crater and two others on softer ground nearby were assessed as caused by 122mm artillery fired from a north-north-easterly direction. A resident showed the SMM a bruise on his abdomen which he said had been caused by a piece of shrapnel that had come through a wall before striking him. The SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 300-400 metres from the impact sites.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. It noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the areas.

At the Ukrainian Armed Forces position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, and inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-1), one of which was observed by an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). On two occasions the SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the railway bridge due to the threat of mines.*

The SMM crossed between government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) on the main route through the disengagement area. Secondary routes were not accessible as a mine hazard sign on the “LPR”-controlled side of the disengagement area warned of the presence of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM could not travel on one route between a government-controlled part of Zolote to the crossing route as several concrete blocks obstructed the way, necessitating a detour.*

While in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-7km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) due to the threat that the road was mined.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed a tank (T-64) on a flatbed truck moving west near government-controlled Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed four multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) for the first time and recorded their serial numbers.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site the SMM observed that four tanks (T-64) were missing, as first observed on 4 October 2016, and that additional weapons were present.

The SMM observed the following armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one IFV (most likely a BMP-1KSh-A) in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk); two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-1) stationary on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) bridge (inside the disengagement area, mentioned above); one static IFV (BRM-1K) mounted with a 73mm cannon at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the edge of the disengagement area near Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed one armoured vehicle near government-controlled Vodiane on 4 November. In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed: five APCs (MTLB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov); and one probable APC (MTLB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in “DPR”-controlled Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed military presence in areas frequented by civilians. In government-controlled Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) kindergarten staff confirmed that a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound (known to the SMM) was located next to the kindergarten and the local administration office. The SMM saw military trucks at the location. Five residents in government-controlled Vidrodzhennia told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were occupying houses. The SMM observed two military vehicles next to buildings in the village, one of which was an IFV (most likely a BMP-1KSh-A) (mentioned above). In government-controlled Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers and a military truck at a public building next to the school and a village council building. Personnel told the SMM that they used the building as their headquarters.

The SMM monitored gatherings outside courts in Kyiv and Odessa. The SMM observed a crowd outside Kyiv’s Shevchenkivskyi district court as the hearing of two men accused of committing a terrorist act in front of the Parliament on 31 August 2015 (see SMM Spot Report: 31 August 2015) was taking place. Around 50 supporters (mostly young men) wearing armbands of the Svoboda-affiliated Sokil youth organization had gathered. Six police vans and 14 police officers were nearby. Another gathering was observed outside Kyiv’s Podilskyi district court in support of persons accused of involvement in the same incident outside the Parliament. The SMM observed approximately 80 people (men and women, about a third of whom were young and belonged to the Sokil youth organization; the rest were Svoboda members aged in their fifties). Some demonstrators waved Svoboda party flags. About ten National Guard personnel and two police officers kept watch. Both gatherings were peaceful. On 3 November, the SMM observed between 15-20 known self-defence activists and Right Sector members (aged between 20-35 years-old, including three women) outside the Prymorskyi district court in Odessa during the ongoing trial of the leader of the local branch of the Right Sector who was charged with, among other things, illegal confinement or abduction of a person. The gathering passed off peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk) as a mine hazard sign on the “LPR’-controlled side of the disengagement area warned of the presence of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO). An “LPR” member told the SMM that he could not guarantee the safety of the SMM due to possible threat of mines/UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.    
• The SMM could not proceed from a government-controlled part of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) to the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route as several concrete blocks obstructed the way, necessitating a detour. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions the SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the railway bridge due to the threat of mines. The SMM observed a sign warning of mines on the road and on one occasion was told by an armed man at the checkpoint that no demining had taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.               
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) in either direction as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.                   
• The SMM could not travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) due to the threat that the road was mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier prevented the SMM from flying its mini UAV where it intended.

Delay:

• Armed men in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) delayed the SMM for 20 minutes on the road to “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). After the JCCC was informed the SMM was allowed to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.