Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 26 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, mostly in areas around Avdiivka-Yasynuvata and Svitlodarsk, as well as east and north-east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region, the SMM noted an increase in the number of recorded ceasefire violations, mostly in areas around the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian and non-civilian casualties in Oleksandrivka and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines. The Mission noted long queues of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. It monitored a border area currently not under government control. The SMM continued to monitor the situation of internally displaced persons in Odessa and Kolomyia.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including more than 280 explosions compared with 193 in the previous reporting period, mostly in Avdiivka-Yasynuvata and Svitlodarsk areas, as well as in areas east and north-east of Mariupol where, in addition, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded over 200 bursts of direct tracer fire.

During the night of 25-26 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 63 projectiles, in sequence: 43 fired from south-south-west to east-north-east, five fired from east-north-east to south-south-west, eight fired from south to north, and seven fired from north to south, as well as four undetermined explosions, all 4-8km east, east-south-east and south-east of its location. The following day, the SMM camera recorded 32 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka the SMM heard, within one hour during the day, an exchange of fire, starting with two explosions assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds, followed by 35 explosions (seven undetermined, 23 assessed as outgoing recoilless gun (SPG-9) rounds, and five as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds) 3-5km south-east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, during the day, 96 explosions (90 undetermined and six assessed as impacts of mortar rounds of unknown calibre) at locations ranging from 1-6km north to north-west. While in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard, in the early morning hours of 26 October, three undetermined explosions 6-8km south-south-west. During the night and early morning hours of 25-26 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 75 undetermined explosions and over 300 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-10km mainly east and south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 13-17km south-south-west.

Positioned in areas east and north-east of Mariupol the SMM heard: 12 undetermined explosions 7-10km south-south-west of its position in government-controlled Zoria (22km north-east of Mariupol) and four undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-west of its position near “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned 2.7km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north. Positioned 1.5km north of Lebedynske, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east; as well as saw and heard three airbursts assessed as artillery rounds of unknown calibre 3km north-east.

During the evening hours of 25 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north-north-east, recorded an exchange of fire starting with 82 bursts of direct tracer fire from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by five rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west-north-west to east-south-east, 124 bursts of direct tracer fire from east-south-east to west-north-west, two undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north-north-east, and four bursts of direct tracer fire from north-west to east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted an increase in the number of recorded ceasefire violations, including almost 300 explosions compared with two on 25 October. Positioned on the government-controlled side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as mortar (82mm) rounds, and a ten- and a twenty-minutes long exchange, respectively, of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east (outside the disengagement area). Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint on the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM heard, in about two hours, 190 undetermined explosions, and more than 300 bursts and shots of recoilless gun (SPG), automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 3-6km north-north-east; and 97 undetermined explosions 5-15km south-south-west and west (outside the disengagement area).

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as artillery rounds, 15km north-west of its location. Positioned 2km west of government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as tank rounds, 2km east. The SMM assessed the explosions as live-fire exercise at the Dmytrivka training area.

The SMM followed up on reports of casualties. Following reports that a Ukrainian Armed Forces member had been injured on 24 October, the SMM visited the hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) where medical staff confirmed that they had received a Ukrainian Armed Forces member with a gunshot wound to his lower leg, who was in a stable condition. At Donetsk Hospital no. 14 a woman in her sixties told the SMM that she had suffered shrapnel injuries to her upper right arm on her way to the cellar of her house in Lenin Street in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk). Another woman, also in her sixties, told the SMM that she had sustained shrapnel injuries to her right foot when a mortar shell had exploded on the roof of her house on Lenin Street in Oleksandrivka on 25 October.

Also in Oleksandrivka, the SMM observed, approximately 200m west of a “DPR” checkpoint and 20m north of the road, an irregular land surface (nearly 200 square metres) of burned grass and smoke, as well as two mine hazard signs (white letters on red background) on 1.5m high sticks, 30m apart.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers to the JCCC told the SMM that there were no plans for disengagement that day, adding that according to their interpretation of the disengagement plan, demining would happen after the completion of the disengagement process; therefore, no demining had been planned. They also said that until the disengagement process was completed, the JCCC could not assist in ensuring SMM security due to possible small-arms fire in the area. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge the SMM observed fresh traces of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP) going from the Ukrainian Armed Forces shelter towards their forward position.

At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed that the mine hazard sign (reading “STOP MINES”) previously installed on the road leading north-east from the parking lot close to the “LPR” checkpoint towards the summer houses area near the railroad, was lying on the ground. An armed “LPR” member said that “LPR” members had removed the sign intentionally so the SMM would not report a restriction of freedom of movement to the JCCC. He explained that “LPR” members had never mined the road nor its vicinity, adding that the mine sign had been installed to stop civilians from going into the area and looting the houses. At the same time, he did not exclude that the area might be mined or booby trapped.

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement on both sides.*

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (40km south of Donetsk) the SMM could not directly monitor in the disengagement area or proceed further west towards the contact line as neither the “DPR” ensured, nor the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC assisted in ensuring its security.* The SMM saw on the southern side of the road leading to “DPR”-controlled Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), an anti-tank mine covered by overgrown grass, approximately 0.5m off the tarmac. The area at the western edge of Petrivske was covered with dense weeds. The SMM saw a deployed anti-tank mine (possible TM-62) some 30cm from the tarmac, covered with weeds, with only the fuse being visible. “DPR” demining team members said that they would be ready to start demining after all the necessary preparations. While in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted a calm situation, but continued to face freedom of movement restrictions.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in government-controlled Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: eight tanks (seven at the Kostiantynivka railway station (60km north of Donetsk) and one in Oleksandropil); and two surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) - one west of Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and one near Sievierodonetsk (75km north-west of Luhansk);

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted as present: 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-27, Uragan, 220mm); 18 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), the serial numbers of six of which matched six of the weapons missing from the following sites. The SMM noted as missing 26 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), as previously noted.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw on 25 October: an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-3) stationary in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), and an IFV (BMP) covered with a camouflage net, stationary in Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area). Aerial surveillance available to the SMM revealed the presence of six armoured vehicles near government-controlled Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk) on 25 October; on 26 October: two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), and five armoured vehicles near government-controlled parts of Zolote (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 25 October, at a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka the SMM observed 45 cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and estimated that the average flow rate was 15 cars per 30 minutes. The SMM saw six pedestrians crossing towards government-controlled areas (each screened in about ten minutes). Armed “DPR” members refused to the SMM entry, on foot, into the passport control area to assess the number of pedestrians, but allowed the SMM to drive through. At 12:55, at a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 70 civilian vehicles and some 320 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, as well as 235 civilian cars, four small lorries, two buses, and some 200 pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction. Between 15:10 and 15:15, there were 240 civilian vehicles, one bus, two trucks, and some 230 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and 85 civilian vehicles, two buses, one truck, and about 150 pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction.

On 25 October at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed up to 700 civilians waiting to walk towards “LPR”-controlled areas. A 65-year-old man complained to the SMM that he had been waiting for six hours. While two women in their late fifties and two couples in their late forties said that on the “LPR”-controlled side the waiting time was another four to five hours. The following day, between 09:00 and 12:00, the SMM observed on average 200 pedestrians (about 144 women and 56 men) an hour being screened by border guards to enter government-controlled areas, and on average 104 pedestrians (about 70 per cent women and 30 per cent men) in the opposite direction. At 07:45, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,800-2,000 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas, and no people queuing in the opposite direction. At 10:45, the queue consisted of 1,000 and 70 pedestrians, respectively in each direction. At 14:30, there were about 500 persons waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to the Shypilovo-Sentianivka railway line near the contact line, 3km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored a border area currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM noted a calm situation.

On 25 October, the SMM monitored a demonstration of self-defence groups in front of the Russian Federation Consulate General in Odessa. The SMM observed 30 people (between 15 and 60 years old, 15 per cent female) gathered in front of the main entrance to the Consulate General. Among them the SMM noted known members of Self Defence, the pro-Maidan self-defence group Council on Public Security, Odessa branch of the Right Sector, Azov Civil Corps, and the Union of Disabled ATO Veterans. The protestors were holding posters with anti-Russian slogans and demanding freedom for “Ukrainian political prisoners” in the Russian Federation. The SMM saw 25 police officers and ten National Guard officers present. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Odessa and Kolomyia (50km south-east of Ivano-Frankivsk). At an unfinished apartment building compound in Odessa city - a communal property reportedly occupied by some 100 IDPs, self-defence activists and families of Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) participants since 24 June - the SMM saw that it was guarded by an IDP who the SMM had met before. The SMM observed two internally displaced men and two internally displaced women (whom the SMM had met before) standing by a fire in the central courtyard. An internally displaced woman told the SMM that some 100 IDPs were currently occupying 36 flats in the compound. The SMM saw white cables connecting an electricity source in the courtyard to the flats. In Kolomyia, a representative of a non-governmental organisation (NGO) working with IDPs, said that the major concern of about 100 internally displaced  families in Kolomyia (consisting of 280 mainly young people), was lack of free-of-charge accommodation provided by the social services. Several IDPs have also on separate occasions told the SMM that they struggle paying rents and increased utility prices due to a high rate of unemployment among them. The SMM has, on different occasions, observed that the living conditions in IDP collective centres are poor.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On two separate occasions on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) the SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge) as it observed mine hazard signs east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge. Armed “LPR” members present at the checkpoint also warned the SMM not to access the road due to possible mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM could not proceed further on the road leading west from the Prince Ihor monument due to the presence of an anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not approach the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from government-controlled Zolote-3 (58km west of Luhansk) due to concrete blocks, wire and a mine hazard sign on the road.
• The SMM could not proceed further from each side of the contact line on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that demining had not yet been conducted in the area. At a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that fields and areas other than roads located in the disengagement area had not been cleared of mines.  The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not control the road from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), thus they could not ensure security for the SMM to travel. The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road had not been removed.
• While in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (40km south of Donetsk) armed “DPR” members stopped and warned the SMM not to proceed further west due to the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” member present at the respective checkpoints on both sides told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.