Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 23 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 22 October and fewer ceasefire violations on 23 October as compared with 21 October. Violations centred around Horlivka and Svitlodarsk and Avdiivka-Yasynuvata. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded one and 40 ceasefire violations on 22 October and 23 October respectively. The Mission followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The Mission noted long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line.

Compared with 425 explosions recorded on 21 October, the SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region on 22 October and fewer ceasefire violations on 23 October, including 430 and 112 explosions respectively. Of these, more than 340 explosions were recorded around Horlivka and Svitlodarsk and more than 90 in the Donetsk-Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area throughout the reporting period.

During the night of 21-22 October, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions at distances approximately 4-10km north-west and south-south-west of its location.

On the evening and night of 21-22 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded eight glowing projectiles fired from north to south and two glowing projectiles fired from south to north, 13 airbursts and an explosion assessed as an impact all at distances approximately 4-5km south-east of its location. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as 120mm mortar round impacts, 22 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar round impacts, two shots of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, one outgoing round of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm), and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire all from distances 2-3km south-east of its position. On 23 October, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 21 outgoing mortar rounds (calibre unknown), 12 outgoing shots of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGL) fire, five outgoing rounds of rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG), three explosions assessed as impacts of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds, five bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU23-2, 23mm), and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at distances 3-5km south-east and south-south-east of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) on 22 October the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at distances 2-5km west of its position. The following day, the SMM heard five undetermined explosion approximately 4-6km south-west of its position.

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), during the day on 23 October, the SMM heard at least 30 explosions of mortar rounds (unknown calibre) as well as eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun and one single shot of small-arms fire, all at distances 3-4km north, north-east and east-north-east of its position.

During the evening and night of 21-22 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions, 14 explosions assessed as 120mm mortar round impacts, 19 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar round impacts, 14 explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round impacts, 25 explosions assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, over 45 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and over 150 bursts of small-arms fire. The following night, the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions, 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from an undetermined weapon, 32 explosions of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds, and 47 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at distances 2-7km east-south-east of its location.

During the evening and night of 21-22 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 outgoing explosions (five of which were assessed as 122mm artillery rounds), 16 undetermined explosions, seven explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from an undetermined weapon, 15 distinct bursts and continuous bursts of fire for one minute of heavy-machine-gun fire, and uncountable overlapping bursts and single shots of small-arms fire for two minutes, all at distances 5-12km west-south-west of its location. The following night, the SMM heard 106 explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (42 rounds of 120mm and 64 rounds of 82mm), six explosions assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds, eight explosions assessed as caused by rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm), ten bursts of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and four bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) fire, all at distances 4-10km west-south-west and west of its location.

On the evening of 21-22 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) while looking north and north-east first recorded three bursts assessed as anti-aircraft fire (ZU-23-2, 23mm) fired from south-west to north-east, followed by 27 multiple-launcher-rocket-system (MLRS) indirect rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west-south-west to east-north-east, one explosion assessed as an impact, 15 bursts of direct tracer fire (of which two were bursts of direct tracer fired from east to west), and one undetermined explosion, all at distances 2-8km north and north-north-east of its location. The following night the camera recorded seven explosions of which three were assessed as outgoing unknown projectiles, as well as over 65 tracer rounds of which 19 were fired from north to north-east, 15 fired from north-east to east-north-east, ten fired from south-east to north-west, seven fired from south to north, six fired from east to west, two fired from south-west to north-east, and six undetermined.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations on 22 October and more ceasefire violations on 23 October, compared with 21 October (including one and 42 explosions respectively, compared with 20 explosions recorded on 21 October). On 22 October, positioned south of the bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1km east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) of its position.  The following day, positioned south of the bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire approximately 0.8-1km north-east of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 23 October, while positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire approximately 800m north-west of its position (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard more than 40 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire approximately 2km east of its location (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties. On 23 October, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) led the SMM to three impact sites in government-controlled Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk). The first impact site was located in a field on the north-eastern side of the village. The SMM observed that at the second impact site, there was damage to the main gas pipeline and two civilian houses approximately 6m from the impact site. The gas pipeline had large shrapnel holes and both houses had broken window panes. The third impact site was located between a road and a residential house, and the SMM observed shrapnel damage to a nearby gas pipeline and the house, and noted that wires of a nearby electrical pylon were severed. The SMM assessed that all three craters were caused by 122mm artillery round impacts fired from an east-south-easterly direction. In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM spoke with a man who showed the SMM infected wounds in his left leg, which he said had been caused by shrapnel during shelling in the village that had taken place in July.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. The SMM’s access remained broadly restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

Positioned between the “LPR” position north of the bridge and the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard one explosion, assessed as occurring inside the disengagement area (see ceasefire violations above). The SMM observed two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP, undetermined type) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BTR-1 and one BRDM), all outside the disengagement area. On both 22 and 23 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that demining had not yet been conducted in the disengagement area and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area had not yet received the order to start disengagement. The SMM was unable to proceed further to the railway bridge east of the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge due to the presence of a mine hazard sign.* 

At the “LPR” checkpoint in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area an “LPR” member told the SMM that the main road between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and Zolote had been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Nevertheless, the SMM was unable to proceed on two occasions due to the lack of security guarantees from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.* On 23 October while in government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard more than 40 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire approximately 2km east of its position, assessed as outside the disengagement area (see ceasefire violations above).

In Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), a senior “DPR” member informed the SMM that no mine-clearing activities had taken place in the area. In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed that the mines on the road to Petrivske via Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) were still present.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Romanivka (42km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) near government-controlled Kostiantynivka (62km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted as present nine anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM observed as missing 14 anti-tank guns (three MT-12 Rapira, 100mm noted as missing for the first time, and 11 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm first noted as missing on 12 June) as well as nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), first noted as missing on 16 July.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP, undetermined type) as well as two armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BTR-1 and one BRDM) all outside the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska (see above), three APCs (BTR-3) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), one APC (BTR-4) near Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk), one APC (BTR-60) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-2) and one APC (BRDM-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), one IFV (BMP-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), and three IFVs (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM noted a calm situation at a border area not controlled by the Government near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 22 October, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,500 pedestrians waiting to move towards government-controlled areas. On 23 October at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed approximately 1,000 people waiting in line to travel toward government-controlled areas. On both days the SMM observed queues of fewer than 50 people traveling in the opposite direction. The SMM observed that damaged handrails and uneven wooden slats and planks of the wooden ramp over the broken section of the bridge had not been repaired. On 22 October, while at the “DPR” checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), a civilian told the SMM that he was forced to install “DPR” plates on his vehicle, which the SMM saw; as a result he claimed that he could not travel to government-controlled areas with his vehicle. The SMM also observed the opening of a government passport control point from government-controlled Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) to government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On six occasions on 22 and 23 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. “LPR” members told the SMM the main road from the “LPR”-controlled side had been demined but they could not guarantee the SMM’s security for the secondary roads inside the disengagement area. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the crossing route had not been demined from the government-controlled side and they were waiting for orders to start demining work. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On three occasions on 22 and 23 October, the SMM was unable to access the disengagement area in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) from government-controlled Zolote-3 due to the presence of concrete blocks, red mine warning signs with a danger symbol and white lettering, and anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) blocking the road. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that the road was blocked based on an order from higher authorities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On three occasions on 22 and 23 October, the SMM was prevented from traveling from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Popasna (70km west of Luhansk) as the road was blocked by anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) and mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions on 22 and 23 October the SMM was prevented from continuing toward the disengagement area in Zolote from government-controlled Zolote-4 due to concrete blocks in the road and the possible presence of mines.
• On seven occasions on 22 and 23 October (four instances from government-controlled areas and three instances from “LPR”-controlled areas), the SMM could not proceed toward the disengagement area from the areas near the railway bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) as in one instance the SMM observed improvised mine warning signs, attached to a piece of wood stuck into the ground, hand written (in Cyrillic) "MINE" and in other instances Ukrainian Armed Forces and armed “LPR” members warned the SMM about the possibility of mines.
• On three occasions on 22 and 23 October, the SMM could not proceed west of the Prince Ihor monument south of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) due to the presence of anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 October on four separate occasions the SMM was unable to access areas south-west of the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces position near the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining has taken place in the area and there were no plans for demining.
• On two occasions on 23 October, the SMM could not access the road east of the parking lot at the “LPR” checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions on 22 and 23 October, the SMM did not proceed across the bridge from government-controlled Shchastia to “LPR”-controlled areas due to the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 23 October, the SMM did not proceed across the bridge from “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as armed “LPR” members told the SMM not to proceed due of the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 October, the SMM was stopped at a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb and prevented from continuing by armed “LPR” members who claimed that demining work was ongoing in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 October, the SMM was stopped at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) and prevented from continuing by armed “LPR” members who claimed that the road beyond the checkpoint had been mined and the demining work was currently underway. The SMM did not observe any demining activities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions on 22 and 23 October, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM was not able to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as a “DPR” member stated on both occasions that there was no demining being conducted in the area, nor did the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions on 22 and 23 October, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not control the road and thus could not ensure security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 22 October, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM in “DPR”-controlled Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km north-east of Mariupol), citing demining activities being conducted near an orphanage.
• On 22 October, armed “DPR” members “DPR”-controlled in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol) stopped the SMM, claiming that “DPR” members were conducting demining activities in the village. 
• On 23 October, armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM in “DPR”-controlled Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented the SMM from proceeding without providing a reason. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:   

• On 23 October, while in government-controlled Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk), a man in his sixties signalled to the SMM patrol to stop along the road and proceeded to block one of the SMM vehicles from proceeding by putting himself in front of it, and then began pounding on the hood of the second car. After the SMM patrol leader exited the first vehicle to speak with the man, he attempted to attack the SMM member with a pocket knife. The SMM along with another local resident calmed the man down and the SMM departed. There were no injuries.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.