Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 21 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, most of which occurred in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area, Horlivka and Svitlodarsk, and north-east and east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous day. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed the presence of a self-propelled howitzer in violation of withdrawal lines. The Mission noted long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line and monitored a public gathering in Odessa.

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including approximately 425 explosions compared with 600 in the previous reporting period. Of these, more than 140 explosions were recorded in the Donetsk-Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, more than 40 on the south-western outskirts of Donetsk city, more than 140 around Horlivka and Svitlodarsk, and  more than 100 in areas north-east and east of Mariupol.

On the evening and night of 20-21 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 26 undetermined explosions and six explosions assessed as impacts, all 3-5km south-east and east-south-east. Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) during the day on 21 October, the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions 4-7km north-north-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 14 explosions, 2-6km west and west-south-west. Positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 19 outgoing mortar rounds (calibre unknown), 36 undetermined explosions and 5 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds; all 2-5km east of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-south-east. Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and up to five minutes of continuous bursts of small-arms fire 0.5-3km north-west.

Starting in the afternoon of 20 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as mortar round impacts, 69 undetermined explosions, 16 explosions assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) and/or rocket-propelled-grenade rounds (four of which were assessed as outgoing, the remainder undetermined) and five explosions assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and their impacts; all 2-5km south and south-east. On the evening of 20 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 explosions assessed as impacts, two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds, all 7-8km north-west; and 20 explosions assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, 5-6km north-west.

On the evening of 20 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded in sequence: three explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, two explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, one rocket-assisted projectile fired from east to west, all 3-4km north; and (simultaneous with the firing of the aforementioned rocket-assisted projectile) one rocket-assisted projectile fired from south-west to north-east, at an unknown distance north-north-east. In the afternoon of 21 October the same camera recorded 26 explosions assessed as impacts, 6km north. Positioned in government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 6-8km south, followed by 21 undetermined explosions 6-8km south-south-east and one explosion assessed as an outgoing round 3-4km west of its position in government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol). A short time later, while in government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous day (including 20 explosions, compared with 22). Over the course of the day on 21 October, positioned south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 0.6km north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), one undetermined explosion 2.5km east-north-east (the SMM was unable to assesses if the explosion was inside or outside the disengagement area), and one explosion 5km east-north-east of its position (outside the disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds and 19 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire. Positioned in a government-controlled part of Zolote (61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-15km south and south-south-east of its position. Later in the afternoon, positioned in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-west and seven undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-east of its position. The explosions in the Zolote area were assessed as occurring outside the disengagement area.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling. In “LPR”-controlled Utkyne (47km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke with an “LPR” member who said that two residents of “LPR”-controlled Seleznivka (43km south-west of Luhansk) had been injured by an explosive device. In “Seleznivka a woman confirmed that her husband and 11-year-old daughter had been injured on 1 October when a mine connected to a wire exploded while they had been collecting water at a well. The man had suffered minor injuries to his arms and the girl had been treated for injuries to her stomach, legs and feet in a hospital, according to the woman. She added that the girl had been released on 20 October but would have to undergo a follow-up operation due to shrapnel fragments in her foot. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka, the SMM observed four fresh impact sites which were the result of shelling from the previous evening, according to a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) who was present at the sites. The SMM assessed three of the impacts as most likely having been caused by mortar rounds fired from an easterly direction. It observed shrapnel damage to the wall of an electricity sub-station and damage from a direct hit to the roof of the sub-station.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

While at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard three explosions, one of which was assessed as occurring inside the disengagement area (see ceasefire violations above). The SMM observed an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint outside the disengagement area, hidden under camouflage netting in the yard of a house. The SMM was unable to proceed further to the railway bridge east of the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge due to the presence of a mine hazard sign.*

At the “LPR” checkpoint in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area an “LPR” member told the SMM that the main road between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and Zolote had been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. Nevertheless, the SMM was unable to proceed on two occasions due to the lack of security guarantees from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.* The SMM noted that eight new mine hazard signs with the words “stop mines” written in Russian against a red background had replaced older mine hazard signs along the southern edge of the disengagement area.

In Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), a senior “DPR” member informed the SMM that no mine-clearing activities had taken place in the area. In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed that the mines on the road to Petrivske via Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) were still present.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in government-controlled Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted as present: 18 multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-27
Uragan, 220mm) and ten tanks (eight T-72 and two T-64). The SMM observed that three tanks were missing (one T-72, noted as missing for the first time, and two T-64, one first noted as missing on 6 September and one on 27 September).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) near “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska (see above) and one IFV (BMP-1) in Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM noted a calm situation at border areas controlled by the Government near Syrotyne (182km north-west of Luhansk) and Demyno-Oleksandrivka (180km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 1,000-1,200 pedestrians waiting to move towards government-controlled areas. An hour later, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 1,300-1,500 people waiting in line to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM did not notice any improvements to the broken and slippery steps and damaged handrails of the wooden ramp over the broken section of the bridge. On 20 October, at a government checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed more than 290 cars and 350 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas. Three women (in their fifties) told the SMM that they had been waiting for two days to travel to government-controlled areas.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Odessa regional administration building on 20 October. Approximately 150 members (men, 50-75 years of age) of an Afghan war veterans’ organization called for the payment of their state benefits, which they said were being progressively reduced and were often paid irregularly or with a delay.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM could not proceed further towards the railway bridge due to the presence of a mine hazard sign. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed from either side of the contact line on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). “LPR” members told the SMM that the main road from the “LPR”-controlled side had been demined but that they could not guarantee the SMM’s security for the secondary roads inside the disengagement area. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the crossing route had not demined from the government-controlled side and that they were waiting for orders to start demining work. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was not able to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as a “DPR” member said that no demining was being conducted in the area and as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not control the road and thus could not ensure security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. Armed “LPR” members at the checkpoint south of the bridge warned the SMM of the presence of mines at the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was stopped by armed men on a road in “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and told that they could not proceed due to a live-fire exercise at a training area, outside of the security zone. The SMM heard two single shots assessed as originating from a known training area in Buhaivka. It informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier refused the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:      

• While attempting to enter “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), armed men at a checkpoint demanded that the SMM open the trunks of its vehicles. The SMM refused to do so and was allowed to pass through the checkpoint; however, the armed men did not allow the SMM to turn at the checkpoint directly to Oleksandrivka. Instead they demanded that the SMM pass through another checkpoint more than 6km down the road before returning to the Oleksandrivka checkpoint. The SMM did so and was then allowed to drive towards Oleksandrivka.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.