Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 20 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded almost twice as many ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, most of which occurred in the Donetsk-Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, Horlivka, and areas north-east and east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous day, but fewer explosions. The Mission followed up on reports of shelling. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed the presence of weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The Mission observed long queues at entry-exit checkpoints.

The SMM observed almost twice as many ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including about 600 explosions compared with 310 in the previous reporting period. Of those, more than 200 explosions were recorded in the Donetsk-Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, 117 in Horlivka and nearly 200 in areas north-east and east of Mariupol.

During the night of 19-20 October, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard, between 22:26 and 03:25, 34 undetermined explosions 6-10km north and north-west of its location. The following day, positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard, between 10:57 and 13:40, 118 undetermined explosions, 44 explosions (34 assessed as outgoing mortar rounds of unknown calibre and ten as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds), as well as 38 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded, within 20 minutes seven explosions assessed as impacts from unknown weapons 4-5km east-south-east and three airbursts 4-5km south-east.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, on the night of 19-20 October, 24 explosions assessed as impacts (18 of 120mm and 82mm mortar rounds and six of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP) cannon rounds), nine explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (five from automatic-grenade-launcher, two from IFV (BMP-1) cannon, and two from recoilless gun (SPG-9)), nine undetermined explosions, as well as exchange of mainly heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km east-south-east and south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, between 19:45 and 21:20 on 19 October, 114 explosions assessed as impacts (109 of unknown weapons and five of automatic grenade-launcher rounds) 5-8km south-east and north-west. The next day, positioned 7km north of Horlivka, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar (82mm) round 2-5km north-east, east-north-east and north-north-west of its position. While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two airbursts and heard one undetermined explosion 5-7km west.

Positioned in government-controlled Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and 11 undetermined explosions, 4-5km south-east. Positioned near a checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, within one hour, 11 explosions (eight assessed as recoilless gun (SPG-9) rounds and three undetermined), and numerous bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-north-east.

Between 18:58 and 23:35 on 19 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north-east, recorded 48 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons 5-7km north-east near “DPR” controlled Azov-Sakhanka (23 and 24km north-east of Mariupol), and 24 rocket-assisted projectiles - in sequence - 19 fired from south-west to north-east and five fired from west-south-west to east-north-east, from government-controlled areas of Shyrokyne.

Positioned near government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and saw, within 90 minutes, 37 explosions assessed as impacts (32 of mortar rounds and five of unknown weapons), 39 undetermined explosions, and 24 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (unknown calibre), all at locations ranging from 1-7km north-north-east to north-west of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard, in about 30 minutes, 30 undetermined explosions, at an undetermined distance north-north-east. Positioned at a “DPR” checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard at least 19 explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds, at an undetermined distance south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations as in the previous day, but fewer explosions (22 compared with 27 in the previous day). Positioned in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, at least seven explosions (first the outgoing rounds of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) and their respective impacts), and multiple bursts and shots of small-arms fire 4km north-west, as well as two undetermined explosions 8km north-west. Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 300-600m north and north-west (inside the disengagement area). Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, the SMM heard, at 15:52, one undetermined explosion about 10km west (outside the disengagement area).

Positioned 1km west of government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within ten minutes, four undetermined explosions likely caused by mortar rounds, 3-5km south-south-east. At around the same time, while in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions about 10km north-north-west (assessed as likely being the same explosions heard in Trokhizbenka). Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (49km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions (one about 10km south-west and one 2km north-west).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In government-controlled Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol), accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer to the JCCC, the SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by shelling on 18 and 19 October. The SMM saw five impacts, four of which were in the yards of civilian houses and one at a field 50m from the residential area, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery shells, fired from an easterly direction. The SMM noted damages to civilian infrastructure, including severed gas pipelines and power lines, broken windows and cracked walls. Two houses had suffered substantive internal damage. The SMM is continuing to follow up on the situation in the area. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed 37 impacts of weapons rounds on open ground in an area north-west of “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne on 19 October; the impacts were not visible on imagery taken on 12 October.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC informed the SMM that no disengagement would take place on 20 October at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as they were waiting for orders. The SMM saw six fresh impacts on the road and on the concrete blocks around the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) and under barrel-grenade-launcher (VOG-25) rounds. The SMM saw another 12 fresh impacts on the tarmac at Zhukova Street in Stanytsia Luhanska, assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS 17) rounds. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed fresh impact signs and craters on the pedestrian road, as well as on the concrete blocks at the sidewalk, assessed as caused by rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) rounds. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire. The SMM observed pieces of self-propelled grenades (RPG-7) scattered around the road where civilians were walking, trying to bypass them. The SMM saw the tailfins of two probably unexploded grenades (RPG) on the fencing of the “LPR” forward position. While at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM heard two explosions (see above).

South of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, at a road about 100m west of the Prince Ihor monument, armed “LPR” member guarding the entrance of the road advised the SMM to stay on the path due to the presence of mines. The SMM observed that a path on the right side of an abandoned checkpoint leading north was partially blocked by fuel canisters.* Inside the disengagement area, 0.6km south-east of the bridge, the SMM observed once again an inert anti-personnel fragmentation mine (MON-90) attached to a warhead (part of BM-21 Grad rocket) on a tree, as well as a mine hazard sign on the left side of the road leading west. The SMM could not drive further on the road as it was blocked with tree branches.* On the road leading to the north from the abovementioned location – near an “LPR” checkpoint – the SMM saw again four mine hazard signs over a stretch of nearly 150m on the edge of the road. Two “LPR” armed members at the checkpoint advised the SMM not to proceed further as the area was mined. (See SMM Daily Report 12 October.)

On both sides of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area the SMM noted a generally calm situation. At a government checkpoint in Zolote, the SMM found a part of a surface trip flare (M49A1).

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, a senior “DPR” member informed the SMM that no mine-clearing activities were taking place in the area. In government-controlled Bohdanivka, the SMM observed that the mines on the road to Petrivske via Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) were still present.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: four self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on flatbed trucks in Bilohorivka (87km north of Donetsk), heading north-east; as well as four static self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika, 122mm) at a field west and two towed anti-tank guns, (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) covered with tarpaulin, heading towards the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: four howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one tank (T-72) loaded on a flatbed truck in Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), heading west-north-west and south respectively; three towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) in Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), heading north-west; one static towed howitzer (D-30, 122mm) in Kostiantynopil (57km west of Donetsk), being repaired on the side of the road, on 19 October; one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on a transport trailer near a checkpoint in Iskra (90km west of Donetsk) on 19 October; and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) south of Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas, the SMM noted as present: 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm); 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm); and 29 tanks (T-64). The SMM observed as missing 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and six 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), of which 15 were noted as missing for the first time; six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), first noted as missing on 2 October; nine anti-tank guns (three D-48, 85mm; and six MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), first noted as missing on 9 June and 14 July respectively; and one tank (T-64), first noted as missing on 27 August. The SMM also observed six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8/9K33 Osa, 210mm) present for the first time.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site which continued to be abandoned as first noted on 2 February, with ten tanks (T-64) and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk), one APC (BTR-3) in Makarove (20km north-east of Luhansk), two armoured vehicles (Kraz cougar) mounted with heavy machine-guns, and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) in Zolote (outside the disengagement area), one IFV (BMP-2) at Donetska Street in Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area); two APCs (BTR, unknown type) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), heading west; nine APCs (eight BTR-80 and one Saxon) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on a truck, north-west of Kurdiumivka (54km north of Donetsk), moving south-east; six IFVs (BMP-2) near a checkpoint east of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) heading towards Avdiivka where the SMM saw also three IFVs (BMP-2); and two APCs (BTR-80) command vehicles west of Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk), heading south.

On 19 October aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM showed three armoured vehicles in “DPR”-controlled Komsomolskyi (46km south-west of Donetsk), one armoured vehicle in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and one near government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), as well as one armoured vehicle in a government-controlled area outside of the disengagement area south of Petrivske.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint on the main road H15 in Marinka, three rows of civilian cars had blocked the entire road, driving towards government-controlled areas, not allowing incoming traffic either. At a government checkpoint in Zaitseve the SMM observed 110 civilian vehicles and at least 500 pedestrians waiting to leave government-controlled areas. A border guard officer attributed this to a reduction in capacity as the entry-exit checkpoint was being relocated to Maiorsk. In the afternoon hours, the SMM heard explosions 2-3km from its position at the checkpoint (see above).

At 09:20 at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed around 1,400 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 300-350 people queuing in the opposite direction. At noon, the SMM observed 200-300 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and no queue in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed up to 1,700 pedestrians waiting (possibly due to a recently introduced computerised registry system and lack of sufficient computers) to travel towards government-controlled areas. An ambulance duty female doctor said that, recently, she had to deal with a growing number of patients suffering from emotional outbursts and high blood pressure. At 17:00, the SMM observed about 100 people still queuing to pass the checkpoint and walk towards government-controlled areas. At the wooden pedestrian ramp at the bridge, the SMM noted that the four pieces of anti-personnel grenades (VOG -7) previously noted fastened to one of the rails were no longer present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not proceed further at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to mine hazard signs that had blocked passage to two other roads. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM could not proceed further towards the railway bridge as an armed “LPR” member said the road was heavily mined and booby trapped. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed from each side of the contact line on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the government checkpoint told the SMM the road remained mined. “LPR” members told the SMM the main road from the “LPR”-controlled side had been demined but they could not guarantee the SMM’s security for the secondary roads inside the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM was not able to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as “DPR” members said that no demining was being conducted in the area, nor did the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not control the road and thus could not ensure security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), adding that he did not know when the mines would be removed. The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM did not proceed across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia from each side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that the area could be dangerous due to the presence of mines. Armed “LPR” members at the checkpoint south of the bridge told the SMM that the area towards the bridge had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint at the western entrance to Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), denied SMM access further east. The SMM informed the JCCC whose successful intervention led to granted access for the SMM after a delay of 23 minutes.
• An armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), asked to the SMM to show its patrol plan and denied further access upon refusal of the SMM to do so. The SMM was granted access, after 21 minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.