Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 14 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a significant increase in ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the day before, the vast majority of which occurred in areas north-east of Mariupol. In Luhansk region more explosions were recorded compared with the day before. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* It followed up on reports of civilian casualties. The SMM observed the presence and movement of multiple armoured vehicles in government-controlled parts of Luhansk region. An unknown person threw an explosive device at the building housing the SMM office in Ivano-Frankivsk. The SMM observed a number of marches and events across Ukraine marking the “Day of the Defender”.

The SMM observed a significant increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region with over 854 explosions compared with 311 the day before.[1] More than 683 explosions were recorded in areas to the north-east of Mariupol.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 20 to 40 explosions, assessed as impacts of multiple-launch rocket systems rounds (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at an undetermined distance to the south; at least 120 explosions assessed as artillery fire (both incoming and outgoing) and 16 undetermined explosions, 1-1.5km south between 11:00 and 11:45.

Positioned in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions, one assessed as an impact and also heard 20 artillery rounds fly overhead and their subsequent impacts 2km west-south-west. The SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance south. The SMM also heard 20 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and subsequent impacts and 32 explosions assessed as artillery fire 2-2.5km west-south-west and west of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 14 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 6-7km south-east and south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 500m north.

Positioned in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 71 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery, 17 explosions assessed as MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) impacts, and 89 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery fire, all at an undetermined distance north-east of its location as well as 14 shots 3km north-east and subsequent impacts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire 4-6km north-north-east. Later, the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and seven explosions assessed as impacts at undetermined distance north-north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard and saw 33 explosions assessed as impacts, 66 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and seven undetermined explosions, all assessed as artillery fire, 8km north. Both incoming and outgoing explosions were assessed as occurring near government-controlled Talakivka, “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km east of Mariupol), between government-controlled Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol) and “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (25km north-east of Mariupol) and near “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol). 

Positioned between government-controlled Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) and government-controlled Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance west-north-west. The SMM observed at least four barrels of artillery at a location approximately 8km west firing east-south-east. It was not possible to identify the weapons’ type as they were positioned in cover in a forested area. The SMM also saw two artillery guns assessed as towed howitzers (D-30, 122 mm) and two trucks in a field nearby, in violation of the withdrawal lines.

While in Mariupol city (102km south of Donetsk) in the afternoon of 14 October, the SMM heard at least 20 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north-east.

Positioned at the central railway station in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 51 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun bursts 3-10km north, north-east and north-north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east. The SMM also recorded 15 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds, 16 undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (82mm) and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms-fire 2-4km east. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 30 impacts 3-5km south-east of its location. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms-fire 1‑5km west-south-west and north-north-west.

Between 13:20 and 14:05, while in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 10km south-west and 30-40 shots of small-arms-fire 1-10km north of its position, assessed as outside of the disengagement area.

While at the observation position in Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), outside of the disengagement area, the SMM heard, between 12:25 and 13:20, explosions from automatic-grenade-launchers and heavy-machine-gun fire in exchanges assessed as between government-controlled Zolote-4 and “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM heard outgoing fire from both areas and assessed that some of the firing occurred inside the disengagement area (see below).

The SMM followed up on reports of a number of civilian casualties. Medical staff at a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that a 71-year-old woman had been killed during shelling in Sakhanka on 11 October. According to the interlocutor, the woman had suffered multiple shrapnel wounds leading to haemorrhagic shock. Medical staff at the hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that a woman had been admitted on 12 October but had been transferred to a hospital in nearby government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the following day. According to the hospital register, she had suffered numerous shrapnel wounds to her face and hands. In Mariupol the SMM spoke to a woman injured on the evening of 8 October when she said shells had hit the village of Vodiane. The woman told the SMM that she had temporarily lost her hearing and has suffered from headaches since the incident.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to monitor parts.

Positioned at an observation post in Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard - between 12:25 and 13:20 - explosions from automatic-grenade-launchers and heavy-machine-gun-fire, that was assessed as exchanges between government-controlled Zolote-4 and “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5. Some of the impacts were assessed as being inside the disengagement area. Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers later showed the SMM what they said was an impact from the fighting. The SMM observed a fresh impact 100m outside the disengagement area – and 300m from a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint – assessed as caused by an automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) round, fired from an easterly direction. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces a civilian male had been injured at the location. Medical staff at the Lysychansk hospital (75km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that a man had been wounded by shrapnel in Zolote and was undergoing surgery.

Due to the lack of guarantees that the area had been demined, the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.*

From the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM proceeded to the railway bridge escorted by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer, but could not cross due to the threat of mines. The SMM observed an empty Ukrainian Armed Forces position close to the bridge. An armed “LPR” member at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska denied the SMM access to the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC and after 15 minutes the same armed “LPR” member let the SMM proceed. 

The SMM was not enabled to enter the disengagement area on the western side of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske as “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) were not present to assist to ensure security for the SMM.* Two previously observed mine warning signs (white lettering in both Russian and English languages on a red background) were visible on the western side of Petrivske. Two armed “DPR” members said they were not aware of any demining activity having taken place. One of the armed men said the SMM could proceed into the disengagement area, but its security could not be guaranteed. The SMM could not enter the area due to the threat of mines the sides had not removed.*

A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) to Petrivske via the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), because, according to him, mines had yet to be removed.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) and two artillery guns assessed as towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) in a field approximately 8km west of government-controlled Talakivka.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed eleven self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) on flatbed trailers attached to Ural trucks in government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk); a tank (T-64) on a flatbed truck travelling west from government-controlled Kurakhove on 13 October. Also on 14 October the SMM observed a tank (T-64) in Kurakhove. Near government-controlled Maloianisol (78km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) on stationary flatbed trucks.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 12 MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm); 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); 19 tanks (T-64). At one site the SMM observed that three tanks (T-64) were missing; two for the first time. Ten additional tanks were present but a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier refused to allow the SMM to record their serial numbers.* Two sites were observed as abandoned, with two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six mortars (2B11, 120mm) observed missing for the first time. At another site six mortars (2B11, 120mm) were observed missing for the first time. At this site the SMM recorded the serial numbers of six new mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm). As the SMM attempted to enter one weapons holding area, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied entry while another loaded his assault rifle (AK-47).* The SMM immediately left the area.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-72) were missing as they have been since 5 March 2016. Additional weapons were observed.

In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed all weapons previously verified as withdrawn were present at one site.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone.[2] The SMM observed four IFVs (BMP-2) heading north out of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and six IFVs (BMP-2) heading in the same direction a short time later; one stationary IFV (BMP-2) in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and one stationary IFV (BMP-2) near the bridge; the SMM observed a truck transporting a multi-purpose armoured vehicle (MTLB) north out of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); two armoured personnel carriers (APCs; BTR-3) stationary in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-2) in government-controlled Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk); nine stationary IFVs (BMP-1) near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and nine IFVs (BMP-1) moving north-west near government-controlled Shchastia a short time later; an IFV (BMP-2) near government-controlled Teple (31km north of Luhansk) heading south-west; two APCs (BTR-70) near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); a multi-purpose armoured vehicle (MTLB) on a flatbed and an amphibious APC (PTC-2) moving north from government-controlled Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk); an IFV (BMP-1) on a trailer heading west near government-controlled Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk); four IFV (BMP-1s) stationary near government-controlled Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2 moving east; one IFV (BMP-2) stationary near government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); a truck towing a twin-barrelled anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), another towing a self-propelled radar-guided anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) and one APC (BRDM-2) in government-controlled Avdiivka; an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near government-controlled Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk) and a multi-purpose armoured vehicle (MTLB) in the village along with a covered vehicle, probably an IFV (BMD).

In the early hours of 14 October an unknown person threw an explosive device at the premises hosting the SMM office in Ivano-Frankivsk (see SMM Spot Report 14 October). The blast broke some windows and caused some burn marks. No SMM staff or assets were harmed. A police investigation is ongoing. The incident took place at the same location where an SMM vehicle was set on fire on 6 September (see SMM Spot Report 7 September).

The SMM monitored a number of events marking the “Day of the Defender” in various cities. In Kyiv the SMM monitored a “March of Heroes’ Glory” on the occasion of the 74th anniversary of the establishment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In Shevchenko Park and the surrounding streets the SMM saw approximately 5,000 people (different ages, 70 per cent men, 30 per cent women) preparing for the march. Participants carried the national flag and flags of Svoboda, of the Svoboda-affiliated youth organisation Sokil, the Right Sector, the non-governmental organization Sich, and of the right-wing group White Hammer. The SMM assessed that approximately 20,000 people took part in the march. Around 100 police cordoned off the area and approximately 75 National Guard officers were positioned along the route from Shevchenko Park to Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) and Mykhailivka Square. The SMM observed another march organized in Kyiv by the Azov Civil Corps. Approximately 6,000 people (90 per cent men, ten per cent women, most aged in their thirties) took part, half of whom wore camouflage clothing, some of whom were masked. They carried the national flag and those of the Azov volunteer battalion and Right Sector. Flags of the ultra-nationalist Misanthropic Division were also observed; the SMM assessed that those belonging to this group numbered approximately 40. National Guard officers in riot gear were visible along the route of the march from Lavrska Street via Hrushevskoho Street to European Square. The march passed off peacefully.

On Dnipro’s central Heroiv Maidanu Square, the SMM observed around 500 to 600 people (mostly men), the majority of whom wore camouflaged uniforms. The SMM also observed the flags of the Ukrainian National Guard, the Ukrainian Volunteers Army, and the Dnipro-1, Kryvbass, and Sich battalions followed by around 600 people (mostly men) marching from the Regional State Administration to the history museum. A large number of police were present and the event passed off peacefully. In Odessa, on 13 October, the SMM observed approximately 500 uniformed service personnel from various branches of the Ukrainian military taking part in an event. The SMM also observed 250 junior cadets from the State Police Academy take an oath in front of the Shevchenko monument, an event which was observed by about 300 people. In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored three events attended by over 400 persons. One event included a swearing-in ceremony for cadets from the State Police Academy. A police presence was noted at all events, and all passed off peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM entry to a weapons holding area. As he did so, another soldier loaded his assault rifle (AK-47). The SMM immediately left the area.
• The SMM could not proceed further from the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from the government-controlled side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from the government-controlled side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk towards government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.

-       As no Russian Federation officers from the JCCC were present in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) to assist in ensuring security for the SMM, the SMM was not enabled to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), because, according to him, mines had yet to be removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The road in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia was blocked by barbed wire. An armed “LPR” member at the nearby checkpoint told the SMM that he could remove the barbed wire but told the SMM not to proceed because of the presence of mines. The SMM reminded the “LPR” member of their obligation to demine. The presence of mines prevented the SMM from travelling further. The JCCC was informed.
• The SMM did not proceed across the bridge from government-controlled Shchastia due to the presence of mines. The SMM reminded the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers of their obligation to demine. The JCCC was informed.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier refused to allow the SMM to record the serial number of tanks at a holding area.

Delay:

• An armed “LPR” member at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska denied the SMM access to the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC and after 15 minutes the same armed “LPR” member let the SMM proceed. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report..

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.