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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 10 October 2016
Newsroom

Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 10 October 2016

KYIV 11 October 2016

The SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous day, whereas in Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous day. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians queuing at entry-exit checkpoints and observed a demonstration in Luhansk city against the deployment of an international armed mission.  

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 329 explosions compared with 127 explosions on 9 October. [1]

During the night of 9-10 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west, north-north-west and two undetermined explosions 6-8km south-south-west. During the evening hours of 9 October, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 55 undetermined explosions, all 4-8km north-west. The same evening, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions, three explosions assessed as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm) rounds, and bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire and automatic grenade launcher rounds. All of them, except for four undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-south-west, occurred 3-6km south-east of its location. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 explosions assessed as 120mm mortar rounds, approximately 7-8km south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (93km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 36 explosions, 24 of them assessed as outgoing and 12 as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, 5km west and south-west. While in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1-2km west of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned 1km south of government-controlled Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance to the east. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 95 undetermined explosions and bursts and shots of small arms. All explosions occurred 3-5km west-south-west, whereas shots and bursts occurred 1-3km west, 1-3km west-south-west and 1-3km north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, all during the day, including six explosions, compared with 47 on 9 October.

At the “LPR” forward position just before the broken part of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north-north-east of its position but could not determine whether in or outside the disengagement area. Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 0.6km north-east of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area, north of the railway bridge).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was able to monitor some parts of the three disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC present on the spot in Stanytsia Luhanska did not provide any new information about the disengagement process to the SMM. The SMM did not observe any signs of disengagement on the spot. The SMM observed a construction crane removing and replacing parts of concrete blocks from the vicinity of the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, while being filmed by a TV crew. A Ukrainian Armed Forces press and media officer stated that both bunkers positioned next to the government checkpoint north of the bridge were going to be removed soon. The SMM could not reach the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska from either side.*

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted that while Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were present during the day, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were not. Due to the lack of security guarantees that the area had been demined, the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.* Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC informed the SMM that earlier announced demining activities had not yet started, however he could not provide the reason for the delay

While in Petrivske, on two occasions the SMM could not proceed west towards Bohdanivka due to the lack of security guarantees.The Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were not present on the spot.* During its presence in Petrivske, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion, assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) stated that he could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to proceed on the road north of the disengagement area, east towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) due to the presence of anti-tank mines on the road in line with the former Ukrainian Armed Forces position and about 100m further east.*  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed two stationary tanks (T-64s) near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), nine stationary tanks (T-64s) on flatbeds near government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) and one tank being transported on a truck near “DPR”-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk). In government-controlled areas the SMM observed several surface-to-air missile systems – one 9K33 Osa, 120mm near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), one 9K33 Osa, 120mm, and one 9K35 Strela-10, 120mm near Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. On 9 October, in “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and nine towed howitzers (seven 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and two 2A18 D30, 122mm). On 10 October, in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing 12 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) previously recorded in these areas, as it has been since July.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles [2] and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (two BTR-3s and one BMP-1) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun and two camouflaged IFVs (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), and six IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC; MTLB) near Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk). The SMM also observed two APCs (MTLB) in “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk).

In government-controlled Kyrylivka (53km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in a residential house near a checkpoint and observed soldiers digging a bunker hole in front of the aforementioned house.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard signs near populated areas. While approximately 7km north-east of government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was stopped by people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, in front of the first government checkpoint. They showed the SMM a piece of UXO lying between the toilets in the median, grassy area between two lanes. The SMM informed the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint about the presence of UXO; however they stated that they would not enter this area outside of their effective control. Near the government-controlled checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time at least ten small red mine hazard signs, at the western area of the checkpoint which could be easily accessed by pedestrians.

Whilst in the vicinity of government-controlled Pavlopil (84km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a team of six demining workers digging in the field below the dam. Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM that it was an international non-governmental demining organisation currently marking mine-sensitive areas along the Kalmius river bank near Pavlopil.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 10:20, at a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk, the SMM observed 250 civilian cars and 200 pedestrians waiting in line to travel towards government-controlled areas, as well as 20 civilian vehicles and 20 pedestrians waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At 14:45, the SMM observed that the first line had decreased to 140 civilian cars and 15 pedestrians, whereas the second one increased to 90 civilian vehicles and 60 pedestrians. The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander at the checkpoint informed the SMM that there were 30 per cent more people crossing than usual, however he could not provide the explanation.

At 10:02, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 200-250 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and approximately 100-150 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that on 9 October 1,469 people had entered government-controlled areas while 2,248 people had passed in the opposite direction.

At 07:28, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,000 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and no one waiting to walk in the opposite direction. By 11:45, this queue had decreased to approximately 600 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups), whereas the number of pedestrians waiting to walk towards “LPR”-controlled area increased to 250. The SMM did not observe any repairs on the wooden part of the broken bridge and noted it still remained in poor condition.

On the main square in the centre of Luhansk city, the SMM monitored a peaceful rally against the deployment of an international armed mission in “LPR”-controlled areas organized by “LPR” members. The demonstration started at 10:00 and lasted approximately 1 hour. It gathered 12,000 to 15,000, mostly young people, between 18 and 25 years old. The SMM was not referred to by participants of the rally, nor were any posters against the SMM observed. The demonstration was well organised. Armed “LPR” members blocked all streets close to the site and two UAVs were flying above the crowd. Close to the square, the SMM saw a large number of buses.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

  • On two separate occasions, in Petrivske the SMM could not proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • While in Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC stated that they could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to move further beyond the last Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position due to the presence of mines located just before the contact line.
  • The SMM could not proceed further from both sides of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • While on foot patrol on Donetska Street in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM attempted to cross a dirt road but could not proceed towards the south because it observed mine signs indicating that the area had not been cleared of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas as “LPR” members present on the spot informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM that demining had not taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM could not proceed to the area of the railway bridge (within the disengagement area) from either side because armed “LPR” members and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that the area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (96km south of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members approached the SMM insisting that it leave the area citing an alleged exchange of fire. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

  • An armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk) asked the SMM for the patrol plan. When the SMM refused to display the document, an armed “DPR” member stated that the SMM needed permission from his superiors to proceed further. After 20 minutes, the armed “DPR” member allowed the SMM to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.  

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.