Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 7 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 363 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (848 explosions). In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 29 explosions compared with nine during the previous reporting period, while 23 of the explosions were attributable to live-fire exercises outside the security zone. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed pullback of forces and hardware from the disengagement area both in Petrivske and Bohdanivka following the announcement by both Ukrainian and Russian Armed Forces representatives to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) about the start of disengagement. The Mission monitored the withdrawal of weapons and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons in Odessa.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 363 explosions compared with 848 during the previous reporting period.[1]

On the night of 6 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions 5-7km north-north-east. The following day, at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 3-5km north and north-north-east.

During the night of 6-7 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 45 undetermined explosions 2-5km north-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 46 undetermined explosions 4-5km north-east, and 35 explosions (six of which were assessed as caused by outgoing 82mm mortar rounds) 2-6km south-east and east-south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 40 undetermined explosions 300m-3km north-north-west and north, and 69km undetermined explosions accompanied with 13 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-7km south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 10-15km south (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).

During  the night hours of 6-7 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 explosions (one of which was assessed as caused by an outgoing 122mm artillery round and seven as the impacts of 82mm mortar rounds) 3-7km south-south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 12km south-south-west.  

On the night of 6-7 October the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions, 15 rocket-assisted projectiles, 34 bursts and 25 tracers at an undetermined distance north and north-east. Of those, the first two tracers and eight rocket-assisted projectiles were fired from south-west to north-east, followed, in sequence, by one undetermined explosion, five rocket-assisted projectiles and three tracers from north-west to south-east, one tracer from south-east to north-west, nine tracers from north-west to south-east, two bursts from east to west, two rocket-assisted projectiles, three bursts and eight tracers from north-west to south-east, two tracers from south to west, 20 bursts from north-west to south-east, nine bursts from east to west and two undetermined explosions.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 29 explosions compared with nine in the previous reporting period, while 23 of them were attributable to live-fire exercises outside the security zone. Positioned near government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 10km south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km west of Luhansk, inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 15-20km north-west and assessed them as occurring at a known training area near government-controlled Mykolaivka (77km west of Luhansk). Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 10-15km south, which were assessed as occurring at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to attempt getting full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was able to monitor some parts of the disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

On 6 October in “LPR”-controlled areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed approximately ten holes in the metal struts of truss of the northernmost part of the bridge. The following day, in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers  removing concrete blocks from their position (inside the disengagement area) – south of the government checkpoint – using a crane and a truck. The Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering officer present told the SMM that they were dismantling the position. The SMM was not able to access the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from either side of the contact line due to possible presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO).*

In the morning the SMM saw that a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team arrived at the government-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route. The SMM did not observe any demining activity throughout the day. The head of the demining team told the SMM that demining would not start in the area without security guarantee from the other side of the contact line. On the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM observed armed “LPR” members rearranging concrete reinforcement behind a newly constructed checkpoint, using a truck and a crane, at the edge of the disengagement area. The SMM was not able to proceed further from either side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route due to possible presence of mines and UXO.*

At 10:57 in Petrivske the SMM observed that the Russian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC spoke with the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC, located in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), via radio to start the disengagement and a white signal flare was launched. Subsequently, on the western edge of Petrivske the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-1) and one military-type truck arriving from a westerly direction. Fourteen armed men wearing military-style clothes disembarked the truck and took position in trenches and one IFV took position in a dug next to the trenches outside the disengagement area. The second IFV and the truck left the scene in an easterly direction.  

At the same time on the northern boundary of the disengagement area, near Bohdanivka, the SMM, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC, observed one IFV (BMP-2) withdrawing to the west from the disengagement area. Subsequently, the SMM saw one military truck carrying 20 soldiers with small arms and equipment, as well as ten armed soldiers on foot withdrawing to the west from the disengagement area. Later the SMM noted there were no hardware or soldiers in Ukrainian Armed Forces positions located in the western parts of the disengagement area, although the SMM did not have full access to the disengagement area due to the presence of mines (see below).

At 13:35 both the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces representatives to the JCCC, separately, informed the SMM about completion of disengagement; the SMM was not able to verify the information as it did not have full access to the disengagement area.* The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of Petrivske towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. According to him, the areas westbound towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) were mined and contaminated with UXO. On an asphalt road leading from Bohdanivka to Viktorivka, the SMM again observed two lines of anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report 30 September 2016), which prevented it from proceeding further to the west. Positioned in Petrivske the SMM also observed, between 14:08 and 15:41, two groups of armed men wearing military-style clothes (11 men and seven men, respectively) walking from the direction of the disengagement area to the east and another group of seven armed men walking toward the disengagement area. During its presence in Petrivske, the SMM heard several explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area (see above).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM continued to observe six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in “LPR”-controlled areas: three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira,100mm) each towed by a truck (Ural) heading south in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: 15 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; Uragan BM27, 220mm), three of which were observed for the first time; 21 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm); six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm); ten anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm); and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The SMM also continued to note as missing: 14 MLRS (Uragan BM27, 220mm); 35 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm; and 15 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm); one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm); nine anti-tank guns (six MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; and three D-44, 85mm); four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm); and 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm).

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 36 tanks (T-64) were missing, as first noted on 19 March (30 tanks) and 10 April (six tanks) 2016 .

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. The SMM saw in government-controlled areas: three armoured personnel carriers (APCs; two BTR-3 and one BTR-4) stationary at a checkpoint in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP) stationary near government-controlled Nyzhnii Minchenok (33km north-east of Luhansk); and four IFVs (BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area).On 6 October an SMM mini UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near a newly extended trench several hundred metres west of the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 7 October 2016) and two IFVs (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area, all near government-controlled Bohdanivka.

At a checkpoint at the eastern edge of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed for the first time approximately 20 mine hazard signs (red boards with white letters stating “danger mines” in English and Russian). These signs were located on both sides of the road towards east stretching for approximately 100m.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure. In the area between government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”- controlled Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) the SMM monitored repairs to railway tracks.

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). An IDP settled at the Kuialnyk sanatorium in Odessa city told the SMM that 110 IDPs were still living at the sanatorium, including 30 children, adding that electricity supply had been cut off and water supply had been intermittently disrupted, both since 3 October. The management of the sanatorium confirmed to the SMM that there was no electricity, but did not know how many IDPs remained at the sanatorium.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was not able to proceed towards the disengagement area as the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC failed to assist in ensuring security for the SMM.
• In government-controlled Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to proceed east towards the disengagement area due to the presence of two lanes of anti-tank landmines (more than 33 pieces) installed on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On the “LPR”-controlled side of the of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route an unarmed “LPR” member told the SMM that they could not guarantee the SMM safety due to the presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint before the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) in Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM not to proceed further to the railway, citing possible contamination of UXO on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At an “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM not to proceed further to the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area), citing security concerns, including possible fire from the other side. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to access the road leading to the hill west of the Prince Ihor monument in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the presence of an anti-personnel mine (MON-90) on the edge of the road. Armed “LPR” members present told the SMM that the road was contaminated with mines, booby traps, and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member again denied the SMM access to a compound, citing the absence of “permission”. This was the fifth time since 12 September, when “DPR” members prevented the SMM from entering the same compound (see SMM Daily Report 6 October 2016).  The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Michurine (61km south of Donetsk) two armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed further to east, citing the activity of “a subversive group” in the area, although the SMM saw civilians coming and going without impediment. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side because the area was not cleared of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas because the area had not been cleared of mines and barbed wire on the asphalt road. An armed “LPR” member at the checkpoint told the SMM that anti-tank mines were still present on the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On two separate occasions the SMM was not able to proceed from government-controlled Popasna to Katerynivka (69 and 64km west of Luhansk, respectively) (see SMM Daily Report 7 October 2016) due to the possible presence of mines on a road. The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander present told the SMM that the passage towards Katerynivka was possible only on foot due to the potential risk of UXO and mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While on the first floor of a mineshaft tower at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), where the SMM camera is installed, the SMM heard movement in the upper floor. After the SMM identified itself, the SMM heard the sound of a rifle being cocked and a man shouting “OSCE get out, or I will shoot!” from the upper levels of the mineshaft tower. The SMM left the area (see SMM Spot Report 8 October).

Conditional access:

• In Boikivske (formerly Telmanove) an armed “DPR” member escorted the SMM during its observation in the town, stating that he had received instruction from his “superiors” to monitor the movement of the SMM in the town. He asked for the patrol route of the SMM and he was continuously filming the SMM, including the ID cards of its members by telephone. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.