Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 6 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a significantly higher number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of shooting in Marinka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line and of civilians queuing at entry-exit checkpoints. The SMM visited border areas outside government control, as well as border areas in Chernihiv and Vinnytsia.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 848 explosions compared with 78 during the previous reporting period.[1]

During the night of 5-6 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-10km north-west. In the evening hours of 5 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded five undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east. The same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 80 undetermined explosions 12km south-south-west and five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (152mm artillery) 5km south. During the early evening hours, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 103 explosions (14 assessed as 73mm recoilless gun rounds and automatic grenade launcher rounds; six assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar rounds, three as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) 73mm cannon fire and five as outgoing 73mm recoilless gun rounds; 72 assessed as incoming 82mm and 120mm mortar rounds and incoming 152mm artillery rounds), bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east and south-south-east. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 415 undetermined explosions, 10-15km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned 2km east of neighbouring government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard at least 156 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-south-east and south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In “DPR”-controlled Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard at least 50 undetermined explosions assessed as artillery, 15km south of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 1-3km west and at least 13 undetermined explosions and multiple single shots 2-5km north-north-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, all during the day, including at least nine explosions compared with 284 in the previous reporting period. However, during the late evening hours on 5 October, while in Slovianskaia Hotel 2km south-east of Luhansk city centre, the SMM heard, during 20 minutes, multiple undetermined explosions at an unknown distance north-north-east. The SMM assessed that the shelling occurred in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), but could not determine whether in or outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned on the government-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route (inside the disengagement area) the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, approximately 8-10km south-south-west and south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of shooting in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). At a school on Druzhby Street, accompanied by three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM observed a shattered east-facing windowpane on the first floor. The SMM observed the shot-out window from the inside and noted a mark in the opposite wall of the classroom where a bullet had evidently lodged. A staff member said that it had been hit between 01:00 and 02:00 on 4 October and that the police were conducting an investigation. According to the interlocutor, the students had come back to the damaged classroom on 5 October. The school is located close to the contact line, and according to the staff member, it had been struck last by shelling or shooting on 22 August.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to attempt getting full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was able to monitor some parts of the disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC in Stanytsia Luhanska present on the spot did not provide any information about the disengagement process to the SMM. The SMM did not observe any signs of disengagement process on the spot. The SMM could not reach Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and cross the contact line from “LPR”-controlled side as access was denied by armed “LPR” members. *

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted that while Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were present during the day, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were not. On the government-controlled side, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that the situation was calm with no military movements and withdrawals from the disengagement area. While in government-controlled Zolote-4 in Studentechaskaia Street, the SMM observed the Ukrainian Armed Forces military engineers marking the boundaries of the disengagement area by replacing smaller wooden sticks with bigger ones (red and white) which are more visible from the road.

On the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, the SMM observed three armed “LPR” members at the newly constructed checkpoint 500m west of “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5, at the edge of the disengagement area. The armed “LPR” member told the SMM that the road to the government-controlled side had been completely demined, as well as the adjacent fields on both sides of the road up to the contact line and down to the cemetery in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). He said that two demining teams co-ordinated by armed “LPR” members had been working to clear the mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). When asked why mine signs remain near the road, he said they do not want locals taking shortcuts across the fields, to protect them from possibly being targeted by snipers on the other side. He invited the SMM to cross the fields and said that he would escort the SMM. Due to the absence of an official guarantee that the area had been demined the SMM could not proceed.* During its presence in Zolote, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions (see above).

While in Petrivske, the SMM was informed on two occasions by armed “DPR” members that it could not proceed west towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) due to ongoing demining.* The Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC was on the spot. During its presence, the SMM observed approximately 15-20 armed “DPR” members walking from west to east and back along the road running through Petrivske. In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC who said that on the road connecting Bohdanivka and “DPR”-controlled areas there were three rows of mines (composed of three mines each) at the eastern side of the road after the last Ukrainian Armed Forces military position before the contact line.* During its presence in Petrivske and Bohdanivka, the SMM heard multiple explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area (see above).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area. The SMM saw four multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) each loaded on a truck in government-controlled Artemivske (71km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: 30 self-propelled howitzers (25 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and five 2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) and 18 tanks (T-64) all static near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk); two anti-aircraft systems (9K33 Osa, 120mm) near government-controlled Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk); and one mortar 82mm loaded on the truck together with other hardware near Artemivske.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and continued observing 33 tanks (T-64) as missing, 30 as first observed on 19 March 2016. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter the site, but instead had some weapons carried outside of the storage site.*   

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. The SMM saw two IFVs (IFV; BMP-2) stationary at a checkpoint in government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) and a SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one IFV (BMP) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area (See SMM Daily Report 6 October). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three armoured vehicles near “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk on 1 October and three armoured vehicles near government-controlled Bohdanivka on 4 October – one of them was inside the disengagement area in Petrivske. The imagery also indicated the presence of a newly prepared vehicle position and an extended trench several hundred metres away from the disengagement area near Bohdanivka, which had not been spotted on 1 October.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 09:24, at the government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed approximately 220 civilian cars, 12 minibuses and 250 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and nobody queuing in the opposite direction.

At 08:35, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 300 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and approximately 250 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that on 5 October 2,414 people had entered government-controlled areas while 2,333 people had passed in the opposite direction. During the SMM’s presence in the afternoon at the government checkpoint, the SMM observed that almost all of the Ukrainian Armed personnel were carrying weapons. South of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge among eight “LPR” members observed by the SMM, one or two were carrying small arms and the others were unarmed.

At 07:20, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 200 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas. At 16:10, this queue was reduced to approximately 40 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) waiting to pass in each direction. In the afternoon, the SMM saw a black flag with “11B” in white on the top of the forward most “LPR” position on the bridge.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. Residents of “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) told the SMM that the water supply had been restored on 5 October in these villages after three weeks without supply. In government-controlled Zolote-4 the SMM spoke with two residents who complained about the lack of water during the last ten days.

The SMM observed a calm situation in border areas currently not under government control, at Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), at Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), at Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), and at Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) border crossing points. At the border crossing point in Marynivka, the SMM observed six civilian cars and one covered commercial truck (six with Ukrainian licence plates and one with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. At the border crossing point in Uspenka, the SMM observed 31 civilian cars and 30 covered commercial trucks (28 with Ukrainian licence plates, one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with Belarusian licence plates) waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. During a 30-minute period, the SMM observed and spoke with one man who said he was trading his place in the queue for money on a daily basis. Near the pedestrian border crossing point Sievernyi, during a 45-minute period, the SMM observed eight pedestrians crossing into the Russian Federation and 29 crossing into Ukraine, and saw 21 civilian cars parked near the border crossing point (all with Ukrainian licence plates). Some of the pedestrians informed the SMM that they crossed this border crossing point on a regular basis because they worked or went to school in the Russian Federation, or visited relatives in Ukraine.  

The SMM monitored three border areas in Chernihiv and Vinnytsia regions, Bolhan border crossing point (208km east of Chernivtsi, Vinnytsia region), Studena Border Guard Station (217km east of Chernivtsi, Vinnytsia region) and Senkivka border crossing point (202km north-east of Kyiv, Chernihiv region). The SMM observed the situation being calm.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk and Dnipro.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On two separate occasions, in Petrivske the SMM could not proceed west of the village towards Viktorivka (2km west of Petrivske). On the first occasion, an armed “DPR” member said that the SMM needed permission from his superior who was not present on the spot. After the arrival of the superior, he told the SMM that it was impossible to access the area due to demining activities. The SMM informed the JCCC. On the second occasion, armed “DPR” members and a Russian Federation officer at the JCCC officer present on the spot told the SMM they could not guarantee its safety from the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and ongoing demining.
• While in Bohdanivka, the SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC stated that they could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to move further than to the last Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position due to the presence of mines located just before the contact line.
• The SMM could not proceed further from the government-controlled side of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. On the “LPR”-controlled side of the crossing route, unarmed “LPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint, stating that the mines and UXO were removed from the road on “LPR”-controlled side. However, the SMM observed mine signs on the side roads which indicated that they are still not cleared from mines and UXO. When asked why mine signs remain near the road, armed “LPR” members said they did not want local inhabitants taking shortcuts across the fields, to protect them from possibly being targeted by snipers on the other side. They invited the SMM to cross the fields and said that he would escort the SMM. Due to the absence of an official guarantee that the area had been demined the SMM could not proceed.
• An armed “LPR” member at the “LPR” checkpoint located 1.2km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge prevented the SMM from proceeding to the west, towards the disengagement area of Stanytsia Luhanska. Earlier that day, the SMM did not encounter any restriction of freedom of movement in this place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in Stanytsia Luhanska, 100m north of the government checkpoint (outside the disengagement area), the SMM approached a small construction resembling a bunker with one Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier standing in front of its entrance. When asked what was inside the bunker, the soldier replied that there was “something” but he could not show it to the SMM. The Ukrainian Armed Forces shift commander who was inside the bunker refused to open and locked the door. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Near government-controlled Novoselivka Persha (30km north-west of Donetsk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a previously unknown military compound after contacting his superior. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces solider denied the SMM access to a military compound near government-controlled Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk) for the second consecutive day. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel warned the SMM that they had not removed the mines from the bridge. They said they had not received any orders from their superiors to clear the area of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas because the area had not been cleared of mines and barbed wire on the asphalt road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in the vicinity of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on the road leading to government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed the presence of anti-tank road obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) and a handwritten mine sign. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present on the spot stated that they had not received any orders to open this road; however, the passage towards Katerynivka was possible on foot. The SMM informed the JCCC; however the Ukrainian Armed Forces Anti-Terrorism Operation command refused access to this road for both the SMM and the JCCC.
• An armed “DPR” personnel at the “DPR”-controlled checkpoint at the northern edge of “DPR”-controlled Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) did not allow the SMM to enter the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.