Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 5 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 78 explosions compared with 76 during the previous reporting period.[1]

In the late evening hours of 4 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-east. The following day, at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km north. In the evening hours of 4 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM recorded five airbursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) fire 5-6km west-south-west of its location.

On the night of 4-5 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded eight explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons, 2-4km south-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (two as 122mm artillery and one as 82mm mortar round), 3-5km south-south-east and west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard, within 40 minutes, 21 undetermined explosions, 10-15km south-west and south-south-east (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). Positioned in neighbouring government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 10km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the night hours of 4-5 October, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 13 explosions (six undetermined, five assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar rounds and two assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds), all 2-5km south-south-east. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions, 10km west-south-west.  

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, all during the day, including 284 explosions compared with 68 in the previous reporting period. Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route (inside the disengagement area) the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, including nine 10-30km south-east and south-west and two 10km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in government-controlled Zolote, outside the disengagement area, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-20km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-east of its position (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at a distance of 15km at an unknown direction and two undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within 25 minutes, 35 undetermined explosions 30km south. Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within two hours, 87 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 5-15km south-east to south-west. Whilst west of government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 3km north-east, assessed as live-fire exercise outside the security zone. While in “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard, within five minutes, 40 undetermined explosions 5km south-west. From its position in Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions (two explosions 10km south and three 10km north-west). At an “LPR” checkpoint in Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 19 explosions (six assessed as mortar rounds, and 13 undetermined) 3-10km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk). At a school on Tychiny Street, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM observed that almost 70 per cent of the windows and window frames on the front side of the building were broken. The school director told the SMM that the school had 101 students (aged 6-15). At a kindergarten, 200m north-west of the school, the SMM observed that two attic windows had been damaged (broken glass and partially destroyed window frame). Several windows of a separate building used as a kitchen for the kindergarten were also broken. Education staff said that a powerful explosion had occurred at 06:55. On the side of another road, the SMM saw a large crater (approximately 2m deep and 5m wide) on the edge of the tarmac road that had resulted from an explosion. The SMM saw shrapnel scars on the tarmac road, fragments of artillery ammunition, and torn military-type clothes in the vicinity of the crater, as well as broken tree branches up to 15m away. The SMM noted ongoing repair works to nearby overhead power lines and pylons that had been severed and damaged by the blast. The SMM could not determine the exact cause of the explosion as it could not conduct crater analysis.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to attempt getting full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was able to monitor some parts of the disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC told the SMM that they were ready, but had received no orders regarding disengagement or demining near the railway bridge. The SMM could not go towards the railway lines as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not assist in ensuring the security of the SMM.* The SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member said that the areas around the bridge could be contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM saw, near the parking lot, the tail parts of rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) and recoilless gun (SPG-9) UXO. The SMM saw from a distance armed “LPR” members removing a fake directional, anti-personnel fragmentation mine (MON-90) near the Prince Ihor Monument south of the bridge. The SMM attempted to travel on several paved roads in the “LPR”-controlled parts of the disengagement area, but was prevented due to the visible presence of mines and UXO.

On the government-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC said that they had no orders about demining. Later, the Ukrainian Armed Forces notified the SMM that there would not be demining as their “military personnel were not allowed in the disengagement areas” and asked the SMM to contact the State Emergency Services on the issue. On the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route armed “LPR” members at the new checkpoint said that they had no information about a possible opening of the route, or orders on demining.*

In Petrivske the SMM saw armed “DPR” members patrolling to and from the direction of the contact line, both on foot and in civilian cars. One military-type truck “URAL” drove through the village several times. The SMM noted at least two sets of caterpillar tracks, consistent with IFV (BMP) tracks, along the main street of the village. An SMM mini-UAV had spotted an IFV (BMP-1) in Petrivske the day before. (See SMM Daily Report 5 October.) The SMM could not proceed west towards Bohdanivka as the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Bohdanivka, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) - one positioned on the road, 50m west of the checkpoint, and another concealed in bushes nearby. The SMM could not proceed east towards the disengagement area as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that they could only assist in ensuring the SMM security up to the Ukrainian Armed Forces last position on the road. He added that the area beyond had been contaminated with mines.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area (see above), and saw 19 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 16 tanks (ten T-72 and six T-64) and six mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing, as first noted on 31 March 2016. The SMM also observed the presence of weapons whose serial numbers did not match the inventory list as previously reported.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle[2] in the security zone. The SMM saw an APC (BTR-3) stationary at a checkpoint in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk)

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoint along the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed 190 cars, ten minibuses and around 700 pedestrians queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, and no traffic in the other direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka, the SMM observed 207 cars, 15 buses and about 300 civilians queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. The SMM saw 90 cars, six buses and about 160 civilians in the area between the “DPR” and the government checkpoint, waiting to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas. At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed up to 350 pedestrians waiting to leave government-controlled areas and some 350 waiting in the opposite direction. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that the delay was caused by a failure of two (out of four) computers used to process passports. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM observed 800 people waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas and 30 pedestrians in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 4 October, in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), two members of the local “administration” told the SMM that the area had been without water for at least ten days. In “LPR”-controlled Yasenivskyi (46km south of Luhansk) three men (between 45 and 70 years old) said that water was available only from wells, but not all households had wells. The SMM observed that residents in the Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) continued to face problems with lack of power and potable water supply since February.

The SMM monitored two border areas in Kharkiv. At the border crossing point in Hoptivka (38km north of Kharkiv) the SMM monitored the smooth outbound rotation of 75 officers of the Russian Armed Forces assigned to the JCCC office in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk). At the border crossing point in Sumy (196km north-west of Kharkiv) the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). On 4 October, the acting head of the sanatorium in government-controlled Sviatohirsk (116km north of Donetsk) where IDPs had been relocated from the Kuialnyk Sanatorium in Odessa said that 55 IDPs had arrived at the centre (29 women, 23 men and three children), while 15 IDPs with disabilities had remained in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) as the Sviatohirsk sanatorium lacked proper facilities. In Odessa, the SMM visited the Borschi school in Podilskyi district (167km north-west of Odessa) - a facility identified by the Odessa regional administration for the relocation of 100 IDPs from the Kuialnyk sanatorium in Odessa city. The SMM observed preparations taking place on the ground floor, including works to widen door frames and the installation of wheelchair ramps. The SMM observed lack of other basic equipment and furniture, including in the kitchen area and in set-up bedrooms.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not proceed to the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska neither from the government- nor from the “LPR”-controlled side as possible mines and UXO had not been removed. On the “LPR”-controlled side, a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that there were no immediate plans to demine it. On the government-controlled side a Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer said that the area could have been contaminated with UXO after an exchange of fire the previous night, but there were no orders to demine it. The SMM saw two mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armedin On another occasion, an armedViktorivka (2km west of Petrivske), but the absence of JCCC officers in the village to assist in ensuring security for the SMM prevented
• In Bohdanivka, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC stated that they could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM beyond the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position as the road north of the disengagement area, leading to Petrivske via Viktorivka, had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from both sides of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route. The Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that there would be no demining and that the SMM had to contact the Emergency Services. On the “LPR”-controlled side of the crossing route armed “LPR” members said that they had no orders on demining. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas because the area had not been cleared of mines and barbed wire on the asphalt road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to a compound. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander at a fuel tank compound in Pavlivka (51 south-west of Donetsk) ordered the SMM to leave the area immediately. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied SMM access to a previously unknown military compound near government-controlled Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk), citing orders from superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied SMM access to a permanent storage site.  The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint in Novo Marivka (64km south of Donetsk) denied the SMM access to the village, saying that SMM needed permission from his superiors. Later, another armed “DPR” member told the SMM that even their superior would not grant SMM access as the area was mined.

Delay:

• In Kalynove, a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander granted the SMM access to a previously unknown military compound but did not allow the SMM to record serial numbers of two air defence systems. After the SMM informed the JCCC and told the commander that this would constitute a freedom of movement violation, he granted SMM full access (after 60 minutes).  

1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.