Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with 3 October. In Luhansk region the number of ceasefire violations recorded increased significantly compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of two non-civilian casualties. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM monitored the withdrawal of weapons and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The electric power supply in Popasna was restored.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and recorded 76 explosions, compared with 153 during the previous reporting period.[1]

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) in the evening hours of 3 October, the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (two as 122mm artillery and six as 73mm infantry fighting vehicle cannon rounds), two explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds and small-arms fire at a range of 5-8km south-south-east.

On the night of 3-4 October, while in “DPR” controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded six explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons 3-4km east-south-east.

Positioned at the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km to the south-south-east (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). Positioned in neighbouring government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire 0.5km south-east and one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance west-north-west, but could not determine whether they occurred inside the disengagement area.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded 68 explosions, compared with eight during the previous reporting period. Positioned on the government-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk (60km north-west of Luhansk) crossing route (inside the disengagement area) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 6-8km south-east (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route (inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions, 32 of them assessed as mortars (80mm and 120mm), heavy-machine-gun fire, small-arms fire and 30 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon (30mm) fire, approximately 8km south-south-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area). While in government-controlled Zolote-4 (outside the disengagement area), the SMM heard another three undetermined explosions 6-8km south (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).

While in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 5-10km south of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of non-civilian casualties. In “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), one armed “LPR” member informed the SMM that, on 3 October, between 17:00 and 18:00, an armed “LPR” member had been killed and another one had been seriously injured as a result of a booby trapped mine explosion in Sokilnyky. At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), medical staff confirmed that one armed “LPR” member who had died from injuries inflicted by a booby trapped mine had been brought to the morgue and the other armed “LPR” member was recovering after abdominal surgery to remove shrapnel from his stomach.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to attempt to get full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was able to monitor some parts of the disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted that while Ukrainian Armed Forces officers with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) were present during the day, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers with the JCCC were not. In the morning hours, at the government-controlled side of the area, the SMM observed two military trucks with unarmed Ukrainian Forces personnel and two excavators arriving and continuing construction works on an underground shelter. In an area that the SMM assessed to be inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed one rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) inside the shelter made of concrete blocks located 10-15m south of the checkpoint and two border guards standing next to it, armed with assault rifles (AK-47). According to Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, on their map, the border guards and the weapons were indicated as being outside the disengagement area. When the SMM informed the Border Guards commander that no armed personnel should be present inside the disengagement area, the commander stated that he had not received any order from his higher command to withdraw from the abovementioned position. The SMM had access only to some parts of the disengagement area,*[2]including government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), where it observed a calm situation with no presence of military personnel, vehicles or weapons.

At the “LPR”-controlled side of the area, the SMM was informed by armed “LPR” members in charge of the new “LPR” checkpoint (inside the disengagement area) that they had removed the last material from the former check point located approximately 150m north from the newly established one, which was located inside the disengagement area as well. At approximately 18:00, “LPR” members declared to the SMM that they had implemented the measures on disengagement of forces and hardware in the area of Zolote.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer in charge of disengagement told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were ready and waiting for orders to start the disengagement process. Nonetheless, he informed the SMM that they had received no orders regarding the disengagement or demining activities in the vicinity of the bridge. The SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. The armed “LPR” members at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge also informed the SMM that armed “LPR” members were ready to withdraw 1km from the river banks. According to them, the checkpoint is planned to remain in the current position within the disengagement area. The SMM did not have access to the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska from any side.*

From “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM was prevented from proceeding west, towards Bohdanivka, due to the presence of mines as a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC was not present on the spot to co-ordinate demining and assist in ensuring safe access.* A senior armed “DPR” member said that he was not prepared to withdraw his personnel unilaterally again (see SMM Daily Report 4 October) and he was not aware of a plan to disengage in synchronized steps. On the government-controlled side just east of Bohdanivka, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said it was planning to withdraw from the disengagement area. The disengagement moves were not made due to lack of co-ordination, and absence of the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative at the JCCC. From government-controlled  Bohdanivka, the SMM was prevented from proceeding east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position, along the road running north of the disengagement area, as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC failed to assist in ensuring security and demining of the road.* An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three men wearing military-style clothes inside the disengagement area close to Petrivske in the same location as reported before (see SMM Daily Report 2 October). Moreover, another UAV spotted one stationary BMP-1 in Petrivske, outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area (see above), and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near “DPR”-controlled Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas the SMM observed that five towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and two automatic mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing, as first noted on 8 March (three towed and two automatic mortars) and 30 April 2016 (two towed mortars).

On 3 October, the SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and a UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-3), one armoured personnel carrier vehicle Kozak stationary in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and two APCs (BTR-3) in Nyzhnie Vilkhova (27km north-east of Luhansk) heading south. At the “LPR” checkpoint in Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed, in violation of the Memorandum, an unidentified fixed-wing UAV flying at a low altitude (approximately 250m from the ground) from the direction of government-controlled Shchastia bridge. The UAV made a circular flight above the checkpoint before leaving toward government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoint along the contact line. At 08:15, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 250-300 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and approximately 50 people queuing in the opposite direction. At 08:35, the SMM observed approximately 120 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 50 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At 14:14, at the government checkpoint, the SMM did not observe any queues in both directions. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel informed the SMM that on 3 October 1,443 people exited government-controlled areas while 2,348 people passed in the opposite direction.

At 07:20, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed approximately 500 pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas. At 09:45, this queue was reduced to approximately 200 people (men and women of different age groups) whereas 350-400 people were queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM observed people with their luggage and trolleys struggling to cross the wooden part of the broken bridge which is still in a poor state of repair.

The SMM continued monitoring the situation of civilians living near the contact line. While in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed as one male civilian (approximately 65 years old) collapsed while queuing for water supplied by a Ukrainian Emergency Service Unit. Medical personnel of an ambulance stationed nearby attempted to provide him medical aid, but the man died of a heart attack.

The chief engineer of Popasna Vodakanal in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) informed the SMM that at 07:10 the electric power supply in Popasna was restored. He explained that it would take another three days to purify the water until it is fully restored.

In the area of the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM saw new trenches at the recently abandoned and closed border guard post along the blocked railroad in government-controlled Chervonyi Chaban (113km south-east of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kyiv, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On two separate occasions, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM could not proceed west of the village towards Bohdanivka, due to the likely mine contamination. Armed “DPR” members told the SMM they could not guarantee their safety from the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance. On the first occasion, an armed “DPR” member added that no demining activities could take place due to ongoing shooting in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske. A Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer at the JCCC stated that they could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM to move further than to the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position because the road had not been demined.
• In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not provide safe passage and warned the SMM that they had not cleared the area of mines. They informed the SMM that they did not receive any orders from their superiors to remove the mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas because the area had not been cleared of mines and barbed wire on the asphalt road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from both sides of the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk because of the possibility that the mines on the road had not been removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed to the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska neither from “LPR”-controlled, nor from government-controlled side as possible mines and UXO had not been removed. On the “LPR”-controlled side, an armed “LPR” member warned the SMM that, should it decide to cross the bridge, the SMM had to strictly stay along the rail tracks due to such danger. On the government-controlled side the SMM assessed the area as unsafe, due to the presence of two mine signs and the information provided by the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer about lack of orders to demine the area, and decided not to proceed further. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.