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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 October 2016
Newsroom

Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 October 2016

KYIV 4 October 2016

This report is for the general public and the media. 

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with 2 October. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling, casualties and civilian buildings occupied by armed formations. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Zolote, Stanytsia Luhanska, and Petrivske. The SMM did not have full access in all disengagement areas and was restricted in its freedom of movement in the area of Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske, where it also recorded ceasefire violations and saw an unidentified unmanned aerial vehicle flying. The Mission monitored the withdrawal of weapons and saw a weapons system in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM continued to observe the presence of mine hazard signs. The Mission monitored the situation of internally displaced persons in Kyiv and Odessa.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and recorded at least 153 explosions, compared with 280 the previous day.[1]

Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), within 20 minutes after noon, the SMM heard 61 undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 2-3 October, the SMM heard 19 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (eight as 122mm artillery, six as 73mm infantry fighting vehicle cannon and five as 73mm recoilless gun rounds), three explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds and small-arms fire at a range of 6 to 8km south-south-east.

On the night of 2-3 October the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, ten outgoing rocket-assisted projectiles fired from east to west, nine outgoing rocket-assisted projectiles from west to east, and one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire from east to west at an unknown distance north of its location. Later, the camera recorded 49 tracer rounds of direct fire from west to east at an unknown distance north-north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun-fire at a range of 2 to 5km east, south-east, south and south-south-west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km west within 15 minutes in the afternoon.

Positioned at the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, between 16:01 and 17:39 the SMM heard ­at least eight undetermined explosions 3-5km west, following small-arms fire 2-4km south-south-east, but could not confirm whether they took place inside the disengagement area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded eight explosions, compared with 99 the previous day. Positioned on the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk (60km north-west of Luhansk) crossing route (disengagement area) the SMM heard five undetermined explosions, approximately 15km west and south-west of its position (assessed as outside of the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of non-civilian casualties and shelling. At the hospital in Slovianoserbsk (“LPR”-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM spoke with medical personnel, who said that in the afternoon of 2 October three lightly injured people (one young woman and two men, 24 and 47 years old) had been admitted there and eventually transferred to Luhansk city by men in camouflage clothing. In addition, they told the SMM that the bodies of three deceased people had been received by the hospital that same afternoon and were in a morgue, but did not provide any further information about the casualties. In Yasynuvata, the SMM saw broken windows, extensive fresh damage to the façades and roofs of four houses as well as damage to gas infrastructure and cut power lines near those houses. The SMM assessed the damage had been caused by shrapnel and explosive blast wave. Owners of the houses told the SMM the shelling had occurred shortly before midnight on 2 October.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in some areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas, but the SMM was able to monitor them remotely, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted that while Ukrainian Armed Forces officers with the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) were present during the day, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers were not. During the time the SMM monitored at the “LPR”-controlled side of the area, four civilian vehicles approached the checkpoint and people asked when the crossing route would be reopened. “LPR” members did not allow anyone to pass. In the afternoon, the SMM saw unarmed “LPR” members unload a water tank at the new checkpoint and transport construction material from the previous checkpoint to the new one, which is outside the disengagement area. The “commander” of the checkpoint told the SMM that the road had been demined, but there were still mines inside the tree line on both sides of the road. He added the road still had to be cleaned of shrapnel, but did not indicate if “LPR” members intended to do that and when. At the government-controlled side of the area, the SMM observed no change in the positions of units. The SMM did not have access to all of the disengagement area and its ability to access the disengagement area was limited, as it was unable to travel along the crossing route because it had seen UXO warning markers in a section of the road between the forwardmost Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” positions.*

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer in charge of disengagement told the SMM the Ukrainian Armed Forces were ready to proceed with disengagement should an order to do so be received. Outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw the construction of a shelter, which a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer said would be their new position after disengagement. The SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. (See SMM Daily Report 3 October 2016.)

In “LPR”-controlled areas of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw ten armed “LPR” members, with four machine-guns (7.62mm), one heavy machine-gun (12.7mm), and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher (AG-7) at the northernmost “LPR” position on the bridge. Near the bridge, the SMM saw a newly established checkpoint, located outside the disengagement area, some 500m south of the Prince Ihor monument, staffed by three armed “LPR” members. At the “LPR” checkpoint at the beginning of the bridge, the SMM observed the departure of three armed “LPR” members who had previously staffed the northernmost position on the bridge. They were carrying a folded black flag and towing a small covered trailer. Later, the SMM saw the northernmost position was staffed by new armed men. The SMM saw that the previously observed main container “office” had been removed from the bridge. Late in the afternoon, the Russian Federation JCCC officer told the SMM that the armed “LPR” members would not withdraw from the bridge on 3 October, without providing an explanation.

In the village of Petrivske, the Russian Federation Armed Forces Major-General representative at the JCCC was present, but did not proceed westwards into the disengagement area due to the presence of mines.* A “DPR” member launched a white signal flare at 14:52 and a red flare at 15:01. According to the Russian Federation Armed Forces Major-General representative at the JCCC, the white flare was to signal readiness for disengagement and the red flare was to signal the start of the disengagement process. The SMM positioned at the government-controlled side of the disengagement area near Bohdanivka saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel launch a red flare at 15:03 from inside the disengagement area, not far from the SMM position. At 15:07, at the Petrivske side, the SMM saw one military-style Ural truck followed by two IFVs (one BMP-1, one BMP-2), entering Petrivske from the direction of Viktorivka (“DPR”-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), between Petrivske and Bohdanivka. At least 17 armed “DPR” members disembarked and occupied a trench nearby, outside the disengagement area. The BMP-1 stopped at the road south at the crossroads on the western edge of Petrivske, outside the disengagement area, while the BMP-2 reversed into the trench, with its crew remaining inside the vehicle. At 15:19, the SMM saw a line of 20 armed men enter Petrivske from the west on foot. All abovementioned people and equipment were coming from the direction of the disengagement area and entered Petrivske using the road from Bohdanivka. The SMM positioned on the Bohdanivka side of the disengagement area saw, in violation of the Memorandum, an unidentified mid-range, black-coloured UAV at 15:05. The SMM saw the UAV fly over at least five times and saw it last at 15:28 when it flew in the direction of the contact line. At around 15:30, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that disengagement would continue after the UAV was identified. At 16:01 the SMM heard at least eight undetermined explosions (see above) and shortly after shots of small-arms fire on both sides of the disengagement area. A senior “DPR” member then told assembled media that “DPR” members would return to the disengagement area because Ukrainian Armed Forces had not withdrawn. At 16:43 a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM positioned at the Bohdanivka side that no disengagement activities would take place due to the volatile security situation. At 17:11, the SMM positioned on the Petrivske side saw the abovementioned BMP-2 leave the trench and drive slowly westwards, out of Petrivske, with 17 armed men walking behind it. At 17:13, the abovementioned BMP-1 drove westwards, also out of Petrivske, with at least 20 armed men walking behind it. At 17:17, 12 armed men also headed out of Petrivske walking westwards. All abovementioned people and equipment left Petrivske on the road leading westwards, in the direction of the disengagement area. Positioned in Bohdanivka, the SMM was unable to proceed east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position, along the road running north of the disengagement area, as the JCCC failed to assist in ensuring  security and demining of the road.*

The SMM noted that previously observed additional mine hazard signs on the road running south from Petrivske were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 3 October 2016). The SMM was denied access to the road running east to west (to the north of the disengagement area) from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske to government-controlled Bohdanivka due to the warnings from “DPR” members of the presence of mines.*

Due to the lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines the SMM was prevented from travelling in both directions on the road between Petrivske and Bohdanivka and south into the disengagement area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM continued to observe an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area (see above).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed 14 tanks at the known training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM observed 18 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas and noted that 18 such weapons systems were missing, as they have been since 8 July 2016.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that five towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) and one multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and a heavy machine-gun in the security zone.[2] The SMM saw two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (see above); a heavy machine-gun fitted on a static armoured vehicle (KRAZ) at the government-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing point (outside the disengagement area). 

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard signs near populated areas. The SMM saw for the first time mine hazard signs (red boards with “Danger Mines” written in white letters in Russian and English) at the south-eastern edge of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km south of Donetsk). In Berdianske (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw 20 mine hazard signs connected to each other with red and white tape, 30m from the shoreline (along the beach, running all along from the eastern most part of the village to its western most part). Residents told the SMM that the signs had been installed the previous week. The SMM again saw an 82mm mortar UXO near the road at the southern edge of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, “DPR”-controlled, 96km south of Donetsk; see SMM Daily Report 27 September 2016).

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian buildings occupied by “DPR” members. In “DPR”-controlled Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk), a local armed “DPR” “commander” told the SMM that his members occupied two village buildings, one of which was the former cultural centre (see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2016). In Shevchenko (“DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw buildings on both sides on the main road occupied by armed “DPR” members. A resident told the SMM that one of the occupied buildings was the village kindergarten.

Residents continued to complain about lack of water supply in several areas north of Luhansk (see SMM Daily Report 1 October 2016). Residents in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) told the SMM that water shortages continued in the town and eight nearby villages, including Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora a resident told the SMM that the water shortages in the village continued.

In Odessa and Kyiv the SMM monitored the situation of internally displace persons (IDPs). On 3 October, the SMM monitored the departure of two buses with approximately 50-55 IDPs (men and women, mostly pensioners, including at least nine people in wheelchairs and 40 blind people) from the Kuialnyk sanatorium collective centre in Odessa city to the main Odessa train station (see SMM Daily Report 1 October 2016), heading towards a sanatorium in government-controlled Sviatohirsk (117km north of Donetsk). The SMM observed six members of the State Emergency Services assisting the IDPs to load their personal belongings and embark onto the first bus. Several IDPs told the SMM that they were relocating because it was impossible for them to stay at Kuialnyk as the facility's management had switched off all utilities earlier in the morning. At the collective centre the SMM observed representatives of the Odessa regional administration informing 20 of approximately 100 IDPs who were still left at Kuialnyk that the sanatorium management was willing to let them stay if they paid for utilities. The IDPs responded that they could not afford it due to delays in their monthly IDP payment. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports that IDPs residing in a collective centre, a former child rehabilitation sanatorium, were facing difficulties with the sanatorium administration such as not repairing the facility. The SMM observed present at the site around 30 men in camouflage clothing bearing the insignia of Donbas and Aidar battalions. A Member of Parliament from the Samopomich party and former commander of the Donbas battalion was also present. A person who introduced herself as the spokesperson for the Donbas battalion and told the SMM that they were there “to protect the territory from an unlawful building project” by the Kyiv municipality, and that their intention was to return it to its previous use as a child rehabilitation centre.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

  • The risk of mines and UXO and the sides’ failure to demine the area, as well as failure of the JCCC to co-ordinate demining, prevented the SMM from travelling on the road east from government-controlled Bohdanivka to “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM requested that Ukrainian Armed Forces and JCCC representatives assist to ensure the security of the SMM. The Ukrainian Armed Forces stated that they could not take responsibility for security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines on the road and did not co-ordinate demining. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • The risk of mines and UXO and the sides’ failure to demine the area prevented the SMM from travelling on the road running east to west (to the north of the disengagement area) from Petrivske to Bohdanivka. Also, the absence on two occasions of JCCC officers to assist in ensuring security of the SMM hindered its access to monitoring near and in Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • The SMM was unable to travel along the crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk because it had seen UXO warning markers in a section of the road between the forwardmost Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” positions.
  • An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to a compound in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, “DPR”-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk). Another armed “DPR” member told the SMM in a verbally aggressive manner to leave, claiming that the compound was a prohibited area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed towards the “LPR”-controlled side as the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not provide safe passage and instead warned the SMM of the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM was unable to proceed towards the government-controlled side as mines on the road had not been removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from moving on any roads other than the main road and in the north of the village of Mykolaivka (“DPR”-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.