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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 30 September 2016
Newsroom

Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 30 September 2016

KYIV 2 October 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 255 explosions compared with 198 in the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, most assessed as live-fire exercise at a training area outside the security zone. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM noted progress in demining and removal of obstacles in Zolote. The SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement, including in the areas of Petrivske and Zolote, on both sides of the Shchastia bridge, as well as at a border area currently not under government control.* The SMM observed lack of water supply in several areas north of Luhansk. The Mission monitored the departure of internally displaced persons from Odessa towards areas not under government control in Donetsk region.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, most in areas north of Donetsk, including 255 explosions compared with 198 in the previous reporting period [1].

On the night of 29-30 September, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight explosions - six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (82mm) and two as outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds; four explosions assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds; as well as over 100 bursts and shots of automatic-grenade launcher, infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) cannon (30mm), anti-aircraft-gun, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Hrabove (65km east of Donetsk) during the day the SMM heard, within 30 minutes, 161 undetermined explosions 15-20km north-north-east, which the SMM assessed as possible live-fire exercise.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions as well as over 500 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km north-west, west, and west-north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east and two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds 2km east. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded three explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons and one undetermined explosion 3-6km east-south-east.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre) the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-8km north-north-east, north-east and west-north-west.

At a position approximately 2km east of government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions, 11 at an undetermined distance north-east and five at 10-15km north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 91 explosions (81 of which assessed as live-fire exercise) compared with 222 in the previous reporting period.

Positioned north of “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard some 80 undetermined explosions and uncountable bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, assessed as live-fire exercise at a training area in Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) outside the security zone. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 20km north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

Armed “DPR” members denied SMM access to travel west from Petrivske to Bohdanivka. On the western side of the village, the SMM saw  a concrete barrier  on a road, outside the disengagement area, leading west towards the disengagement area.* The SMM could not travel east from Bohdanivka to Petrivske due to the presence of mines on the road north of the disengagement area.* The SMM saw and heard from a distance the detonation of what a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) said were two fougasse mines near the most forward Ukrainian Armed Forces position in Bohdanivka, but the mines on the road (see SMM Daily Report 30 September) were not removed. He also accompanied the SMM to a location where a JCCC observation post was planned to be established, 1km west of the contact line, adjacent to the disengagement area. Near the planned observation post, the SMM observed a trench-digging machine working. In a “DPR”-controlled area an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two men wearing military-style clothes inside the disengagement area.

The SMM saw 14 mine hazard signs and holes in the places of four previously observed semi-buried TM-62M anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report 5 April) around a new “LPR” checkpoint being constructed 200m south of the former checkpoint, inside the disengagement area, on the Pervomaisk (“LPR”-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) -Zolote crossing route. A directional, anti-personnel mine (MON100) previously attached to a tree, had been removed. A makeshift fence made of barbed-wire and tree branches was being cleared by armed “LPR” members to an extent that will allow vehicular traffic. The SMM walked from the closed crossing point in Pervomaisk 2km north towards Zolote and back and saw on the route, near the bridge in “LPR”-controlled areas, unexploded ordnance (mortar, 82mm) marked with a mine hazard sign (a red triangle on a metal stick, with a letter “M” written on it). Two Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC told the SMM that demining had been conducted on 29 September and about 20 new mine hazard signs had been placed in the area. In the government-controlled parts of the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, the SMM observed Ukrainian flags on the four northern edges of the disengagement area.

The SMM observed an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, inside the disengagement area and in violation of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons. (See SMM Daily Report 30 September.) At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two stationary IFVs (BMP-2) one of which being driven closer to the forward position. About 1km south of the bridge, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed a newly created bunker and an excavator digging trenches next to the bunker in “LPR”-controlled areas. Further south, outside the disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a military-type crane digging a ditch next to a rectangular construction, assessed as a new position. (See SMM Daily Report 29 September 2016.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM observed four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near “DPR”-controlled Zhdanivka (37km north-east of Donetsk), heading south. Near a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fitted on an IFV (BMP-2) (see above).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed 13 tanks at the known training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), one of which for the first time. For six of the howitzers the SMM could not determine whether they were present for the first time or previously recorded due to a restriction of access.*  

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing, as first noted on 5 March.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone [2]. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-3) stationary at a checkpoint in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); an IFV (BMP-2) in the yard of a house in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside of the disengagement area; one armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun and two rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-26, 72.5mm), as well as four rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-26) in Zolote, a few metres outside the disengagement area; an APC (MTLB) south of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), heading north; and one recoilless gun (SPG-9) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed reinforcement with concrete blocks of the “LPR” checkpoints near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

Residents complained about lack of water supply in several areas north of Luhansk. A 65-year-old woman in a government-controlled part of Zolote said there had been no water supply in the area in the last three days or notification on the reasons. Five women (between 35 and 60 years old) in a nearby village confirmed the lack of water supply, including in government-controlled Popasna and Hirske (63km west of Luhansk). A representative of Popasna VodaKanal company told the SMM that they were working on an alternative supply route for the water needed by these three municipalities. The SMM observed that “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora and Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) continued to have no water supply. (See SMM Daily Report 26 September.)

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk), the SMM noted a new insulated steel portable container 100m north of the checkpoint, as well as new concrete blocks in front of another “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka. At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed 300 persons queuing to enter government-controlled areas and some 400 persons queuing in the opposite direction. About 50 minutes later, the queue had dropped to 300 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 250 people waiting in the opposite direction. At 07:15, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM observed some 700 persons queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and about 200 queuing in the opposite direction. Several pedestrians (men and women of different age groups) said that they had waited two hours at each, the government and the “LPR” checkpoint.

The SMM visited a border area currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed, during 95 minutes, 12 cars (11 with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM observed a crane being used for construction inside the border crossing point area. The SMM also observed 15 cars with Ukrainian licence plates (seven entering the passport control area and eight waiting to exit Ukraine).

On 29 September, the SMM monitored the departure of 22 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Kuialnyk sanatorium in Odessa city to the main train station, to then head towards government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). Three volunteers from a non-governmental organization accompanied the IDPs (13 women and nine men, elderly, including two in wheelchairs) who told SMM they planned to further travel by bus from Kostiantynivka to Zaitseve and then towards Donetsk. Several of them stated that they had been effectively evicted from the sanatorium in Odessa city, where the management had turned off power and water on 26 September, as also stated to the SMM by a representative of the Odessa regional administration. On 30 September, the SMM observed a bus with IDPs crossing the government checkpoints in Zaitseve and Maiorsk, continuing across the contact line through the last “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka into areas not under government control.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

  • The risk of mines and unexploded ordnance, as well as failure of the JCCC to assist in ensuring security and of the sides to demine the area in order to ensure full access to the SMM to monitor near and in the disengagement areas, hindered the SMM access from Pervomaisk into the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • Failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to clear the road between Zolote and Pervomaisk from explosive devices prevented SMM passage along the road. The SMM turned back and informed the JCCC.
  • Anti-tank mines on the road near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM reminded “LPR” members on their obligation to demine and informed the JCCC.
  • Two lines of anti-tank mines on the government-controlled side of the bridge near Shchastia prevented the SMM from travelling further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At the border crossing point in Voznesenivka an armed “LPR” member denied SMM access to the passport control area, citing lack of permission from superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC which, about 50 minutes later, told the SMM that access would be granted. The SMM returned, but the “LPR” member again denied its access.
  • Near Kruhlyk an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area, citing security reasons. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • At a Ukrainian Armed Forces position east of Bohdanivka the possible presence of mines on the road north of the disengagement area and failure of the JCCC to assist in ensuring security prevented the SMM from travelling east to Petrivske.
  • Armed “DPR” members denied SMM access across a checkpoint west of Petrivske. The SMM saw concrete blocks on the road and informed the JCCC.
  • Armed “DPR” members denied SMM access to a heavy weapons storage area, citing maintenance work. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied SMM access to a possible heavy weapons storage area and prevented it from verifying serial numbers of the weapons at another such area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • South of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) two armed “DPR” members ordered the SMM to leave the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • Armed “DPR” members denied SMM access through a checkpoint south-west of Samiilove (89km south of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

  • At an “LPR” checkpoint near Uspenka armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM and delayed its proceeding further for 25 minutes, citing the conduct of live-fire exercises at Uspenka military training area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

  • At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge two armed “LPR” members demanded to take down the names of two SMM members, asking why the SMM went close to the window where they process documents.  

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.