Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 23 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk, including 209 explosions compared with 63 in the previous reporting period, with most of them concentrated in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded ten explosions compared with 29 in the previous reporting period. The Mission monitored two border areas currently not under government control. The SMM encountered restrictions to its freedom of movement, including in the disengagement areas near Petrivske and Zolote, and noted a calm situation in the wider Petrivske area. The SMM continued to monitor the anti-mayor protest in Odessa and observed a blockade at the Uzhhorod border crossing point. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including almost three times as many explosions (209) compared with the previous reporting period (63). Most of ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, including 201 explosions.

Between 21:11 on 22 September and 15:41 on 23 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 179 explosions (100 of which were assessed as caused by impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons, and 79 were undetermined explosions) 3-7km east-south-east and south-east of its location. During the day, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as caused by impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 3-5km east-north-east, and eight undetermined explosions 2-10km east-south-east, south-east and south of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions all 2-6km west of its position.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw and heard five explosions 2-3km north of its position – an area near the terminal building of the destroyed Donetsk airport. The SMM also observed smoke columns with high dust content after each explosion recorded and assessed them as controlled detonations. The Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that a “DPR” member had informed about demining activity in the area.

In Luhansk region the SMM continued to note a relatively calm situation, with ten explosions recorded compared with 29 during the previous reporting period. While in “LPR”-controlled Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as caused by artillery rounds 7-10km south of its position, and assessed as a live-fire exercise at a known training ground near “LPR”-controlled Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk). Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard, at 12:03, one undetermined explosion 3km south-east of its position and assessed it as occurring from a location outside the disengagement area. Whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard, between 20:38 and 22:44, 15 small explosions assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) or under-barrel grenade launcher (GP-25) fire and four shots of small-arms fire, and saw four flares and one tracer round (fired from north to south), all 3-4km south of its location. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) – on the north-eastern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard, between 13:27 and 13:29, five single shots of small-arms fire 1km south-east of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware. On 22 September the SMM received baseline information on disengagement of forces and hardware from “LPR”. On 23 September the SMM received baseline information on disengagement of forces and hardware from “DPR”.

Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske respectively, the SMM noted a calm situation in the wider Petrivske area. In Bohdanivka the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces mining team was laying anti-tank mines along the sides of the road leading to the easternmost forward position. The SMM was unable to proceed further to the east from the forward position in order to reach the disengagement area in Petrivske as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM.* In Petrivske a “DPR” member told the SMM to stay on the main road, stating the area was mined and contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO).* On the road leading from the village to the west, the SMM again observed mine hazard signs* (see SMM Daily Report 23 September 2016), which prevented it from reaching the disengagement area. The SMM saw that three men (aged 17-19), wearing military-style clothes, each carrying a sniper rifle, were passing the mine hazard signs and walking towards the west.

At the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled parts of Zolote, concrete blocks in the middle of the road prevented the SMM from proceeding further to the disengagement area in Zolote. At the closed crossing point in government-controlled parts of Zolote the SMM had to turn around due to the possible presence of mine and booby-traps, about which Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had previously warned the SMM (see SMM Daily Report 22 September 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in an open-air storage in government-controlled Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 September.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM noted ten stationary tanks (T-64) at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 16 tanks (T-72) and 21 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), while it noted as missing one anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) which it had observed on 24 April 2016.

The SMM revisited an Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. The SMM observed as missing 30 tanks (T-72) which it had noted on 2 May 2016 (see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2016).

The SMM revisited a “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and one multiple-launch rocket-system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing, which it had first noted on 5 August (five D-30) and 20 August (one BM-21).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) heading south near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) on 22 September; one IFV (BMP-2) at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge; one stationary IFV (BMP-2) near Shchastia; and  one IFV (BMP-2) heading north-east near Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk). The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded two amphibious vehicles moving toward a beach near Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw one IFV (BMD-1) near Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on 22 September and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 22 September in Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two fresh impacts/holes in the west-facing metal gate of an inhabited house and assessed them as caused by 5.6mm bullets fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw two fresh impacts/holes on the west-facing side of a concrete block located 5m from the gate and assessed them as caused by 5.6mm bullets fired from a westerly direction. A resident (a man aged 35) told the SMM that the former two impacts had been caused on the night of 20 September and the latter two on the following night. In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the director of School no.5 told the SMM that children have been psychologically affected by the conflict, giving the example of a 16-year-old girl, who according to him was experiencing memory problems and developing a speech disorder after her house was struck by indirect fire.

The SMM continued to follow-up on reports of interrupted water supply to Luhansk city and nearby areas (see SMM Daily Report 18 September 2016). In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed a water truck of a water supply company distributing potable water to eight residents, who were filling their plastic bottles. An employee of the “local administration” (a woman aged 60) told the SMM that they received potable water for the first time since 12 September, when water supply was interrupted.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 22 September, at a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted 20 minutes before the closure of the checkpoint, that 250 cars were queuing to enter government-controlled areas and no cars queuing in the opposite direction. The following day, at the same checkpoint the SMM observed a queue of 251 cars facing west 75 minutes before the closure of the checkpoint.

In the morning, at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 200 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 400 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. Early afternoon, at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge, the SMM observed around 800 pedestrians queuing to walk towards government-controlled areas and 600 pedestrians queuing in the other direction.

The SMM monitored two border areas currently not under government control. The SMM was able to reach the border crossing point in Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) for the second time this year (see SMM Daily Report 12 September). “LPR” members had repeatedly restricted the SMM’s access to the area. At the border crossing point the SMM observed that access was blocked by one concrete electric pole laid across the road and did not observe signs of any traffic. In the village of Leonove a resident (a man aged 30) told the SMM that the border crossing point had been closed for four months. At the border crossing point in Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk) an “LPR” member, introducing himself as “border guard”, told the SMM that the border with the Russian Federation remained closed. The SMM did not observe signs of any traffic.  

In Odessa the SMM monitored a gathering against the Odessa mayor (see SMM Daily Report 22 September 2016). At 11:30 the SMM observed 18 people (17 men and one woman aged 20-50) wearing camouflage attire and sitting on the benches 100m from the city hall, six men inside the tent that had been erected by protestors on 19 September, and three men in the same camouflage uniforms near the tent. The SMM also observed a police bus parked next to the city hall, and one National Guard truck and one patrol police vehicle (four police officers inside) parked on the corner of the Dumska square nearby. In the afternoon, the SMM returned to the site to follow-up on media reports about a confrontation between protestors and the police, in which a woman had allegedly been injured and one of the protesters had been arrested. A man who said he was a demobilized soldier and a police officer at the scene separately told the SMM that, at 13:50, activists had tried to install another tent in front of the city hall and clashed with guards of city council.

The SMM followed-up on reports of a blockade at the Uzhhorod border crossing point (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia region) between Ukraine and Slovakia. On 21 September the SMM had monitored a protest of 30-35 people (mostly men, different age groups) who were blocking with cars vehicular traffic in the direction of Slovakia on the road 500m before the border crossing point. Protesters had told the SMM that they had been protesting at the border crossing point for five days, and demanded to amend regulations regarding vehicles with non-Ukrainian licence plates. On 22 September the SMM did not see any protesters at the site. Two patrol police officers confirmed to the SMM that the protesters had removed cars in the morning, adding that the protesters had reached agreement with authorities. The Chief of Zakarpattia regional police told the SMM that no incidents had occurred during the five days of the protest.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed further to the west. When the SMM explained about its freedom of movement, one of the armed men, having introduced himself as the “commander”, said that if the SMM would not leave the area, the SMM members would be handcuffed in a cellar. The SMM left the area and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area from government-controlled Bohdanivka as the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske a “DPR” member told the SMM not to leave the main road, stating the area was mined and contaminated with UXO.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was prevented from entering the disengagement area due to the presence of mine hazard signs on the westerly road connecting the village with the disengagement area.
• At the closed crossing point in a government-controlled part of Zolote the SMM had to turn around due to possible presence of mine and booby-traps, about which Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had previously informed the SMM (see SMM Daily Report 22 September 2016). At the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled parts of Zolote, the concrete blocks in the middle of the road prevented the SMM from proceeding further to the disengagement area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member allowed the SMM to proceed further to “DPR”-controlled Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) on condition of accepting an escort. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• In the centre of “DPR”-controlled Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk), a road was blocked by a farm trailer with a mine hazard sign on it. The SMM was not able to proceed further to the west. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.