Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 15 September 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region including 425 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (670 explosions). The SMM observed no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. It observed damage to civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region and facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance and also followed up on an uncontrolled detonation near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region than during the previous reporting period with 425 explosions, compared with 670 the previous day.
During the night of 14-15 September while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, before midnight the SMM heard 233 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west of its location, 147 of which were heard in less than one hour. The SMM also heard one other explosion after midnight. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 68 undetermined explosions in just over one hour 6-7km west and 8-10km south-west of its location, as well as six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-6km north, all prior to midnight on 14-15 September.
On 15 September whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 63 undetermined explosions as well as 54 single shots and seven bursts of small arms fire all 2-6km west-south-west of its position in just under four hours. The SMM also heard one outgoing explosion of an unknown weapon 3-4km south-east of its position in Avdiivka.
Before midnight on the night of 14-15 September the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded 43 explosions assessed as impacts of unknown rounds and six more after midnight. It also recorded several exchanges of continuous crossfire between east and west, 3-6km east-south-east, 2-3km south-south-east, 4km south-east and 8-9km east of its location.
The SMM observed no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
The SMM followed-up on reports of shelling and observed damage to residential areas. In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (32km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed damage to buildings at three sites. Three separate groups of residents told the SMM that residential areas had come under fire on 14 September. In the loft of a residential building in Tsentralna Street the SMM observed a hole in the floor of a loft and assessed it as an impact likely caused by an anti-tank projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also observed a hole in the roof where it assessed the projectile had entered the building of the loft, and damage to it being repaired by workers. Two male residents of the building (20 and 36 years old), one of whom was the owner of the damaged flat, told the SMM that the incident had occurred the afternoon of 14 September. The owner of the flat told the SMM he and his mother had been in the adjacent room when the round hit. In an office at a second, non-residential building in the same street the SMM observed damage to shelves located close to a broken western-facing window assessed as caused by bullets fired from a westerly direction. Four women (aged 20-65) told the SMM they had been present in the room when it was hit, but none of them had been injured. Outside the building the SMM observed broken glass under the window of the affected office. At the third site, at School no. 3 in Lenina Street, the SMM observed bullet holes in the west-south-west-facing window of a teacher’s office. The window had not shattered and was assessed as having been penetrated by a large calibre round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. On the second floor of the school the SMM observed a west-south-west facing window which it assessed as having been penetrated by a large calibre round fired from a west-south-westerly direction, again possibly 30mm. On the school’s football grounds the SMM observed a divot where it assessed a round of ammunition had impacted the ground and also damaged the iron rod of a fence. The SMM assessed that the impact in the field was recent. The director of the school told the SMM that 14 pupils were still present on the premises of the school when it came under fire. In total approximately 350 students are enrolled in the school.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (2S6M Tunguska), near government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) on 14 September; and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) inside a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound 1km south of government-controlled Anadol (39km north of Mariupol).
Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) travelling north-west near government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 55km north-west of Donetsk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM noted the presence of 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 16 of which were observed for the first time, 27 towed howitzers (15 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 155mm), 24 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 12 mortars (M120-15, 12mm). The SMM continued to note as missing 34 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 16 of which were observed as missing for the first time, 15 towed howitzers (three 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 155mm), 61 anti-tank guns (55 MT-12 Rapira,100mm and six D-48, 85mm), 18 mortars (12 2B11 Sani, 120mm; and six PM38, 120mm). The SMM also noted that three of those areas continued to be abandoned (one since 12 March and two since 14 July).
The SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and observed ten tanks (T-64) missing as it observed for the first time on 21 July 2016.
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33 km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two stationary light-armoured vehicles (Kraz Cougar) each mounted with a heavy machine-gun. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (59km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed one stationary armoured personnel carrier (MTLB).
The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In government-controlled Orikhove (50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an unexploded 122mm rocket (MLRS) stuck in the ground in a field approximately 200m from a house and 200m from a road. In “DPR”-controlled Kamyanka (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a UXO of unknown type in a toilet at an agricultural facility.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the railway tracks in government-controlled Orikhove (57 km north-west of Luhansk) and to the water pumps at “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM observed the establishment of new secondary positions in “LPR”-controlled Dovhe (23km north-west of Luhansk). Some 800m from the contact line, the SMM observed new trenches and observation positions approximately 2km long, next to a road near the bus station and 20-25 armed “LPR” members walking on the road where the trenches were located.
At a border crossing point controlled by the Government in Milove (108km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed seven cars (licence plates not visible) waiting to cross the border from Ukraine and two other cars crossing the border in a thirty-minute period. It did not observe any vehicles entering Ukraine. The commander at the border crossing point told the SMM that approximately 2,500 pedestrians and 400 vehicles cross the border in both directions every day.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- In government-controlled Yurivka (32km south-west of Mariupol) an armed guard at a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound denied the SMM access to the site. The guard refused to allow the SMM entry despite the patrol explaining the SMM mandate and its freedom of movement. The JCCC was informed.
Conditional access:
- An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint in Kalynove (59km west of Luhansk) stopped the SMM and would not allow them to pass. Another armed “LPR” member told the SMM they could only proceed with an “escort”. The SMM was “escorted” towards the contact line. The JCCC was informed.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.