Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 9 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations both in Donetsk (including 36 explosions recorded) and Luhansk (five explosions recorded) regions compared with the previous reporting period (including 63 and 41 explosions recorded, respectively). All ceasefire violations were recorded during the daytime, with many concentrated in Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area. The Mission observed long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line, and visited schools on both sides of the contact line. It encountered impediments to its freedom of movement on eight occasions, all but one in areas outside the government control. The SMM noted a calm situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM followed up on media reports on clashes with the involvement of Azov Civil Corps in Kyiv.  

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region during the reporting period including 36 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (including 63 explosions). Most of ceasefire violations were observed in Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 2-6km west-north-west and north-north-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM recorded 16 undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east of its position.

In the evening at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as having been caused by an outgoing automatic grenade launcher round and one explosion assessed as having been the impact of an automatic grenade launcher round, both 1-2km north-east of its position.

Positioned south-east of government-controlled Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-5km south-south-east of its position. Positioned 2.5km south-west of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km west of its position.

The SMM also recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region during the reporting period with five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (41 explosions). Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (61m north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2km north-east of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions more than 10km north-west of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) mounted on a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) at a checkpoint in government-controlled Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM saw three surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) at a military compound near government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk); one surface-to-air missile system (SA-13 Strela-10, 120mm) at a military compound near government-controlled Novooleksiivka (70km south of Donetsk); and six tanks (T-64) at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas, the SMM noted as present 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), and noted as missing 25 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm). The SMM visited another site for the first time and observed six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) whose serial numbers matched the six missing weapons from one of the abovementioned sites.

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted one such site continued to be abandoned, with 16 tanks (T-64) missing as first noted on 29 July 2016. It also observed that 22 tanks (T-64) and ten mortars (seven 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm; one 2B14 Podnos, 82mm; and two BM-37 82mm) were missing from another site, as it observed previously. At one site, the SMM noted that all previously recorded weapons were present.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one stationary armoured personnel carrier (BRDM-2) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) towed by a truck heading south near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk); and one APC (BRDM-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor the repair work of water pumps in the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as well as the  Mykhailivka power sub-station in “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 306 cars and three buses waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 131 civilian cars and two buses waiting to travel in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon at the same checkpoint the SMM noted a queue of 282 cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas, while 240 cars were queuing in the opposite direction. A man (in his forties) queuing told the SMM that traffic was lighter that day and had waited six hours , adding that occasionally they had to spend the night in an area between a government checkpoint and a “DPR” checkpoint with approximately 100 other vehicles.

In the morning hours, at the last government checkpoint before the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 300 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 150 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM noted again the poor condition of the wooden ramp across the broken part of the bridge – in some places the handrails were missing while in others they were loose. A woman (in her seventies) told the SMM that she had very poor eyesight and had great difficulties to cross the wooden part of the bridge. With her approval the SMM helped her to cross that section of the bridge.

The SMM monitored the situation at schools near the contact line. In government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM noted that the municipal computer science school was not in use. Two residents told the SMM the school had been closed since shelling in July 2014 damaged the roof. In the same town the SMM also observed a military compound at a former psychiatric clinic approximately 600m from an orphanage. At school no.84 in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka, the deputy director explained to the SMM changes to the curriculum from that of the previous school year: the number of Ukrainian language classes in a week had decreased from two to one and the history of “Motherland” was taught instead of the history of Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. At the crossing points near Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67, 77 and 163km south-east of Kherson, respectively) and in adjacent areas, including Chonhar Peninsula, the SMM noted a generally calm situation. On 8 September the SMM observed a four-wheeled armoured vehicle at the end of the border guard controlled area at the Chonhar crossing point. The following day, the SMM noted a new military position under construction north of the Kalanchak crossing point.

The SMM followed up on media reports on clashes with the involvement of the Azov Civil Corps in Kyiv. In the evening of 8 September, in Sviatoshyn district (west of Kyiv city centre) the SMM observed a construction site being cordoned by approximately 200 law enforcement officers and 30 activists (aged 20-30), some of them wearing T-shirts with insignias of the Azov Civil Corps nearby. Later that evening, the SMM saw smoke rising from the vicinity of the construction site. According to an official police statement, dozens of activists had tried to break into the construction site, throwing fireworks and smoke bombs. In response to the activists’ actions security guards and employees of the construction site had lit tyres. The following day the SMM saw 15 activists wearing T-shirts with the insignias of the Azov Civil Corps and a small tent with the logo of the Azov Civil Corps near the construction site with remnants of the broken metal fences surrounding the construction site. In the morning of 9 September, the SMM observed a gathering of 100 people (mostly men aged 20-40 wearing helmets and vests with logos of different construction companies) in front of the building of a construction company in Pecherskyi district. A representative of the company told the SMM that workers had gathered to support the company following clashes that had allegedly taken place earlier that day. The SMM saw burned marks on the street. According to the official Kyiv city police report, 50 activists of Azov Civil Corps had blocked the entrance of the company building and burned tyres and garbage in order to protest against the construction in the aforementioned site. In the vicinity of the site, the SMM also noted six patrol police officers and  four buses with approximately 150 officers of the National Guard and special riot police forces.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In the morning at the eastern entrance of Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member stopped and prevented the SMM from entering the village. The JCCC was informed.
• In the afternoon an armed “DPR” member again denied the SMM access to Sosnivske at the aforementioned location. The JCCC was informed again.
• An armed “DPR” member denied access to a site on the eastern edge of “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), where amphibious landing exercise had been allegedly conducted the previous night. The JCCC was informed.
• In the morning at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), armed “LPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed further to a hill. The JCCC was informed.
• In “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (28km south-west of Luhansk), three armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM while on route to a training area. They asked the SMM to turn back, citing live-fire exercises being conducted in the training area. The SMM noted that the roads around the training area were closed with armed men wearing military-style clothes guarding the area. During its 35-minute observation at two different locations further away from the training area, the SMM did not see or hear any live-fire exercise. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access

• At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to pass the checkpoint on condition that the SMM vehicles would follow a “DPR member walking ahead of the vehicles. The JCCC was informed.
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander allowed only one of the SMM monitors to enter a military compound in government-controlled in Novooleksiivka.

Delay:

• In the afternoon at the aforementioned checkpoint in Pionerske, two armed “LPR” personnel stopped the SMM and prevented it from proceeding further up the hill. After one hour and 20 minutes, the “commander” arrived at the location and allowed the SMM to proceed. The JCCC was informed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.