Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 8 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded an increase in ceasefire violations, but a decrease in explosions in Donetsk region, 63 compared with 139 explosions in the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded 31 explosions, assessed as live-fire exercise. The SMM followed up on reports of a non-civilian casualty in Donetsk city. The SMM visited schools on both sides of the contact line. It followed up on the alleged attack at Inter television channel in Kyiv. The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea where it observed a helicopter, a surface-to-air missile system and two multiple-launch rocket systems.

The SMM recorded an increase in ceasefire[1] violations, but a decrease in explosions in Donetsk region, 63 compared with 139 explosions in the previous reporting period.

Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km north-north-west of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, throughout the day, 42 undetermined explosions 2-5km west of its position. In the evening hours of 7 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded one explosion assessed as an impact of recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire 7km south and three airbursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 3-6km east-south-east of its location. The next day the camera recorded six undetermined explosions 6-7km east-south-east of its location.

On the night of 7 September the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded, within 40 minutes, 115 bursts of direct tracer fire, in sequence: 90 from east to west, eight from west to east, six from east to west, and 11 from west to east; four undetermined explosions and five explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons; as well as 29 rocket assisted projectiles from west-south-west to east-north-east, all at an unknown distance north-east. 

In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and uncountable single shots of small arms-fire 2-3km south-south-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded in total 41 explosions, attributable to live-fire exercises outside the security zone, and one shot of small-arms fire. Positioned at two different locations, in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard in total 41 undetermined explosions, which it assessed as live-fire exercise at a known shooting range near government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Yar (north-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city) the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire 3km east of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM observed two howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported on flatbed trucks on the road near government-controlled Chasiv Yar (62km north of Donetsk) heading west, four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and about 500 rockets (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in government-controlled Ivanivka (59km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 11 July 2016).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed five tanks (T-64) at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed that one such site continued to be abandoned and that 29 anti-tank guns (28 MT-12 Rapira 100mm, and one T-12 Rapira 100mm) were still missing as first reported on 11 April 2016. The SMM visited another site for the first time and observed ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

The SMM revisited two Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and at one site observed that 16 tanks (six T-64, and ten T-72) and six mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing as first observed on 31 March 2016. The SMM also observed the presence of weapons whose serial numbers did not match the inventory list as previously reported.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60 and BTR-70) heading north, and one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) parked in the yard of a house.

The SMM followed up on reports of a non-civilian casualty, allegedly an unarmed “DPR” member killed on 7 September in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre). The SMM visited the Kalinin hospital morgue in Donetsk city where it was allowed to observe, only after a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) spoke to the staff at the morgue, the body of a 34-year-old male dressed in camouflage pants heavily stained by blood in the groin area and a sleeveless shirt with no visible insignia. The SMM observed two field dressings applied to the thigh and a tourniquet fastened below the knee of the right leg of the victim, as well as a tourniquet around the left leg and a dressing applied to the back of his head. The bandages prevented the SMM from observing any wounds. The Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC officer gave a statement in front of a television camera.

The SMM visited schools on both sides of the contact line and in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 500m from School no. 3. The SMM observed newly installed windows in one part of the building while the rest had been covered with plastic. As there was no school staff on site, the SMM spoke with four residents (three women, one man, aged 30-50) living close to the school. They said School no. 3 had relocated to School no. 5 while the former was being repaired. The SMM also visited School no. 11 in “DPR”-controlled Bunhe (formerly Yunokomunarivsk, 43km north-east of Donetsk) and spoke with the director who said the school had been damaged by shelling in August 2014. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls near the entrance of the school. The director said the school had re-opened in April 2016. The SMM observed most of the windows on the south-east side of the school had new windows and that the school had a new roof and it also observed track marks embedded in the asphalt 50m from the school’s main entrance resembling tracks of an armoured vehicle. A man living close to the school spoke with the SMM in his front yard and told SMM he had lived in his house during the entire time of the conflict. He said that previously there had been a “DPR checkpoint” on the road leading to the school and that there had been armed positions near a lake towards the north-east. He told SMM there had been shelling back and forth from the lake to the school grounds in August 2014.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians travelling across the contact line at the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). On the government-controlled side the SMM twice observed wheelchairs being used to transport elderly impaired people in a ten minute period. State Emergency Service personnel informed the SMM that they were in need of more wheelchairs for transporting people across the bridge as they only had two. The SMM also observed that the door to one of two wooden toilets had broken off. State Emergency Service personnel further told the SMM that they only had two blood pressure monitors and both were broken. They said they urgently needed repairing as well as additional monitors to carry out their work efficiently. At the southernmost “LPR” checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM spoke with people working there who said  no computers were being used by “LPR” members to process travel documents in either direction and that all registration was done by hand. On the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed that the handrail on the wooden broken part of the bridge was still missing on the top left side. The SMM saw a number of people struggling to go up or down the wooden ramp, including one lady with serious difficulties walking. (The State Emergency Services had taken her to the bridge by wheelchair).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 7 September at a checkpoint in government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed approximately 250 pedestrians, 21 passenger vehicles and two buses waiting to cross south into government-controlled areas, and approximately 50 pedestrians, 26 passenger vehicles and two buses waiting to travel in the opposite direction.

On 8 September at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM noted 180 civilian vehicles waiting to travel toward government-controlled areas. Some people in the queue (men and women, aged 30-60) said they had been waiting between six and ten hours. On 8 September at a “DPR” checkpoint at Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 190 cars waiting to move towards government-controlled Maiorsk (44km north-north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on an alleged arson attack that occurred on 4 September at Inter television channel in Kyiv. (See SMM Daily Report 5 September 2016). The SMM observed six security guards at the building’s side entrance and two other security guards in camouflage clothing and bullet proof vests at the back of the building. Inside the building the SMM observed that clean-up and repair works were underway.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. At the crossing points near Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67, 77 and 163km south-east of Kherson respectively) and in adjacent areas, including at the administrative boundary line on the Arabat spit (near Valok Resort, 205km south-east of Kherson) and the Mala Kosa peninsula, the SMM noted a generally calm situation. In Strilkove (193km south-east of Kherson) the SMM observed a helicopter (assessed as MI-8/MI-24) flying from north to south some 10km from its position. The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) at a military compound near Khlibodarivka (90km south-east of Kherson) and two truck mounted MLRS (9P140, Uragan, 220mm) at a guarded military compound near Molochne (87km south-east of Kherson).

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Three armed guards denied the SMM access to a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed man stopped the SMM at the south-eastern edge of “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk) and told the patrol that it was not allowed to proceed on the road leading to “LPR”-controlled Khriashchivka (22km east of Luhansk. He told the SMM that civilians were allowed to travel on the road but the SMM was not.  The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access

• “DPR”-members at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM they had new orders that all cars had to queue except those with elderly and disabled people and that no exception would be made for the SMM. The SMM was in the queue for ten minutes before passing through the checkpoint. The JCCC was not informed.

Delay:

• Five armed “DPR” members at the checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM that it could not enter “DPR”-controlled areas. After 23 minutes the SMM was allowed to pass. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from entering a Ukrainian Armed Forces military compound located on the edges of Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol). The JCCC was informed and after 34 minutes the SMM was allowed entry.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.