Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 September 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region (18 explosions compared with 95 on 31 August) and also in Luhansk region (eight explosions compared with 155 on 31 August). The SMM followed up on reports of civilian deaths and injuries, conducted crater analysis in Oleksandrivka, Yasynuvata and Sakhanka in Donetsk region, and observed damage from shelling to civilian infrastructure. The SMM monitored three border areas in Mykolaivka, Krasna Talivka and Blahovishchenka, and visited schools on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to monitor a calm situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, with 18 explosions recorded compared with 95 explosions recorded the previous reporting period.  

On the evening of 31 August while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions. The following day positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard  nine undetermined explosions and 30 bursts of small arms fire, all 2-7km west of its position. The SMM heard another three bursts of small-arms fire 1km east of its position. The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka recorded five explosions assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons 3-5 km east and south-east of its location. From its position at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 4-5km to the east-north-east and a single shot of small-arms fire 1km to the west-north-west.

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations also in Luhansk region, with eight explosions recorded, compared with approximately 155 explosions recorded during the previous reporting period.

At 03:30 on 1 September in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city centre, the SMM heard a loud undetermined explosion assessed to have occurred some 400m north-west of its position. Later that day the SMM followed up on media reports of an explosion of an improvised explosive device (IED) in a local park and observed minor damage to the base of a monument located at the same place where the aforementioned explosion was assessed to have occurred. The SMM also saw two “LPR” members apparently examining the scene.

At 19:38 on 31 August, while in Luhansk city centre, the SMM observed an unidentified object flying across the sky that was assessed as an unknown rocket emitting a fiery trail and traveling from the north-east to the south-west at approximately 1000m in altitude. The object was visible to the SMM for approximately one minute until it crossed the horizon.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 10km west-north-west of its position. From its position in government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-7km north of its position. The SMM also heard one undetermined explosion 50-70m to the north-east while on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (government controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties, observed the results of shelling and conducted craters analysis. On 31 August in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a “DPR” member, observed eleven fresh craters in a residential area – in the back yard gardens of houses, behind a nightclub, near a pharmacy and on an asphalt road. Two craters were located 100-150m from a school. The SMM assessed that all craters had been caused by 73mm rounds (2A28 Grom or recoilless gun (SPG-9)) fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to metal gates and windows of houses and a parked car. In addition, the SMM saw that the west-facing entrance of a house had been severely destroyed and several windows had been shattered. A woman (in her mid-forties) told the SMM that she had sustained a minor injury on her left arm from broken window glass. Twelve residents (six women and six men, aged 20-63) told the SMM that shelling had taken place between 20:00 and 23:00 on 30 August. On the road close to the craters the SMM saw fresh tracks of tracked vehicles and freshly cracked corners of  asphalt sidewalks; residents told the SMM that they had seen at least two armoured vehicles on the street during the shelling.

On 31 August in Yasynuvata, the SMM conducted analysis on three fresh craters, concluding that they had been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from north-westerly (two) and westerly (one) directions. The craters were located 5-15m from apartment buildings. The SMM observed one building had numerous shattered windows, a destroyed wooden fence and shrapnel damage to a concrete pole and surrounding vegetation. The SMM also saw a large hole on the west-facing wall of another apartment building caused by a fresh impact – between the fifth and sixth floors – and assessed it had been caused by either a 120mm mortar round or a 122mm artillery round. In addition the SMM saw two houses destroyed by fire. Ten residents said that the houses had caught fire as a result of shelling that had taken place on the evening of 30 August. At the Yasynuvata Railway hospital, staff told the SMM that a man (aged 30) had been killed by shelling the evening of 30 August while in the garden of his house and had been taken directly to the morgue. Staff of the Yasynuvata branch of the Forensic Institute at the morgue informed the SMM that the victim had sustained mine-blast trauma. A woman (aged 72) told the SMM that she had been injured in the shoulder by mortar fragmentation in her home in Yasynuvata during the shelling that started on the night of 30 August.

In “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM, accompanied by a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, observed a fresh crater at a graveyard. Analysis indicated that it had been caused by a projectile of undetermined type fired from a westerly direction. The SMM assessed that the projectile had not exploded. In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 1.5km north of Sakhanka), the SMM saw a fresh crater approximately 20m from a house and assessed it had been caused by a projectile of undetermined type fired from a north-north-easterly direction. The SMM assessed that the projectile had not exploded.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, 1km west of government-controlled Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four military trucks, one of them was towing an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), heading west towards government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, in government-controlled Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). At a military training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten stationary tanks (T-64).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces areas and observed in total 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS, BM-21 Grad, 122mm). The SMM also observed as missing 13 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), as first recorded on 23 February (one piece) and 26 February (12 pieces) 2016; two self-propelled air-defence missile systems (SA-13 Gopher, Strela-10, 120mm), since first recorded on 26 February 2016; 30 tanks (T-64), since first recorded on 19 May 2016; and 18 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), since first recorded 1 August 2016.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. The quantity and serial numbers of the weapons matched the inventory, except for nine missing tanks (T-64), as previously recorded, and two missing automatic mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), which were observed missing for the first time.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM) and another of the same model moving north towards government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On the edge of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one stationary APC (BRDM).

The SMM observed an improvised mine hazard sign at the eastern edge of government-controlled Lobacheve with “warning – mines” written in Russian on white cloth and attached to logs. Previously it had been positioned at the side of the road but is now in a different place, partially blocking the road.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the railway in government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and observed demining activities in government-controlled Orikhove which needs to be completed prior to actual work on the railway can begin.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In Donetsk region at a government checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw a line of at least 200 civilian vehicles waiting to cross into government-controlled areas and no vehicles travelling or waiting to travel in the other direction. During the morning hours at the government-controlled checkpoint in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed approximately 80 pedestrians and 60 civilian vehicles waiting to cross into government-controlled areas and approximately 50 pedestrians and 20 civilian vehicles waiting to cross in the opposite direction.  At the same checkpoint in the evening, the SMM observed 64 civilian vehicles travelling from non-government-controlled areas into government-controlled areas and 69 civilian vehicles travelling in the opposite direction.

With the start of the new school year, the SMM visited schools. In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM visited five schools and observed that four appeared to be functioning and that School no. 7 had not opened for the new school year due to heavy damage that had not been repaired. The SMM visited a school located in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) where it observed new wooden screens along the lower part of every window attached to the school wall. Two school staff members told SMM the screens had been installed on 30 August.  

The SMM also monitored three border areas, in Chernihiv region and in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. On 31 August in Mykolaivka (248km north-east of Kyiv city) the SMM observed a low level of traffic. At the Krasna Talivka (50km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM spoke with the commander of the Ukrainian border guard service who said the situation was calm. In Blahovishchenka (65km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed the road leading to the border was dug up rendering it impassable.  

The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. At the Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar crossing points (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson respectively) and in adjacent areas, the SMM observed a calm situation. On 31 August in the vicinity of Kalanchak the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC, BTR) with six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel riding on the top heading west. On 1 September the SMM observed four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) being towed by as many APCs (MT-LB) travelling from Novooleksiivka to Henichesk (162 and 176km east of Kherson, respectively).

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Other impediments:

• A “DPR” member who introduced himself as a “police officer” asked to see the SMM’s notes in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.