Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 11 August 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions, in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period, predominantly during night hours. The SMM confirmed reports of civilian injuries and conducted crater analysis in districts of Donetsk city, the area of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and Novooleksandrivka. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons on both sides of the contact line, and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance and mine warning signs in areas close to the contact line. The SMM intensified its monitoring of the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period [1].

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre during the night of 10-11 August, within three hours, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west and north of its position.

While in Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 39km north of Donetsk), on the evening of 10 August, within 30 minutes the SMM heard five explosions it assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds, 19 explosions assessed as outgoing and one as impact of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and three bursts of heavy-machine gun fire, all 1km north of its positions 8, 9 and 10km north-north-west of Horlivka city centre. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), during the night of 10-11 August, the SMM heard 75 explosions, including 16 it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and small-arms shots, all 3-8km north-west, south-east and east of its position.

On the same evening, within 10 minutes, positioned near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight explosions – four assessed as caused by mortar rounds and four - as automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded at least 62 undetermined explosions, nine single shots of unknown weapon and uncountable overlapping bursts (over 40 tracer shots) of heavy-machine-gun fire from east-north-east to south-west, all at unknown distance.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) during the day the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions, numerous bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at distances ranging between 3 and 5km south, south-south-east and south-east of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), during the day, the SMM heard 13 shots of small arms 1km north-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in the number of recorded ceasefire violations. While in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), within two hours before midnight on 10 August, the SMM heard two explosions it assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, 24 explosions - 12 assessed as outgoing and 12 as impacts of recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds, 48 explosions - 24 assessed as outgoing and 24 as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) rounds, 58 explosions assessed as 23mm cannon rounds and hundreds of bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3.5-4km south of its position. The direction of fire was north-south and vice versa.

The SMM confirmed reports of casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Donetsk Trauma Hospital the SMM, accompanied by a Russian Federation officer at the JCCC, met a 16-year-old female civilian who got injured in shelling in the Petrovskyi district of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), on 10 August. According to medical personnel, the victim sustained shrapnel injuries to her left upper thigh and left lower arm.

On 10 August in Yasynuvata, the SMM, accompanied by Russian Federation officers at the JCCC, followed up on allegations of shelling. In a residential area, the SMM saw that the garage and a workshop in the yard of a house, some 4-5m west of the house had been destroyed. The SMM saw no crater and was unable to assess the type of projectile that caused the damage, and the direction of fire. The owners of the damaged property told the SMM that the shelling had occurred between 23:35 and 23:37 on 9 August and there had been no casualties. The SMM spoke to other residents in the area, who said their houses had not been damaged.

In a residential area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district the SMM analysed three fresh craters, all of which according to residents had occurred at around 03:00 on 10 August and there had been no casualties. The first was located on the edge of an asphalt road, in the immediate vicinity of a house, and the SMM assessed it as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel impacts on the roof and fence as well as broken windows on the south-west facing side of the house. The SMM saw that the neighbouring house also had shrapnel damage to its fence facing the road. Across the road, the SMM noted that on the north-east facing side of a house there were two broken windows, blast damage to its roof and its wooden fence destroyed. At the site where a man had been injured (see SMM Daily Report 11 August 2016), across the street from his residence the SMM saw 22 broken windows and some shrapnel damage to the west-facing façade of a two-storey residential building. At the third site, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the edge of the asphalt road 2m from a garage, severe damage to the garage door, shrapnel damage to the vehicle inside, including a broken back window. The SMM saw several broken windows on the south-east facing façade of a two-storey residential building and shrapnel damage inside the first-floor apartments.

In the Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city the SMM analysed 23 impact sites, which it assessed as caused by 30mm cannon rounds fired from a north-westerly and west-north-westerly direction. The SMM saw impacts on three cars, walls, roofs or fences, broken windows of houses and damage to a gas pipeline, which had already been repaired. According to residents, the shelling had occurred on 10 August between 22:30 and 23:00 and there had been no casualties.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), near the southern-most Ukrainian Armed Forces position near the Stanytsia Luhanska pedestrian bridge, the SMM saw fresh bullet holes, two fresh impacts and fragments of 40mm rocket-propelled grenade-launcher (RPG-7) rounds, one fresh impact and fragments of a 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) round, as well as a crater located 25m west, off the pedestrian bridge, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round. The SMM assessed all impacts as caused by projectiles fired from a southerly direction.

In the area of the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska pedestrian bridge, the SMM saw fuses and fragments of several under-barrel grenade-launcher rounds on the ground of the parking lot. Closer to the checkpoint, the SMM observed two small fresh craters on the asphalt surface it assessed as caused by impacts of under-barrel grenade-launcher rounds fired from a northerly direction. On the pedestrian bridge, moving towards government-controlled areas, the SMM observed fresh wires of anti-tank guided missiles laying 50m north of the broken section of the bridge.

In Novooleksandrivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM analysed three impact sites in a residential area. The first impact location was around 30m north-west of a house, in a field. The SMM assessed it as caused by an automatic-grenade-launcher round fired from an easterly direction. There was also a hole in the roof of a garage about 30m north-east of the house and the SMM found a number of fragments in the garage that it assessed to be from an automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) round, but could not determine the direction of fire. The third impact was on the roof a house and had caused a small hole. The SMM assessed it as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) rounds. The owner of the property told the SMM that the house had been hit at around 04:00 and at the moment of impact there were three people in the house: an elderly woman, a young man and the middle-aged owner himself.

In government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on reports of Ukrainian Armed Forces casualties sustained on 6 August. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were also present. The battalion commander told the SMM that the casualties (three killed, one injured) had been caused by booby-traps. He added that the deceased had been transported to the morgue in government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), while the injured soldier was in hospital in Kharkiv.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw in government-controlled areas: six anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk); one self-propelled surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and one self-propelled surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near the village of Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) moving west.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 18 tanks (T-64) stationary at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). In the area, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as training-related outgoing tank (T-64) rounds, and heavy-machine-gun bursts.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The following weapons were missing: nine self-propelled howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (12 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm and three D-48, 85mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the security zone in government-controlled areas: one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) stationary on the side of the road near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); four stationary APCs (BMP-1) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk), three stationary APCs (BMP-1) in Serednoteple (28km north of Luhansk), one APC (MT-LB) moving north in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk); one APC (BRDM) stationary in Stanytsia Luhanska and one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine warning signs in areas close to the contact line. Near Kamianka (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) on the road to Olkhovatka village (“DPR”-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw UXO stuck in the road surface and assessed it as a rocket of no more than 120mm calibre. The SMM saw one improvised mine hazard sign (rectangular wooden board about 50cm wide reading “Mines” in Russian written with black paint) in a field in the north-western part of Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

In “LPR”-controlled Sentianivka (formerly Frunze 44km west of Luhansk), in the morning, the SMM observed a train made up of 38 freight cars loaded with wood and coal travelling west, toward the contact line. At 14:00, while still in Sentianivka, the SMM saw an empty train travelling east.

The SMM continued to insist on responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. Despite provisions in the Addendum stipulating rapid response to violations reported by the SMM, Mr Zakharchenko again did not respond to a request to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response to the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016).* The SMM highlighted these concerns in a meeting with another “DPR” member, Mr Pushilin and expressed concern for the lack of action regarding the above incident.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM observed that all three crossing points at Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively) were open. The SMM saw long queues of vehicles in both directions at the Kalanchak and Chonhar crossing points and very low traffic at the Chaplynka crossing point. At 13:50, when approaching the Kalanchak crossing point, the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces armoured personnel carriers (BTR70) carrying about ten soldiers each, moving along the coastal line in a northerly direction at a distance of 1km north of the crossing point. On the Crimean side of the administrative boundary line at Kalanchak, the SMM saw two covered military trucks (Kamaz) moving from the crossing point in a westerly direction along the boundary line towards the coast and another two covered military trucks (Kamaz) parked some 15m to the right of the checkpoint. One of the parked trucks had three satellite dishes mounted on top.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers prevented the SMM from proceeding through a checkpoint when travelling towards Kodema (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). The soldiers cited orders of the battalion commander. The SMM took an alternative route and reached its destination.
• The Ukrainian Border Guards shift commander for the first time denied the SMM access to an outpost at Ad Peninsula (97km south-east of Kherson). He stated that he had received instructions from his superior not to give any statements and not to allow the SMM access as he could not guarantee its security.

Conditional:

• Armed men stopped the SMM in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and demanded to inspect the trunks of the SMM’s vehicles alleging that there were rumours that weapons were being transported in SMM vehicles. The SMM complied and then resumed its patrol. The JCCC was informed.
• An “LPR” member allowed the SMM to proceed further north only after taking the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM at the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and only allowed them to proceed after taking the names and ID numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.