Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 9 August 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission observed the aftermath of shelling on both sides of the contact line and analysed craters in and around Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove), Novotoshkivske, Popasna and Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), assessing in all cases the direction of fire. It observed the presence of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) in violation of the respective withdrawal line on both sides of the contact line. The SMM noted long queues at an entry-exit checkpoint near the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska and monitored one border area not controlled by the Government. The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea, observing the closure of one of the crossing points. The Mission observed public gatherings in Lviv and Kyiv.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 220 explosions.
On the night of 8 August, whilst in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at locations 5-15km ranging from north-west to north of its position.
Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), on the night of 8 August, the SMM heard 51explosions assessed as impacts (including eight artillery rounds and one mortar round) 5-7km east of its position. It also registered eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery 2km north and three explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons 7km north-east of its position.
Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) between 07:45 and 13:30 of 9 August, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 58 undetermined explosions 2-6km west-south-west, west-north-west, north-west and north of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 64 undetermined explosions, all 3-5km east of its position.
While stationed in government-controlled Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 1km west-north-west of its position.
The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. On the night of 8 August whilst in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 25-26 explosions (19-20 were assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and six as outgoing artillery rounds), all 3km west of its position. The following day, while positioned in government-controlled parts of Zolote 1 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three single shots of small-arms fire 200m south-east of its position.
The SMM conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw eight craters: one in a field 25m away from a hospital, two in and around the gym of a college, one on an asphalt road, and four in yards of two different inhabited houses. It assessed seven of them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from east-south-easterly (five of them) and easterly (two of them) directions, and one by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The SMM saw a tail fin from a 120mm mortar round stuck in the floor of the gym of the college and assessed that the round had penetrated its roof. The SMM observed shattered windows and shrapnel damage to the wall of a house. The Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and residents told the SMM that shelling occurred between 04:00 and 05:00. No casualties were reported.
The SMM observed three inhabited houses damaged by shelling in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) that several residents separately said had taken place on the night of 9 August. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the south-west facing wall and shattered windows of a house, and a resident (woman aged 48) stated that her son (aged 28) had sustained serious wounds in the chest, stomach, left shoulder as well as face, and had been admitted to a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol). The SMM also saw shrapnel damage to the roof and wall of another house and shrapnel damage to the north-west-facing corner of a small summerhouse. The SMM assessed the impacts as having been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly (first two impacts) and a north-westerly (third impact) directions.
In government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed fresh remnants of a 120mm mortar shell, stuck in an asphalt road at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, 500m away from a residential area, and assessed it as having been fired from a southerly direction. At the eastern edge of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM conducted analysis on two fresh craters on an asphalt road – 500m away from a residential area, and assessed them as having been caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an east-south-easterly direction. In both locations, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel separately told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the previous night and no casualties had been reported.
In a residential area of “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), the SMM, accompanied by the Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC, saw three fresh craters (one in the backyard of an inhabited house, the second in a field close to a factory and the third in the factory), which it assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw an abandoned house with a newly destroyed west-facing wall and another with windows shattered. Residents separately told the SMM that shelling had started at around 03:00 and lasted until 04:00 that morning. In the vicinity of the town, the SMM also conducted analysis on two fresh craters – one on an asphalt road and another in the gravel side of the road, concluding that they had been caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.
In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad, 122mm) heading west in government-controlled Mykhailivka (37km north-west of Donetsk). An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted the presence of two MLRS (BM21 Grad, 122mm) together with two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city on 8 August, as well as the presence of the presence of one tank (T-72), one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and an anti-tank radio-guided missile system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB, 9P149) together with one APC (BMP-2) and six infantry fighting vehicles (BTR-4) near government-controlled Syze (23km north-east of Luhansk).
Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal line the SMM saw 15 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) as it had observed previously. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they had been since 6 April with 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 155mm) missing.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to insist on accountability for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. Mr. Zakharchenko again did not respond to a request to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response to the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016).*
At the JCCC headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the SMM referred the JCCC to longstanding and continuing impediments to monitoring and verification of areas south of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and between government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). The SMM emphasized that responsibility for remedying these violations lay with those in control of the respective areas but reminded the Russian and Ukrainian representatives of the mission’s mandate – including freedom of movement – and the JCCC’s obligation under the Addendum to the Package of Measures to facilitate rapid response to the abovementioned violations of the Addendum, which were an obstacle to normalization.
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant (government-controlled 20km north of Luhansk), and repair work to water infrastructure near “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed approximately 500 pedestrians waiting to cross into government-controlled areas and some 250 people waiting to proceed in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed a queue of around 500 people waiting to proceed to government-controlled areas.
The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. At the pedestrian border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) over 55 minutes the SMM observed seven pedestrians crossing towards the Russian Federation and seven pedestrians crossing into Ukraine.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Ukrainian mainland and Crimea in Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively). At around 11:00 on 8 August in Kalanchak, the SMM observed that the crossing point was closed in both directions with 19 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to exit Kherson region. The following day at the southernmost border guard position of the same crossing point, the SMM saw that the road before the crossing point on the Crimean side was blocked with a metal fence. Both on 8 (at 13:00) and 9 August (at 13:45) at Chaplynka crossing point the SMM observed approximately 120 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to cross to Crimea and no traffic flow from Crimea. The border guard shift commander told the SMM that traffic from Crimea has not been allowed on the Crimean side. The SMM noted that border guard personnel were on heightened alert, carrying assault rifles and continuously searching the area with binoculars. At 13:00 of 8 August at Chonhar the SMM saw a queue of some 140 cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and 150 pedestrians waiting to cross to Crimea and no traffic from Crimea. Several drivers separately told the SMM that they had been waiting at the crossing point for eight hours.
The SMM monitored public gatherings in Lviv and Kyiv. On 8 August in front of the building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) office in Lviv, the SMM observed a gathering of approximately 50 people (mostly men aged 25-35) including ten men dressed in green military-style uniforms with the insignia of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) expressing support to fellow members of their organization, arrested by the SSU. According to an official statement of the SSU, “five members of a terrorist group, planning to simultaneously explode railway tracks in three different locations in Lviv, had been identified and arrested”. A member of the OUN told the SMM that their three members had been detained by the SBU in Lviv on the night of 7 August.
On 9 August in front of the National Bank of Ukraine in Kyiv, the SMM observed some 250 people (mixed gender, mostly elderly) demanding their savings in their accounts of a closed bank being returned. The gathering passed off peacefully overseen by 20 police officers.
In Kyiv, the SMM also monitored the situation around the Obolonskyi district court building, where a court hearing of 12 former members of the former Tornado volunteer battalion was being held. The SMM observed 70 people (men and women, different age groups) and 50 journalists gathering next to the court building which was cordoned by approximately 400 law enforcement officers. Among 70 participants, the SMM saw some holding national flags and banners expressing support to the detained, and others dressed in T-shirts or camouflage uniforms with the insignias of former volunteer battalions of Donbas, Tornado and Aidar. The SMM saw two small clashes between the police officers and supporters, when the police tried to arrest some participants and the crowd prevented it from doing so. At about 15:15 the crowd dispersed.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction to the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Besides the abovementioned general restrictions, the SMM was not subject to any specific restrictions to its freedom of movement.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.