Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 27 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous day. The largest concentration of ceasefire violations was recorded in the area north of Donetsk city centre and Svitlodarsk. The SMM conducted crater analysis in Dokuchaievsk and Novotoshkivske. Concerning the 25 July incidents with the SMM mini UAV, the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative to the JCCC told the SMM that those responsible had been identified and disciplinary measures had been taken. The Mission continued to observe heavy weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines. The SMM could not access proposed areas for disengagement in Petrivske, and continued to note the presence of unexploded ordnance. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on four occasions, all in areas outside government control.*

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region compared with the previous day.  

During the night of 26-27 July, whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 100 undetermined explosions 5-8km north and north-west of its position. During the day of 27 July, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy machine-gun-fire 2-8km north-east and north-north-east of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 explosions: ten assessed as 82mm outgoing mortar rounds, ten as mortar round impacts. The SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) cannon fire (73mm) and ten explosions assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, all 1-6km south-south-east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions, seven bursts of direct tracer fire from south-south-west to north-north-east, followed by two rounds of direct tracer fire from east to west and two bursts and two rounds of direct tracer fire from north-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with a total of 18 undetermined explosions, with the majority having been assessed as live-fire training in areas outside the security zone, in Vrubivskyi (“LPR”-controlled, 22km south-west of Luhansk) and Azarivka (“LPR”-controlled, 32km SW of Luhansk)

The SMM conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In front of a residential building in Dokuchaievsk (“DPR”-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater and assessed it as caused by an unknown weapon fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The SMM saw broken windows at the south-eastern and south-western façade of the building, assessed to be the result of a blast wave. According to the family living in the building, shelling had occurred in the evening of 26 July. In Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh craters near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. The SMM assessed the first crater as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-easterly direction. The second crater was assessed as caused by a grenade launcher (AGS-17) round fired from a westerly direction. Both craters were located about 3km away from the contact line. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer present at the checkpoint, shelling occurred on 25 July.

In relation to an SMM mini UAV being targeted in two separate instances with small arms fire in “LPR”-controlled areas (see SMM Spot Report 26 July 2016), on 25 July in Luhansk city an “LPR” member told the SMM that “LPR” members were looking into the incident and that disciplinary measures would be taken against those responsible. At the JCCC headquarters in Soledar (government-controlled, 79km north of Donetsk) the Russian Federation Armed Forces representative to the JCCC told the SMM that the two responsible “LPR” members had been identified and disciplinary measures had been taken.

In relation to the SMM long-range UAV that crashed during the night of 25 July while flying over government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 26 July 2016), the SMM is continuing to follow up on the case, including with the JCCC, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and “DPR” members, to confirm information and establish a possible cause of the crash.

The SMM tried to reach an area proposed for disengagement in Petrivske (“DPR”-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk). At a Ukrainian Armed Forces position about 2km east of Petrivske, the officer in charge told the SMM that the area 500 metres further east towards the contact line was mined and that safety for the SMM patrol could not be guaranteed. Near the “DPR” checkpoint at the northern entrance to Petrivske, the SMM observed for the first time four mine signs (red with white Cyrillic letters reading “Mines”).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) mounted on a military truck (UAZ) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines and outside assigned areas the SMM observed one tank in a static position at a training ground near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), 13 tanks in a static position in at a training ground near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and 16 tanks near Yelyzavetivka (40km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM observed 39 tanks (T-72, T-64) and three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) missing. The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in “LPR”-controlled areas and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone, namely three amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles (BMB1) mounted with an anti-tank guided missile system each in the area of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure at the Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) power plant and on the water pipeline in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk). In Zolote (60km north-west) repair works on electrical power lines were cancelled as the demining work had not taken place.

The SMM monitored the arrival in Kyiv and conclusion of the religious procession organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2016). The SMM noted a large presence of police and National Guard officers, and metal detectors for screening the procession participants along the route in central Kyiv. Around mid-day, the SMM monitored a religious service at the Saint Volodymyr Hill (Volodymyrska Hirka) with some 25-30,000 participants (75 per cent women, of different ages). In the afternoon, the SMM saw a procession of some 15,000 people arrive at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, the final destination of the procession. There, the SMM saw some 550 law enforcement officers, including anti-riot police and from the National Guard. Throughout the day and all along the routes, the SMM noted a calm situation and all events passed off peacefully.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• Armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM at the “LPR” forward position north of the “LPR” checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) and did not allow the patrol to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member at “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 69km south-east of Luhansk) insisted on seeing SMM’s patrol plan, which the SMM did not show. He then asked the SMM to move away from the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint at the northern entrance to “DPR”-controlled Petrivkse (42km south of Donetsk) prevented the SMM from passing through. The SMM informed the JCCC. After a 20-minute delay the SMM was allowed to proceed further.

Conditional access:

• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) visually inspected of the SMM vehicle trunks before the SMM could proceed further.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.