Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 21 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, particularly in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata and Shyrokyne areas. In Luhansk region, however, the SMM noted an increase in ceasefire violations recorded, with the majority near Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and civilian injuries and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line, in Avdiivka, Horlivka, Andriivka, Kominternove, Zolote, and at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM was informed that the downed electrical power lines supplying the water filtration plant near Yasynuvata were repaired. Its freedom of movement was restricted on six occasions, five of which were in areas outside government control, including at a checkpoint in Horlivka.*

The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, with no violations recorded by the SMM patrol hub in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city and forward patrol bases in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), during approximately 90 minutes on the night of 20 July, recorded 13 undetermined explosions near government-controlled Shyrokyne and 20 explosions assessed as impacts near “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka. The camera also recorded 23 undetermined explosions, 84 bursts of direct tracer fire from south-south-west to north-north-east, four rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east, and one explosion assessed as an impact at an unknown distance and direction.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 77 undetermined explosions, six explosions assessed as airbursts from an unknown weapon, bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and single shots and bursts of small-arms fire 2-5km west, west-north-west, and north-north-west of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and five explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 2-5km east, south-east, and north-west; one explosion assessed as an outgoing 122mm artillery round 2-3km south-east; and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4km east of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a higher number of ceasefire violations than during the previous reporting period.

While in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two separate episodes of fighting during the night of 20-21 July, including at least 94 explosions assessed as grenade rounds, 33 shots assessed as outgoing grenade rounds, and  single shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-4km south and south-west of its position. The first episode took place around midnight and consisted mainly of outgoing fire from the south-western edge of the village, rather than from the pedestrian and the broken railway bridge, where exchanges had been previously noted. The SMM heard the sound of armoured vehicles manoeuvring in the south-western part of Stanytsia Luhanska during this time. The second episode, which started approximately 3.5 hours later, was assessed as having occurred around the abovementioned bridges as well as the south-western edge of the village.

Positioned in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions from an unknown weapon 4-5km south of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 explosions assessed as artillery fire from training exercises 10-12km north-north-east of its position in the direction of a training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis. The SMM followed up with representatives of the water company and electric company regarding the downed power lines that cut electricity to government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), parts of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), and the water filtration station situated between these two cities. Both companies said that the specific power line supplying the water station had been repaired on 21 July but the water company explained that the station would not resume work until the next day due to security concerns. The electric company said damage to the separate power lines feeding Yasynuvata was identified, but the potential risk from mines and unexploded ordnance prevented repairs and a ceasefire and security guarantees are necessary to enable sappers to check and clear the area where the damage is located.

In “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters and two civilian houses damaged by shelling. The SMM observed a destroyed concrete column of one house as well as shrapnel damage to the walls of the house and broken windows. The SMM assessed that the house had been hit by a 73mm self-propelled grenade round fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM also observed a partially destroyed steel fence which it assessed as having been caused by a weapon of an unknown calibre fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM analysed two craters, both within 20 metres north and west of the house, and assessed them as having been caused by 73mm self-propelled grenade rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM also analysed a crater in the garden of the house and assessed it as having been caused by a weapon of an unknown calibre fired from the north. The SMM observed a hole in the roof of another house and assessed the damage as caused by a 73mm self-propelled grenade round fired from a south-easterly direction. The owners of the houses told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 17 and 20 July.

At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces position north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 17 fresh impacts on the concrete slab just south of the position. At least one of the impacts was assessed as having been caused by a heavy-machine-gun round (12.7mm). Approximately 250 metres south of the same Ukrainian Armed Forces position, the SMM observed a fresh crater, which it assessed as having been caused by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). At the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed 14 stationary tanks (T-64). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near government-controlled Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces holding area, the SMM observed 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), 12 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and for the first time, six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm).  The SMM noted as missing for the first time six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm). At “DPR” holding areas, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), as previously recorded.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. Ten previously observed tanks (T-64) continued being noted as missing, as first observed on 20 June 2016.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed fresh tracks assessed as those of an armoured vehicle (BMP or MT-LB). At the government checkpoint east of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one stationary armoured vehicle (BMP-2). At the first government checkpoint north of Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed one armoured vehicle (BMP 2) stationary behind cover. While in “LPR”-controlled Khriashchuvate (10km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a trailer carrying an amphibious transport vehicle (PTS-M) and heading south. Aerial imagery revealed three armoured vehicles (BMP-2) on the south-western edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) near the bridge, and at least three armoured vehicles 2.4km south-east of government-controlled Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored gas pipeline repair works conducted near “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored maintenance works at the Shchastia power plant that took place on both sides of the Siverskyi Donets river.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mine hazard signs and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and followed up on reports of civilian casualties. In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), an “LPR” member in military-style clothes warned the SMM about possible minefields along the paved road behind the hospital. The SMM observed a mine sign obscured by overgrown grass on the left side of the road. Two possible cases of UXO presence were also observed in overgrown grass in the Festivalnii district. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), as it had done previously in March 2016.

The SMM confirmed two injured civilians were treated at the Institute of Urgent and Reconstructive Surgery in Donetsk city on 20 July. Reportedly, on the same day, near “DPR”-controlled Andriivka (18km south of Donetsk), a harvest machine had triggered an unknown explosive device. According to the hospital staff, two men (early forties) had been injured: one more seriously with burns to his head, neck, body, and arms as inflicted by the flame of the explosion, and the other slightly, with fragmentation injuries to his head and arms. The two men told the SMM that the incident occurred when the harvester was crossing the road, moving from one field to another.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• While the SMM attempted to enter non-government-controlled areas at the “DPR” checkpoint into Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), six-eight civilian women blocked the SMM patrol convoy from moving forward, with one climbing onto an OSCE vehicle. They said they would not let the SMM pass and wanted the patrol to stay overnight, waiting in the queue under shelling as they did so. The “DPR” members at the checkpoint refused to assist the SMM in exercising its freedom of movement, citing orders from their superior. After 20 minutes, the SMM reversed course and returned to base in Kramatorsk. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area, stating they had no instructions regarding access and could not contact their commander. Access was granted through the JCCC only after the SMM had left the site.
• The SMM was stopped at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) by an armed man who asked the SMM to show its patrol plan (in the Russian language). He said he had been instructed to deny the SMM access to the bridge without a patrol plan (in the Russian language). The SMM left the area after 50minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While attempting to leave government-controlled areas, armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM from crossing the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a border area not controlled by the Government, in “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 29km east of Luhansk), the SMM was stopped by an “LPR” member who asked for the patrol plan and names of the patrol members. The SMM refused to present the patrol plan and was denied passage. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While attempting to enter a compound in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM was stopped by an armed man who told the SMM to wait for permission from his superiors. After one hour of waiting, he denied the SMM access. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member denied the SMM access to a factory currently being used by armed men in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] 

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.