Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 12 July 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous reporting period. Most of the fighting was recorded in the areas around Donetsk city, Yasynuvata, Horlivka and Shyrokyne. In Luhansk region for the third consecutive day, the SMM continued to record a relatively high number of overnight ceasefire violations in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, including 237 explosions. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line, in Sakhanka, Zaichenko and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk, Pryshyb and Shchastia. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The Mission monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and encountered a restriction of its freedom of movement there; overall, the Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on five occasions, four of which were in areas not controlled by the Government.*

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations [1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

During the late evening and night of 11 July, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as 82mm mortar round impacts, 35 explosions assessed as artillery round (122mm) impacts, 50 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery (122mm) rounds, 20 single shots of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23/2, 23mm), eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-7km west and west-south-west of its position.

During the night of 11 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded at an unknown distance north-east of its position: 34 undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as impact; as well as an exchange of tracer fire, which began in the late evening hours with (in sequence) one burst from south to north, six bursts fired from west to east, 67 bursts from south to north, 15 bursts from east to west, and ended by 1:40 with 17 bursts from west to east, two bursts from east to west, 13 bursts from west and south-west to north-east and 15 bursts from south to north.

Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), during the day, the SMM heard over a two-hour period, six undetermined explosions, 279 single shots and 50 bursts of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 2-7km north-north-east, north and north-north-west of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions, 50 single shots and 47 bursts of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-5km west and west-south-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire 1-7km south-east of its position. Aerial surveillance available to the SMM revealed more than 200 impacts which were assessed to have been caused between 26 June and 11 July by undetermined weapons in areas between government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata.

Whilst in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km east of its position.

In Luhansk region for the third consecutive day, the SMM continued to record a relatively high number of overnight ceasefire violations, including 237 explosions.

Positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska, during the night of 11 July, over the period of an hour, the SMM heard 237 explosions, assessed as recoilless-gun (SPG), rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG), 82mm mortar and automatic grenade launcher (AGS) fire and 500 bursts and single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations 3-5km south and south-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), during the day, the SMM heard 40 single shots of small-arms fire 2km north of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. On 11 July, in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM conducted analysis on two fresh craters on Havrylenko Street (one in a residential area and one in a field 70 metres west of the first crater) assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction which also caused shrapnel damage to two neighbouring houses (broken windows and struck walls) and caused damage to gas pipelines and electrical wires in the same street. In “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a fresh crater on Nova Tavriia Street and assessed it as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. On the same street, the SMM observed broken windows and pierced walls of two houses, assessed as caused by shrapnel.

On 11 July, in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a burned-down house located in Barbashov Street. The SMM saw remnants of a 30mm automatic grenade launcher (AGS) round and assessed it as fired from an easterly direction. The SMM could smell fresh burning on the spot. The SMM spoke to the owner of the house, who said shelling occurred in the early morning hours of 11 July. The owner said that the fire brigade had arrived at the spot after 20-30 minutes due to ongoing shelling and had to return again due to lack of sufficient water in the vehicle’s tank. The SMM observed another fresh crater in the backyard of another house located in Lomonosov Street, approximately 400 metres east of the burned house. The SMM assessed the impact as caused by a 30mm automatic grenade launcher (AGS) round fired from a south-easterly direction. On 12 July, south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed two fresh craters on the side of the road north of the bridge and eight fresh impacts on the new Ukrainian Armed Forces forward positions (projectile impacts on the wooden and concrete barriers) north of the bridge. The SMM assessed all damage and craters as caused by 30mm automatic grenade launcher rounds fired from a south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed one towed gun (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk) on 11 July. An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted the presence of three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), one multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm)  and 23 tanks (T-72), 20 of which were assessed by the SMM as being non-serviceable hardware, in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed seven tanks at a training site in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) and eight tanks (T-64) at a training site in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). An SMM long-range UAV spotted the presence of ten tanks near government-controlled Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also observed weapons in areas known to the SMM, which it could not verify as withdrawn as they do not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm); eight MLRS (9P140 Uragan, 220mm); and 22 tanks (T-64) and 12 mortars (2B11, 120mm). The SMM noted as missing seven towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) (four first observed missing on 2 April 2016, one on 30 May 2016 and two on 4 June 2016); six MLRS (9P140 Uragan, 220mm), first observed missing on 6 May; 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), first observed missing on 14 March; six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm), first observed missing on 14 March 2016; and nine tanks (T-64) and six mortars (2B11, 120mm), first observed as missing on 12 July.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) in the centre of Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk); one APC (BTR) and one armoured vehicle (Cougar) with a 14.5mm machine-gun and an anti-tank rocket launcher near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol); and one APC (BRDM) near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk). An SMM mini-UAV spotted the presence of 16 armoured vehicles, one APC (BRDM-2), 45 military-type trucks and seven trailer trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city. Aerial surveillance available to the SMM revealed the presence on 11 July of two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) and two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Avdiivka. At a training site in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka, the SMM observed three amphibious transporter vehicles performing a water crossing exercise.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. On 11 July, in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable workers of the Luhansk gas lines company to conduct repair works of gas pipe lines. On 12 July, in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable workers to conduct maintenance on a water pump in the area of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) power plant.  

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 11 July, at a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 121 civilian vehicles queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 32 civilian vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. On 12 July, at the “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (“DPR”-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 305 civilian vehicles waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 38 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 136 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas and 301 civilian vehicles and one bus waiting in the opposite direction.

At the last government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a queue of 30 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas and 80 pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 40 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas and 400 pedestrians waiting in the opposite direction. In the late afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 100 people waiting to exit government-controlled areas and no pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, in the early morning, the SMM observed a queue of more than 500 pedestrians waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians waiting to pass in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and encountered a restriction there.* The SMM visited the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi (85km south-east of Luhansk) and observed 86 civilian cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates, except for seven with Russian Federation and one with Belarus licence plates) waiting to exit Ukraine. Four trucks (KAMAZ, all with Ukrainian licence plates), each with a trailer covered with canvas, were parked around the border area in parking spaces together with 20 civilian cars (mainly with Ukrainian licence plates). At the border crossing point, armed “LPR” members told the SMM to leave the area.*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member denied access to the SMM when the SMM refused to provide a patrol plan (demanded in Russian and stamped by the “LPR” “border guards”). The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was informed.
   
• At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi, armed “LPR” members told the SMM to leave the area because the SMM did not present an official permission from “LPR” “border guards”.

-          At the first “DPR” checkpoint west of Kominternove (“DPR”-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members wrote down the names of all SMM patrol members and instructed the SMM not to take any pictures or stop in the village. The JCCC was informed.

Delay:

-          At the first “DPR” checkpoint west of Kominternove, armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 20 minutes. The JCCC was informed.

Other impediments:

-          The global positioning system of an SMM long-range UAV was jammed while flying over government-controlled Katerynivka (47km north of Donetsk) and government-controlled Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.