Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 July 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared to those recorded during the day on 3 July. Most of the fighting was recorded in the areas around Yasynuvata, Horlivka and Shyrokyne. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations during the reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line, in Klynove and Kominternove. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The Mission monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and encountered a restriction there. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on six occasions, five of which were in areas not controlled by the Government.* In Odessa, the SMM monitored the 49th consecutive day of an around-the-clock protest by internally displaced persons. In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on reports of weapons discovered in Mala Rohan.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to those recorded during the day on 3 July.

During the late evening of 3 July, positioned in Mariupol city centre, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east. During the night of 3 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded at an unknown distance east-north-east of its position: seven undetermined explosions and three explosions assessed as impacts; as well as an exchange of tracer fire, which began in the evening hours with (in sequence) 65 bursts fired from the south and south-south-west to north-north-east and 16 bursts fired from the north-north-east to south-south-west and ended around midnight with five bursts fired from the north-north-east to south-south-west and 20 bursts fired from the south-south-west to north-north-east.

During the night of 3 July, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 4-7km south-west and west of its position, 40 undetermined explosions 8-11km north of its position, 25 bursts of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23/2, 23mm) and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-7km south-west and west of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) during the day, the SMM heard 153 undetermined explosions, 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 71 bursts and 76 single shots of small-arms fire, at locations ranging between 1 and 5km north-west, west, west-south-west and south-west of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), during the day, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 4-6km south-east of its position.

Whilst at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), during the day, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 1-5km west of its position. Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from reaching the area where the SMM had planned to fly a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), claiming that “DPR” units in the town were currently under fire.* In “DPR”-controlled Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard 11 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 0.5-1km north-east of its position.

In southern Donetsk region, whilst in government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (undetermined calibre) within three minutes: three explosions assessed as outgoing and three as impacts 2-3km to the north-east and four explosions assessed as outgoing 2-3km to the south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations during the reporting period.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM conducted analysis on three craters in a field and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-easterly direction. In “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM conducted analysis on four fresh craters caused, according to local residents, by fighting on the evening of 2 July. Two of the craters were assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher rounds fired from a north-easterly direction, one by automatic-grenade-launcher round fired from a south-westerly direction, and one by an anti-tank wire-guided missile fired from a north-westerly direction. Damage observed included a partially destroyed roof (north-west side) and charred walls of a house (north-west side), and a splintered fence. No casualties were reported.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed three tanks and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training site in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM visited such a site and noted that all weapons previously recorded as withdrawn to that site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk); seven IFVs (BMP-2) near Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk) and four armoured personnel carriers (APC; BRDM-2) near Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk).

At a training site in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka, the SMM observed near a lake four to five pontoon trucks loaded with pontoons, two military cranes used as assembly kit for pontoons and ten IFVs (BMP). The SMM assessed the situation as preparation for a pontoon bridge crossing exercise.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 90 civilian vehicles queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 50 civilian vehicles and 40 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed some 200 civilian vehicles queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 40 civilian vehicles waiting in the opposite direction. At the “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (“DPR”-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 247 civilian vehicles queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 15 pedestrians and 118 civilian vehicles waiting in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 50 civilian vehicles, seven minibuses and 20 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 48 civilian vehicles, about 100 pedestrians waiting in the opposite direction. At the last government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a queue of approximately 300 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas. There was no queue in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 20 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas. There was no queue in the opposite direction.

On 3 July in government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a new checkpoint set up in a residential area where the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel have been occupying ten private houses, approximately 2km from the contact line.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government and encountered a restriction there.* The SMM visited the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk). The SMM observed 75 civilian cars, nine cargo trucks and three passenger buses waiting to exit Ukraine (the majority with Ukrainian licence plates, a few with “LPR”/“DPR” new “number plates”, one civilian car with Polish and one with Belorussian licence plate). Whilst at the border crossing point, armed “LPR” members told the SMM to leave the area and to withdraw to a position 500m away from the border crossing point*. 

The SMM observed mine hazard signs at a checkpoint in government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM saw for the first time two new “Danger, mines” signs, red, with white letters in Cyrillic, around 30x35cm in size.

In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on media reports of weapons discovered in Mala Rohan village (2km east of Kharkiv), consisting of five rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-26), 44 hand grenades (F-1, RGO and RGD-5 with fuses), eleven magazines for AK-type military grade rifles, approximately 4,000 rounds of various ammunition and 55 spare parts for different weapons. Representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine confirmed to the SMM that the weapons were discovered through a joint operation. They said that the case was being investigated under Article 263.1 of the Criminal Code on illegal handling of weapons, ammunition and explosive substances.

The SMM monitored the 49th consecutive day of an around-the-clock protest by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in front of and inside the Odessa regional administration building. In front of the building, the SMM spoke with an elderly woman, who was the only IDP present and said that she thought the protest was coming to an end and only two IDPs had spent the previous night in the building. (See SMM daily report 19 May and 7 June 2016.)

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At the checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member refused to allow the SMM to cross the checkpoint towards government-controlled areas. The SMM left the area after approximately four hours.
• At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi, armed “LPR” members told the SMM to leave the area and to withdraw to a position 500m away from the border crossing point. The JCCC was informed.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, armed “DPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed further citing security concerns. Therefore, the SMM was prevented to reach the area from where it had planned to fly a mini UAV.

Conditional access:

• At the government checkpoint in Novotroitske, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel asked the SMM to show the content of a towed trailer. The SMM showed the content of the trailer, of which the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel took photos. After 20 minutes the SMM was allowed to proceed.
• At the “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka, armed “DPR” members asked the SMM to show the content of the abovementioned towed trailer and the handover papers describing the carried items. Armed “DPR” members made copies of the respective handover papers.
• After passing the “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka, six armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM and asked the SMM to show the contents of the trailer. After ten minutes the SMM was allowed to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.