Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 26 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public

In Kominternove the SMM found the bodies of two young boys killed by power lines most probably downed by shelling. In Donetsk region the SMM observed more ceasefire violations on each 25 and 26 June compared to 24 June. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations on 25 June, and fewer on 26 June compared to 24 June. It conducted crater analysis in Makiivka. The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line, where civilians complained about lack of basic facilities. The SMM monitored a public meeting in Lviv. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on seven occasions both in government- and non-government-controlled areas.*

In “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM found the bodies of two young boys tragically killed by downed power lines. Following reports of an incident involving the death of a six-year-old boy not far from its position in Kirov Street, the SMM saw the body covered by a white sheet near two downed power lines. Later the SMM discovered the body of a seven-year old boy about ten meters west of the first casualty. The SMM assessed that the cause of death had been electrocution. Residents told the SMM that the power lines had been downed 8-12 hours before the boys were killed, adding that they had cut the power to one line, unaware of the second one. Around the site, it saw shrapnel that had, according to residents, been there for a long time. Shelling had occurred the day before and the SMM observed a severely damaged house on the same street of the incident, indicating that the most probable cause of the downing was shelling. Local “police” informed the SMM that that the bodies would be taken by family members. The SMM carried the bodies of the two young boys in SMM sleeping bags to the house of one of the boy’s relatives.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region on each, 25 and 26 June compared to 24 June, mostly in Yasynuvata. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and saw and heard one incoming airburst, all 2-8km west and west-south-west of its position, on 25 June. The next day the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions and more than 120 bursts and 61 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 3-8km south-east to north-west of its position. In addition, the SMM heard within 15 minutes at least 100 undetermined explosions and uncountable overlapping bursts and single shots of heavy-machine gun and small-arms fire 1km north-west of its position.

Positioned in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and 19 single shots 3-12km north and north-north-west of its position, during the early morning hours of 25 June. Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 63 undetermined explosions, saw and heard five explosions assessed as 82mm mortar round impacts, heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and three bursts and 93 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 2-12km north-north-east to north-west of its position, on 25 June.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm cannon (BMP-1) fire and multiple bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 2-3km south-east of its position, on 25 June. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard on 25 June, 51 undetermined explosions 5-10km north and west-north-west of its position.  

On 25 June, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 23 explosions (19 undetermined and nine impacts assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds), one burst of direct tracer fire from west to east, 52 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, and 17 bursts of direct tracer fire from west to east. In addition, the SMM heard at least 55 distant explosions about 22km east of its position in Mariupol, on 25 June.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations on 25 June, and fewer on 26 June, with six explosions recorded as compared to 32 on 24 June. Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions 8-10km south-west of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis. In Kominternove the SMM observed the north-western side of a house newly damaged by a wire-guided anti-tank missile in Kirov Street, the same site of the incident involving the death of the two young boys. The previous day, on 25 June, the SMM had observed damage to two houses which, according to local residents, were caused by shelling during the night. At one house, the SMM observed a hole in the roof and assessed that the fire had come from a south-westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel inside the house that it assessed to be from a recoilless gun (SPG-9) round. At another house, the SMM observed a smashed window on the south-west side of the wall consistent with shooting assessed as having originated from a south-westerly direction. An elderly resident told the SMM that he had been wounded by shrapnel the previous night. The SMM saw a 1cm wound above his left knee.

On 24 June, in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM conducted analysis on a crater in a field some 60 meters north-west of a five-storey apartment block in Chervonohvardiiske district. The SMM assessed the fresh crater (210cm wide and 70cm deep) to have been caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The SMM observed at least ten apartment windows on the north-east side of the building shattered and shrapnel fragments that had pierced the glass and entered the apartments. Near the affected residential area the SMM observed a fenced military-type compound with at least one military-type truck inside, and armed men in military-type clothes. In the vicinity of the compound the SMM observed two sets of fresh tracks assessed as being from a tank (T-64).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted: at one site all weapons previously recorded as withdrawn to that site were present; at another site three anti-tank guns (D44, 85mm) were missing from where they had been first observed on 23 December 2015. In a “DPR”-controlled area, the SMM noted that all weapons previously recorded as withdrawn to a site were present.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, on 26 June the SMM observed 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed at training sites in “LPR”-controlled areas: seven stationary tanks (T-64) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and seven stationary tanks (T-64) and about a dozen armed “LPR” members taking part in a training exercise near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisits locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 30 Addendum-regulated tanks (T-64, 125mm). At one site, the SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing, as first observed missing on 1 February. Another site was abandoned as first observed on 1 February, with 12 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas: the SMM observed 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) being loaded onto rail cars together with nine anti-aircraft artillery systems (2S6M, Tunguska) at the train station in government-controlled Rubizhne  (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas: the SMM saw three stationary infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-2) and one armoured personnel carrier (MP-31) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk), one stationary IFV (BMP-2) in Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), one IFV (BMP-2) moving west in Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk), and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) dug in at a government checkpoint in Olhynka (41km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM noted a stationary IFV (BMP-2) behind a house under a camouflage net near the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed 338 civilian cars and nine vans, five commercial trucks, and 270 pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas, and 31 cars and 70 pedestrians queuing in opposite direction, on 25 June. Two pedestrians told the SMM that it had taken them one hour to pass through the document control, despite having biometric passports. They also complained about lack of access to sanitary facilities, shade, and potable water. In the afternoon, the SMM noted 193 vehicles and one bus in a 1.3km long queue and 250 pedestrians waiting to travel toward non-government-controlled areas. Several of them said they had been queuing since 05:00 in the morning while on average they had to wait six to seven hours to cross the checkpoint. The SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers delivering water bottles to pedestrians. On 26 June, at the same checkpoint, the SMM estimated that around 30 vehicles and 100 pedestrians entered government-controlled areas on average per hour.

At a government checkpoint in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw 142 civilian cars queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 138 civilian vehicles waiting in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka the SMM observed 193 vehicles and 99 pedestrians queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and 20 vehicles waiting in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south of Donetsk), the SMM noted 172 vehicles waiting to travel toward government-controlled areas. Some 30 people (men and women of different ages) told the SMM that usually they had to wait three to eight hours to enter and 90 minutes to leave government-controlled areas at that checkpoint.

On 25 June, at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed around 250 persons queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 350 queuing in the other direction. The SMM noted two newly constructed toilets near the checkpoint. On 26 June the SMM observed short queues at the government checkpoint of some 30 civilian vehicles travelling to and 50 civilian vehicles leaving government-controlled areas and no queues at the “LPR” checkpoint on the bridge which, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) present at the bridge, was due to the long weekend including the 28 June public holiday.

The SMM monitored border areas outside government control and encountered a restriction at one of them.  In “DPR”-controlled Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 11 civilian cars (some with Ukrainian and some with Russian Federation licence plates) and one large commercial truck (with “DPR” “licence plates”) queuing to leave Ukraine. One man (aged 50) said that he had been waiting for about an hour. The SMM observed that the border crossing point had functioning toilets. On 26 June three armed “LPR” members refused to allow the SMM to proceed at the entrance of the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 29km east of Luhansk).*

At the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea, at the Chonhar crossing point (162km south-east of Kherson), the SMM noted a long queue of at least 100 vehicles (predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to travel to Crimea. A guard said that it was due to an increase in tourist traffic ahead of the upcoming public holiday on 28 June.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure and demining. In government-controlled areas the SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire and monitored the ongoing repair works of the 600m water pipeline in Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), as well as the repair work of the power plant in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), on 24 June. In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire and monitored the repair works on the electricity pylons in Holubivske (50km north-west of Luhansk), the high voltage power line in the area of Zolote-5 (60km north-west of Luhansk), and the high voltage electricity pylons near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) where the co-ordinator of the repair company said that they would not have gone near the contact line without the SMM presence as they did not feel secure. 

In Lviv the SMM monitored a public meeting between Nadiya Savchenko and a group of some 100 activists (men and women of different ages) on 25 June. Ms Savchenko said, among other things, that priority should be given to ensuring the release of Anti-Terrorism Operation participants who are in captivity in non-government-controlled areas. She advocated a total exchange of prisoners as opposed to negotiating the release of individual prisoners on a one by one basis. The SMM did not observe any police present. The gathering concluded peacefully and without incidents.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 June, a guard refused to let SMM enter a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site. The SMM contacted the JCCC, but access was not granted. Beforehand the SMM had seen two unidentified tanks not far south of the permanent storage site, moving west 22.5km from the contact line.
• On 26 June, at a government-controlled checkpoint in Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied access to the SMM to proceed further. The SMM contacted the JCCC, but it could not facilitate access.
• On 26 June, three armed “LPR” members refused to allow the SMM to proceed at the entrance of the border crossing point in Parkhomenko when the SMM did not agree to show its patrol plan. The SMM contacted the JCCC.
• On 23 June, a border guard officer denied SMM access to the Border Guards position jointly operated with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, at Cape Kutara in Kherson saying that advanced notice was required.

Conditional access:

• On 26 June, at a government checkpoint west of Krymske (44km north-west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer prohibited the SMM from entering the village. Some 45 minutes later, two armed personnel arrived and allowed the SMM to proceed escorted by them.

Delay:

• On 26 June, the SMM entered a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site after waiting 50 minutes for permission from the commander. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.