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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 23 June 2016
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Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 23 June 2016

KYIV 24 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the previous day and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. It followed up on reports of shelling and observed significant movement of weapons in Luhansk region. The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In Chernivtsi National University, the number of woman enrolling in the department of military training programme has steadily been increasing, the SMM heard. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on one occasion in areas outside government control.*

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous day. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard approximately 390 undetermined explosions, mainly 3-6km north and 4-6km north-east but also 2-4km west, over the course of the day. The SMM recorded 162 explosions occurring in less than 20 minutes and 70 explosions in less than ten minutes. The SMM also recorded 84 explosions in 12 minutes assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and their impacts, 4-6km north of its position. Eight residents separately told the SMM that the situation had deteriorated over the last few weeks in Yasynuvata, with incoming fire from government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and outgoing fire from “DPR”-controlled Spartak (9km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata.

Whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM recorded 28 explosions during the night of 22 June, 10-12km north of its position.

Earlier in the evening, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka, the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions 9-10km north-north-west and four undetermined explosions 12-13km west-south-west of its position.

Around midnight, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 11 airbursts in four minutes, at an unknown distance to the north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed no ceasefire violations.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. The SMM observed ten fresh craters at Ukrainian Armed Forces positions near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). The SMM assessed the craters as having been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from an easterly direction. Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed nine fresh craters in an agricultural field. The SMM assessed the craters as having been caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction. In Avdiivka, the SMM observed five fresh craters in residential areas. The SMM assessed that four of the craters were caused by shells fired from an easterly or south-easterly direction, and that three of these were caused by 82mm mortar rounds. The fifth crater was assessed as having been caused by an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (70mm) fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed fresh IFV (BMP) tracks approximately 1.5km west of the crater. The SMM observed shattered windows and shrapnel damage to the roofs and walls of nine houses. Three residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on the evening of 21 June. One of the residents had a bandage around his leg which he told the SMM was the result of shrapnel injuries. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was present at each of the sites.

The SMM urged the JCCC to follow up on the incident of 22 June (see SMM Spot Report 22 June 2016), in which both came under mortar shelling in government-controlled Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk). The Mission was unable to travel to the area due to security concerns and the lack of safety assurances from the JCCC.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM observed, at different times during the day, beyond the withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the following in government-controlled areas: one tank near Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk), four tanks (T-64) being transported by military trucks near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk), one tank (T-64) being transported by a military truck and one tank (T-64) stationary near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), five tanks (T-64) being transported by military trucks near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), ten tanks (T-64) being loaded onto railway cars at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), five tanks (T-64) and three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being transported by military trucks near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk), and four tanks (T-64) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited a location known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such a location and observed that 29 anti-tank guns (29 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being loaded onto railway cars at the train station in Rubizhne.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw, at different times during the day, two command vehicles with mounted antennas (BMP-2 and BMP-1Ksh) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), one IFV (BMP-2) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-2) and one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), and 23 IFVs (22 BMP-2 and one BMP-1) and 11 APCs (MT-LB) near Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk).

In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) being towed by a military truck in Luhansk city, just outside of the security zone.

Five kilometres south of Luhansk city, the SMM observed ten white trucks, with Russian Federation Ministry of Emergency Situations logos on the side and Russian Federation licence plates, travelling south. The cargo area of the trucks was covered.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At “DPR” checkpoints near Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw approximately 380 vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and approximately 40 vehicles and 350 pedestrians waiting to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM spent seven hours in one of the queues and still did not reach the checkpoint. Approximately 20 groups of people (5-40 people in each group) separately told the SMM that the average wait time was six to seven hours and sometimes they had to wait overnight. They also told the Mission that there was limited access to toilets, water and medical facilities at the checkpoint, as confirmed by the SMM’s observations.

At a government checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), in the early morning hours, the SMM saw 35 vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 153 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. At the checkpoint, the SMM spoke to 14 people (both men and women of different ages) who said they had spent more than 24 hours queuing at two government checkpoints waiting to travel into government-controlled areas. A woman later told the SMM that she had waited 3.5 hours to pass the checkpoint to travel in the opposite direction. An elderly woman collapsed at the side of the road near the checkpoint and the SMM facilitated the arrival of an ambulance.

At a “DPR” checkpoint near Horlivka, the SMM observed over 400 vehicles and nearly 300 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and five vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction. Several passengers in a shuttle bus told the SMM that it took 10 to 12 hours to cross in either direction.

At a “DPR” checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed approximately 300 vehicles waiting to travel to government-controlled areas. The Mission noted a large number of elderly people, children, and pregnant women in the queue.

At the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed a queue of approximately 500 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 70-100 pedestrians waiting to walk in the opposite direction. The SMM also observed a new tent providing shade to pedestrians. Benches were being installed in the area and an excavator was working on the side of the road. On the southern side of the bridge, the SMM noted that a tent with medicine, water and an ambulance had been set up.

The head of the department for military training at Chernivtsi National University told the SMM that the number of female graduates enrolling in the military officers’ department had increased steadily since 2014. While the average number of students attending the training had remained steady at approximately 200 students; eight women had graduated from the program in 2015, 20 were going to graduate this year, and 30 women had already applied for the program next year.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

  • An armed man told the SMM that it was not authorized to conduct monitoring within 100 metres of the “DPR” checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM conducted its monitoring activity, which did not bring it within 100 metres of the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.