Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 13 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with 11 and 12 June. The Mission conducted crater analysis and observed damages to civilian houses caused by shelling. The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. It facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to infrastructure. The SMM noted long queues at entry-exit points along the contact line and monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. The SMM noted that the power supply of its repeater in Donetsk city, needed for the operation of remote monitoring equipment, had been reconnected. The Mission faced three restrictions to its freedom of movement.*

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region than on each of the previous two days. 

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard at least 70 undetermined explosions 10-12km south-west of its position during the evening of 12 June. The SMM did not record any ceasefire violations on 13 June in Svitlodarsk.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), during the night of 12 June and the early morning hours of 13 June, the SMM heard approximately 280 explosions; 20 of which were assessed as caused by 152mm artillery round impacts 3-8km west and south-west, and 54 assessed as outgoing 152mm artillery rounds 4km west. Fifty of the outgoing rounds were recorded over a ten-minute period.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city centre); the SMM heard approximately 150 undetermined explosions, including over 30 explosions in a ten-minute period, and 30 airbursts, over the course of the day. The explosions, nearly all of which were recorded 1-7km west and west-south-west of the SMM’s position, were accompanied by numerous bursts and shots of continuous heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire. 

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard over 90 explosions assessed as caused by various weapons, including: incoming and outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher-rounds, 82mm mortar and recoilless gun round (SPG-9) impacts, and two 120mm mortar round impacts; all 3-7km south-east of its position.

Whilst positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) in the afternoon, the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions within 23 minutes, 2-3km north-north-west of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one outgoing explosion assessed as caused by a mortar round of an unknown calibre and several single shots of small-arms fire 500 metres north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations than during each of the previous two days. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at least 63 undetermined explosions approximately 7-10km west and south-west of its position in the early afternoon. In government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three machine-gun bursts, fired approximately 200-300 metres south of its position, impacting in the tarmac approximately 50-60 metres from the patrol. The SMM immediately left the area. In the Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) area, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

The SMM followed-up on reports of shelling in residential areas. In Horlivka, the SMM observed 12 fresh craters, conducted analysis on seven of these craters and spoke with more than 60 inhabitants of a residential area in a north-eastern part of the city. The SMM assessed the seven craters as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from the north-west. The SMM observed damage to the windows of buildings and observed that shrapnel had entered flats located on the first floor. The residents told the SMM that they had heard heavy shelling the previous night and that their neighbourhood had last been shelled in August 2015.

The SMM observed a fresh hole in the north-western side of the roof of an uninhabited house in Kominternove, which it assessed as caused by an anti-tank guided missile fired from the north-west. Residents living nearby told the SMM that at approximately 17:00 on 12 June, a projectile had hit the house.

In “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 11 fresh craters in Chervonohvardiiske district (approximately 9km from the contact line). At two of the sites, the SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire or calibre of weapon that created the craters, four craters were assessed as caused by artillery rounds (the SMM was able to assess the calibre of one of the rounds as 152mm), and five as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (at least two of which were assessed as having been fired from a close distance). The SMM was able to assess that two of the artillery rounds were fired from the west and one from the west or south-west. The SMM noted houses with shrapnel damage and broken windows, as well as perforated and mangled gas and water pipes, and one small building which had been completely destroyed. Residents told the SMM that they had heard shelling between 20:00 on 11 June and 02:30 on 12 June. A patient at a hospital in Makiivka told the SMM that he had received numerous injuries during the shelling and that his arm was pierced by a piece of shrapnel above the elbow. In Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district, where the SMM had analysed numerous craters on 9 June, residents told the SMM that the intensity of shelling had now reached the level of what they had witnessed at the beginning of the conflict. Two interlocutors shared their concerns that no one was assisting with the repair of houses and buildings damaged by shelling.

Approximately 700 metres west of the edge of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM analysed six fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also observed from a distance that white smoke was rising approximately 200m from a residential area in the settlement. According to a resident and five armed “LPR” members, shelling had occurred to the west of the village in the early afternoon of 12 June (see SMM Daily Report, 13 June 2016).

The SMM observed that the power supply to its repeater had been reconnected, which is necessary to operate remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in Avdiivka. The power supply to the repeater had been disconnected by “DPR” members on 20 May in Donetsk city (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM observed at “LPR” training areas, beyond the respective withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, 18 tanks (T-64) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and six tanks near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 13 June) and observed four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near government-controlled Pryvilne (72km south of Donetsk). Near “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). In addition, several hundred men in military-style clothing, as well as military-type trucks, transport vehicles and tents were set-up near residential and industrial buildings.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and noted that five previously recorded howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 18 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 15 Addendum-regulated mortars (ten 2B11 Sani 122mm; three BM-37, 82mm; and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and 29 Addendum-regulated tanks (T-64). The SMM noted that one tank (T-64) was missing for the first time.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone in government-controlled areas: one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 50mm heavy machine-gun near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60s) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to infrastructure and demining works. Near government-controlled Artemove (42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair work to a factory. A demining team was also present in the area. In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining around the Shchastia power plant. In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair work to an electrical power line.

The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. During the morning hours of 13 June, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed approximately 400 people waiting to cross the bridge towards government-controlled areas. There was no queue of people waiting to cross in the opposite direction. The SMM observed that the new “LPR” forward position leaves no more than 1.2 metres for pedestrians to pass. Three women complained that it was difficult to pass the checkpoint with luggage. The new position is located on Stanytsia Luhanska bridge but north of the Siverskyi Donets river (see SMM Daily Report 13 June). The new position has advanced the “LPR” position 450 metres north from its previous forward position, in contravention of the Minsk Memorandum, and across the contact line.

At a checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed at least 300 civilian vehicles and 200 pedestrians waiting to travel into government-controlled areas and approximately 100 civilian vehicles and 200 pedestrian waiting to travel in the opposite direction. Shortly before noon, at a “DPR” checkpoint near government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed approximately 750 civilian vehicles and 200 pedestrians queuing to travel into government-controlled areas and 25 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. At “LPR-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) border crossing point, the SMM observed 19 civilian cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates, the remainder with Ukrainian licence plates) and two commercial trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates) whose cargo was covered, waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. During a 20 minutes time period, the SMM observed two civilian vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates crossing into Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed man denied the SMM entrance to “DPR”-controlled Pervomaiske (59km south of Donetsk). He said the SMM required a permit and, once obtained, it would be allowed to proceed with a “DPR” escort. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka, an armed man did not allow the SMM to enter the railway station, claiming that it needed special permission.

Conditional access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander in government-controlled Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk) asked the SMM patrol members about their nationalities. He allowed three members of the patrol to enter the compound but did not allow an SMM national staff member to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.