Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 5 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region both on 4 and 5 June as compared to 3 June, and observed a similarly high number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on the night of 3 June – compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to 3 June. In particular, a sharp increase of violence was noted in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and south-east of Svitlodarsk. On both sides of the contact line, the Mission conducted crater analysis and observed damages to civilian houses caused by shelling; on one occasion, the SMM observed a dead person. The SMM noted that a “DPR” checkpoint had been relocated closer to a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential infrastructure. The Mission’s operations were restricted by the sides on several occasions.*

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region both on 4 and 5 June as compared to 3 June. In particular, a sharp increase of violence was noted in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and south-east of Svitlodarsk. 

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 3 June, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 3-7km west of its position. The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 64 explosions (22 impacts and 42 undetermined explosions) 2-7km north-west, north-north-west, north and north- north-east of its position. On the night of 4 June, whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions 4-8km north and west, and 20 air explosions of anti-aircraft-cannon fire 3-5km north-north-west of its position. On 5 June, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station, the SMM recorded nine undetermined explosions 2-7km north and north-east of its position.

On 4 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 157 explosions (71 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) at locations ranging from north-west to west-south-west and 3-8km of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 187 undetermined explosions (58 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) at locations ranging from south-east to east and 3-6km of its position. On 5 June, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 162 undetermined explosions 1-4km south-west, west-south-west, west and west-north-west of its position. On the same day, whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 27 explosions (19 of which were assessed as caused by mortar impacts and eight were undetermined) 2-7km south-east, east and north-east of its position.   

On the night of 3 June, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 60 explosions (15 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) 3-4km south-east of its position; on the following night, it recorded 95 explosions (seven of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds).

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a similarly high number of ceasefire violations on the night of 3 June compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to 3 June. On the night of 3 June, whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a 2.5-hour period, 383 explosions (13 of which were assessed as caused by outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds, 84 as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire and 12 as impacts of automatic-grenade launcher fire, while the rest were undetermined) 2.5-6km south-south-east and south-west of its position. Between the morning hours of 4 June and the evening hours of 5 June the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Stanytsia Luhanska. On 5 June, whilst in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three outgoing explosions 5-8km south-south-west of its position and saw grey smoke rising assessed as caused by impacts of tank-fire at a location 3km to the south-south-west of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In a residential area of government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM analysed four fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortars fired from a north-easterly direction (two craters) and 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-north-easterly direction (two craters). The SMM also observed a punctured gas pipeline, fractured walls, and destroyed roofs. The SMM also observed two impact sites in a residential area of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), which, according to residents, were caused on the night of 2-3 June. The SMM analysed a crater and concluded that it had been caused by a 122mm artillery round or a 125mm tank round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. In government-controlled Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk), two female residents (aged 60) informed the SMM they had heard shelling the previous night. At four locations in the village, the SMM analysed four fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from an easterly direction (one crater) and an east-south-easterly direction (three craters). The SMM saw one of the craters on an asphalt surface 4m away from the kindergarten building and another one in the kindergarten playground, and observed at least 60 broken windows and most parts of the roof broken. The kindergarten director told the SMM that due to the damage they would not be able to receive pupils in September. At an industrial compound in the village, a security guard informed the SMM that after the shelling during the previous night he had found his colleague (man, aged 42) dead at the compound. The SMM saw a human body lying partly covered with the roof debris and the upper part of his body covered with blood, and a big pool of blood under his torso.

In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), at a children’s playground – 35m from a residential building, the SMM saw a tree it assessed as having been felled by a powerful impact of an undetermined weapon. The SMM assessed that the direction of fire had been from a south-south-westerly direction. At the courtyard of a detached house, the SMM observed a crater and assessed it as caused by a 125mm tank round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. The SMM saw a south-west-facing window of the house had been broken resulting from a blast shock. A woman (in her sixties) and her two grandchildren told the SMM that they had been inside the premise when they had heard an impact hitting the house at 1:16 the same morning.

In a residential area in the north-eastern parts of government-controlled Mykolaivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted crater analysis on nine fresh craters, which had allegedly been the result of shelling on the night of 4 June, and assessed that they had been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a northerly direction. The SMM saw that one house had been partially damaged by a direct hit, which had destroyed the roof completely and penetrated the north-facing wall and the ceiling of the house.

On the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM analysed 12 fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-easterly and northerly direction. The SMM saw at least three houses had damages to their walls, windows, and roofs facing north and north-east. 

In government-controlled parts of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM assessed damage to houses which, according to residents, had been caused by shelling on 2 and 3 June. At one house, the SMM observed that all windows were broken, and the west-facing walls were charred by burning. At three other houses, it observed holes on west-facing walls and entrance doors, which it assessed as caused by projectiles of undetermined weapons.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted as missing 30 tanks (T-64) and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm), as has been observed for the first time on 19 March and 6 January, respectively.

The SMM also revisited “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May) on 4 June. Also in violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8, Osa 120mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk); and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk), on 4 June.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: seven towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing 15 towed howitzers (four D-20, 152mm, first observed missing on 2 April; and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm, first observed missing on 14 March). The SMM noted that one site was abandoned with 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) missing, as observed for the first time on 22 April.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV;BMP-1) near Hirske (62km north-west of Luhansk), on 3 June; one anti-aircraft gun near Pervomaiske, one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-60), one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Nyzhnie, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-60) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on 4 June; one IFV (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka, two APCs (BTR) near Popasna, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novozvanivka (70km west from Luhansk) on 5 June. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 2 June, of one armoured vehicle near Avdiivka. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one APC (BTR-80) in Donetsk city on 4 June. In “LPR”-controlled area, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) near Kalynove on 5 June.

The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. During the morning hours of 4 June, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 400 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and no people waiting in a queue to proceed in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed some 200 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and ten people waiting to proceed in the opposite direction.

On 5 June, the SMM noted that a “DPR” checkpoint on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) had been relocated 900m further north-west, closer to a Ukrainian Armed Force checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).  

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works on essential infrastructure. On 4 June, the SMM observed repair works on gas pipelines in government-controlled Marinka and Krasnohorivka. During its monitoring, the SMM heard 12 single shots of small-arms fire and one undetermined explosion 1-5km north-east and east-south-east of its location. On 5 June, the SMM observed repair works on power lines near “LPR”-controlled Obozne (19km north of Luhansk). Five meters north of a road under the power line to be repaired, the SMM noted a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which it assessed as an artillery shell (122-152mm), and informed an “LPR” demining team. Subsequently, the demining team arrived and extracted the shell from the ground.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was obstructed on two occasions. On 3 June, at  “DPR”-controlled Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed nine passenger cars, five commercial trucks and one bus (11 with Ukrainian licence plates and four with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting in a queue to cross to the Russian Federation. Whilst in Marynivka, an unarmed “DPR” member asked the SMM not to approach the border line.* On 5 June, at the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 11 vehicles (nine with Ukrainian licence plates and two with Russian Federation licence plates) in a queue waiting to cross to the Russian Federation. On 4 June, in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), a man stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed further to the border crossing points in Krasnodarskyi and Nyzhnia Harasymivka (58 and 56km south-east of Luhansk, respectively).* 

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 3 June, at the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), an unarmed “DPR” member asked the SMM not to approach the border line. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 June, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to check the serial numbers of weapons present in a heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 June, at a checkpoint on the northern edge of government-controlled Berdianske (20km east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to proceed further east, stating they did not have authorization to let the SMM pass the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 June, in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), three civilian men (aged 45-50) denied the SMM access to a compound. The SMM was therefore unable to verify the alleged presence of weapons. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 4 June, in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), a man, who introduced himself as a “border guard”, stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed further to the border crossing points in Krasnodarskyi and Nyzhnia Harasymivka (58 and 56km south-east of Luhansk, respectively). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected as they have been since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in government-controlled Avdiivka is disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

Conditional access:

• On 4 June, at a checkpoint at the eastern edge of Yasynuvata, “DPR” “traffic police” delayed the SMM for 26 minutes and allowed it to proceed further to west on condition of accepting an escort. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• On 4 June, at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), armed men denied the SMM passage. The SMM informed the JCCC and 25 minutes later, the SMM was allowed to proceed further to north-east.

Other impediments:

• The SMM’s monitoring capacities from the air are limited following the incidents with SMM unmanned aerial vehicles on 27 May and 2 June (see SMM Spot Report 27 May and SMM Spot Report 3 June).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.