Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a lower level of violence in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous day. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons; it noted also armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to the SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected.* The Mission could neither locate nor recover any debris at the presumed crash site of an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Korsun.

SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared with the previous day. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 2-3 June, the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 1-7km north and north-east of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 undetermined explosions 3-8km north, north-east and south-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 58 undetermined explosions, 120 bursts of small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire, 1-8km north, north-east, east, south-east, south-south-east and south, of its position. In addition, the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as automatic grenade launcher fire, four explosions assessed as mortar fire (82- and 120mm) all 4-6km east of its position.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous day, mainly during the night hours of 2-3 June. Whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM heard at least 353 undetermined explosions 2.5-6km south-east, south and south-west of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM visited six locations affected by shelling. The SMM observed damage to several houses, including shrapnel damage to roofs and walls facing a west, south-western direction, fences and broken windows. In one of those houses the SMM saw a washing machine with a fuse of a 120mm mortar round stuck in it. The SMM analysed four craters and assessed them as being caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction (two craters) and a south-westerly direction (one crater) and south-south-westerly direction (one crater). No casualties were reported. According to several residents, “DPR” armed members usually fire towards Ukrainian Armed Forces positions from residential areas in the village; afterwards incoming shelling and shooting towards the residential areas from Ukrainian Armed Forces positions take place.

In Petrovskyi district (“DPR”-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM observed shrapnel damage to roofs and walls of several houses on east- and south-east-facing walls and burn marks on the walls. The SMM analysed four craters and assessed them as being caused by 40mm grenades fired from a south-easterly direction. Two other craters were assessed as caused by either 120- or 152mm artillery fire. The SMM could not ascertain the direction of the fire.

The SMM followed up on the loss of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report, 3 June 2016) and visited the area near the presumed crash site to recover possible debris and collect other relevant information. According to a “DPR” member who was present, the area was mined and booby-trapped. When the SMM intended to launch a small-size UAV to fly over the area, the “DPR” member said that it would be shot down by his colleagues.* The SMM informed the JCCC and eventually conducted two flights over the presumed crash site in an area north and south of Korsun, but no debris was found. The SMM observed a military-type compound with a big antenna on the northern edge of Korsun.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures the SMM observed, in violation of the respective withdrawal lines, two stationary tanks in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing ten tanks (T-64; first observed missing on 13 August 2015), 23 towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm; ten observed first missing on 2 March, two since 6 April, six since 20 April, three since 19 May and two since 3 June), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm; three first observed missing on 2 March and one on 4 February), three anti-tank guns (D44, 85mm; first observed missing on 6 April), and 37 self-propelled howitzers (33 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm; four 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; ten missing since 2 March and 27 since 19 May). The SMM observed additional weapons for the first time: three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and seven towed mortars (2B11 Sani).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-4) being transported on a truck in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one APC (BTR-80) in Donetskyi (50km north-west of Luhansk) and 11 military-type trucks including one command vehicle, two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-1) and two multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicles (MTLB) in the vicinity of Chornukhyne (64km south-west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed two stationary IFVs (BMP) in Styla (34km south of Donetsk). In the evening of 2 June, from its base in Donetsk city centre, the SMM observed 1-3km north of its location a silver-coloured flying object, assessed as a UAV, moving from north to east.

In addition, outside the security zone, the SMM observed a convoy consisting of 42 military-type trucks (ZIL-131) all stationary and one APC (BTR-70) in Ivanivka (46km south-west of Luhansk),

The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 70 civilians waiting to leave non-government-controlled areas and some 100 civilians in the opposite direction, waiting to enter non-government-controlled areas. Later on, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, the SMM observed 41 civilians waiting to walk towards non-government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that checkpoint personnel allowed groups of 30 people with small children, disabled and elderly to enter government-controlled areas without waiting.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• A “DPR” commander at a “DPR” checkpoint in Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) did not allow the SMM access to a house to conduct crater analysis, citing security reasons. The SMM was allowed to proceed to a shop located in the village, where later on, an armed “DPR” member approached the SMM. He told the SMM that he would be present to ensure that the SMM did not discuss any sensitive issues with the local population, such as information related to the presence of “DPR” members and “DPR” positions in the village.  The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected, as they have since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in government-controlled Avdiivka are disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).
• When the SMM intended to launch a small-size UAV to fly over “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk), a “DPR” member said it would be shot down by his colleagues. The SMM informed the JCCC and eventually conducted two flights.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.