Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 19 May 2016

This report is for the general public and the media.

The SMM observed a similar level of violence in Donetsk region and recorded slightly fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared to the previous day. The SMM conducted crater analysis in Stanytsia Luhanska. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and noted numerous armoured combat vehicles, as well as anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. The Mission followed up on reports of casualties from a landmine incident in Pavlopil. It also monitored a protest in Lviv region. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on three occasions exclusively in areas not controlled by the Government.*

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations with most of them occurring at the same locations, between Yasynuvata and Avdiivka, as in the previous reporting period. [1] Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 107 undetermined explosions, and heard nine explosions assessed as caused by impacts of rounds from unknown weapon types, as well as117 bursts and 446 single shots of small-arms fire, all 1-7km west and west-north-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as caused by impacts of recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9) and automatic-grenade-launcher fire (ten at a distance of 3-6km east-south east and south-south-east, and eight at a distance of 5-6km south-south-west). The SMM also heard and saw nine air explosions of 82mm mortar fire, and heard eight undetermined explosions and 41 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-6km east-south-east and south of its position. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded, over the night of 18 May and on the following day, three undetermined projectiles from east to west and nine from west to east, three columns of smoke of undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as caused by an impact, all 3-7km east-south-east and south-south-east.

Whilst positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 2-8km north, north-north-east, north-east, west-north-west, and north-west of its position.

The SMM observed a slight decrease in the number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared to the previous day. Whilst in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) in the early morning hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions, 3-5km south of its position. Positioned at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as outgoing fire of an unknown weapon and one explosion assessed as an impact 700m north-east of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis at an “LPR” checkpoint at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The crater was located some 500m south-east of the bridge. The SMM assessed that the crater was fresh and it was caused by an automatic grenade launcher (AGS VOG-17/VOG-30, 30mm) round fired from a north-north-westerly direction. The SMM also noted a piece of explosive remnant of war assessed as 30mm AGS VOG-17/VOG-30, near the crater. Two armed “LPR” members (men, aged 35) present claimed that the crater was caused by incoming shelling in the evening hours on 17 May.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 12 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six near Novozhelanne (33km north-west of Donetsk) and six near Zhelanne (34km north-west of Donetsk).

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 21 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 12 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; eight 9K51 Grad, 120mm; and four  9K57 Uragan, 220mm), three anti-tank guns (2A29, MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and 19 Addendum-regulated 82mm mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek; three BM-37; ten 2B11), and one 120mm mortar (2B11 Sani). The SMM found one additional 120mm mortar (2B11 Sani) present for the first time. The SMM noted that 30 Addendum-regulated tanks (T-64, 125mm), three 120mm mortars (2B11 Sani), and 16 self-propelled howitzers (two 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; and 14 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing (13 for missing for the first time and three of the latter first observed missing on 20 April 2016). The SMM noted that one area was abandoned for the first time, with 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) missing.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2), two light-armoured towing vehicles (ATV; MTLB) mounted with 12.7mm machine-guns, and an ACV (BRDM-2) near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk); an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-60) and an armoured artillery reconnaissance vehicle (Snar-10) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); a static ACV (BRDM-2) and a ZU-23 east of Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-4) mounted with a heavy machine gun near Popasna (61km west of Luhansk), and an APC (BTR-60) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas: an APC (BTR-80) in Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk), a ZU-23 mounted on an ACV (MTLB), and one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP) stationary near a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (19km west of Donetsk).

Also in the security zone in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed 14 ACVs (four MTLB, one MTLB with a mounted double anti-aircraft gun (ZPU-2), one IFV (BMP-2) and eight ACVs of undetermined type) inside a compound. At the same place, the SMM was denied access by an armed “LPR” member to the compound where the above-mentioned hardware was visible from the outside.*

Outside the security zone, at a bridge in government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw on the river, 100 meters from the bridge, a smoke screen, two armoured vehicles (type unspecified) and equipment for building a pontoon bridge. The SMM assessed it to be a river-crossing-offensive-assault exercise.

The SMM observed the presence of mines in the security zone. At the government checkpoint H15 in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw two sets of four unmarked anti-tank mines (previously observed as arranged in one set of eight) on both sides of the road some 20m east of the checkpoint. Their fuses were attached to a command wire next to the mines for remote detonation. The mines were placed on wooden boards attached to ropes so that they may be moved, and there were no concrete blocks around the mines “protecting” them from civilians or vehicles.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties from a mine incident on 18 May where a tractor hit an anti-tank mine near government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 19 May) and resulted in the death of a young man (aged 26) and serious injury of another (aged 28). The SMM visited the morgue and the hospital in Mariupol. The forensic medical examiner at the morgue confirmed that the young man had died as a result of a mine explosion. The chief doctor at the hospital said that the young man was being treated in the intensive care unit as he had suffered life-changing injuries from the mine.

The SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire and monitored repairs of essential infrastructure. The SMM monitored works related to the installation of a gas pipeline in Marinka. The SMM saw five members of a “DPR” de-mining team checking the area for mines and UXO and four employees of the gas company going to evaluate the area. Later the SMM observed the team of de-miners coming back from their examination of the area, carrying a rocket propelled grenade round. While at the site, the SMM heard an explosion-like sound north-west of its position, which resulted in the interruption of the repair works. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) present at the site told the SMM that there had been an explosion likely caused by a booby trap triggered by an animal.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. At a government checkpoint in Marinka, the SMM observed 575 civilian cars and 180 pedestrians queuing to travel west and 110 civilian vehicles heading east. At the government checkpoint at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 350 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 180 pedestrians waiting in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 226 civilian vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled areas and none in the opposite direction. At checkpoints in Marinka and between Donetsk and Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) civilians (men and women, aged 25-50) physically blocked the SMM vehicles for 10-20 minutes on three different occasions. They expressed to the SMM frustration from having been waiting, as some claimed, for more than 12 hours to get across.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government. At the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 25 commercial trucks (all Ukrainian licence plates) waiting to cross to the Russian Federation. An armed “DPR” member told the SMM that people with “DPR” “passports” or driving vehicles with “DPR” licence plates were allowed to cross. One man (aged 60) also told the SMM that usually he would be allowed to enter the Russian Federation with “DPR” licence plates. At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a high number of vehicles queuing to go to the Russian Federation: 60 civilian cars (55 with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates), seven civilian buses and 27 cargo trucks (three with Russian Federation licence plates). The SMM also observed an increased number of armed “LPR” members in military-type attire near the border crossing point, as compared to its last visit on 6 May.

On 17 May the SMM visited three crossing points in Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (70km, 77km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively) at the administrative boundary line with Crimea and noted a calm situation.

The SMM observed a protest in Lviv region. Near the village of Pidriasne (12km west of Lviv) the SMM observed some 100 people (two-thirds women, aged 20-60) blocking a road in protest against the Lviv City Council issuing construction permits allegedly without the involvement of the village councils. The SMM observed some 80 buses and trucks stuck in the blockade and hundreds of passengers getting off the buses to proceed on foot. The SMM observed five police officers (one woman) redirecting hundreds of private cars. The protestors said that their community lands were being confiscated and turned into construction plots.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint in Staromykhailivka, “DPR” members denied SMM access through the checkpoint, claiming that they needed permission from their superior. The SMM left the area 50 minutes later.
• In “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov, an armed “LPR” member denied SMM access to a compound full of military-type hardware visible from the outside. The SMM left the area and noted that men in military-type clothing in a nearby house were filming and taking photos of the SMM.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) asked the SMM about the purpose of its visit and route, and insisted on searching the trunks of its vehicles before allowing the SMM to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.