Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 15 May 2016

The SMM observed a slightly higher level of violence in Donetsk region both on 14 and 15 May as compared to the previous two days and recorded a low number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on 14 May and none on 15 May. The Mission observed the presence of weapons and hardware in the security zone. It noted the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. The SMM monitored the situation affecting civilians near the contact line and at checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. It visited border areas both in government- and non-government-controlled areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on three occasions on both sides of the contact line.*

The SMM observed an increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region[1] both on 14 and 15 May as compared to the previous two days, with most of the explosions observed in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk). There, on 14 May, the SMM heard 97 undetermined explosions, including 26 assessed as 82mm and 120mm mortar fire, and 15 explosions assessed as impacts (eight from unknown weapons and seven assessed as 80mm and 120mm mortar fire). Of the total number of explosions, 43 occurred within 20 minutes. In addition, the SMM saw and heard six airbursts of an unknown weapon system, and heard approximately 350 single shots of small-arms fire, all 1-6km west-south-west and west of its position. The following day, the SMM heard 136 undetermined explosions, of which 109 within 90 minutes, and more than 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 30 shots of small-arms fire 1-6km west-south-west and west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), on 14 May, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as impacts of recoilless gun fire (SPG-9), seven air blasts assessed as 82mm mortar fire and several bursts of small-arms fire 1-6km east and south-east of its position. The following day, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, heard 26 impacts, and heard and saw six air blasts assessed as 82mm mortar fire, heard 14 impacts of recoilless gun (SPG-9) fire, 18 bursts of 30mm cannon (BMP-2) fire, and more than 160 bursts of heavy-machine gun and small-arms fire 3-10km east, east-south-east, south-east and south of its position. The SMM camera in Avdiivka  recorded six columns of smoke caused by undetermined explosions, one explosion caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire, two undetermined projectiles fired from south to north and west-south-west to east-north-east, and 13 rounds of direct tracer fire from west to east, at a distance of 1-6km south-east of its position, on 14 May. The following day, the SMM camera recorded four columns of smoke caused by undetermined explosions 3-7km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-east.

Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-10km north and north-north-east of its position, on 14 May. Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, in the evening hours of 14 May, six undetermined explosions, 23 bursts (one from anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) fire, 16 from heavy-machine-gun fire, and six from automatic-grenade-launcher fire), and 15 bursts and six shots of small-arms fire 1-6km south-east. The following day, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 4-5km north-north-east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 40 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), in the evening hours of 14 May, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a slight increase in the number of ceasefire violations on 14 May as compared to the previous day, and no ceasefire violations on 15 May. Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 20 explosions assessed as mortar fire of unknown calibre and some 200 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south of its position, on 14 May.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside permanent storage sites, the SMM observed 20-30 stationary tanks assessed as T-64 at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted the presence of 27 tanks near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) on 12 May; and four tanks in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city, and 30 tanks in “DPR”-controlled Torez (62km east of Donetsk) on 13 May.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited one such location on 14 May, but was prevented from accessing the area;* however, from a distance, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM long-range UAV spotted the presence of one surface-to-air missile system (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) in government-controlled Roty (65km north-east of Donetsk) on 12 May, and one towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) in “DPR”-controlled Torez, on 13 May.

Beyond the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (SA-8 Osa, 120mm) near government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on tank transporters in government-controlled Stritenka (former Oktiabrsk; 46km north of Mariupol). The SMM long-range UAV spotted the presence of 20 towed howitzers (12 D-30, 122mm and eight 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), and 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Myrne, on 13 May.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons, and other hardware in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-4) in Vrubivka (72km north-west of Luhansk); two stationary APCs (BTR-60 and BTR-4) in Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk), and two stationary APCs (BTR-60) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), on 13 May; one APC (BTR-60) and one armoured artillery reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10), both stationary near a government-controlled part of Nyzhnie (54km north-west of Luhansk); one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on a truck near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun near the government-controlled part of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), on 14 May; and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a stationary Ural truck in Hirske (63km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (MT-LB), one with a mounted machine-gun of unknown calibre, and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) in Zolote, a stationary APC (BTR-4) in Komyshuvakha; and two stationary APCs (BTR-4 and BTR-60) near Popasna; a stationary APC (MT-LB) in Novozvanivka (69km west of Luhansk); and an armoured vehicle (BRDM) south of Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 15 May.

In “LPR”-controlled areas in the security zone, the SMM observed: two APCs (MTLB), 2km north of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); six APCs (BMP; one loaded with an anti-aircraft gun) in Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk), and an IFV (BMP-2) in Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), on 14 May; and a surface-to-air-missile (SA-13 Strela 10) parked along with a covered armoured vehicle in “LPR”-controlled part of Nyzhnie, on 15 May.

Also in the security zone on both sides of contact line, the SMM long-range UAV spotted the presence of one APC near government-controlled Troitske and one APC near Kalynove, on 12 May, as well as one APC near government-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), three APCs near government-controlled Luhanske (60km north-east of Donetsk), four APCs near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), one armoured vehicle near “DPR”-controlled Sanzharivka (65km north-east of Donetsk),  17 APCs near “DPR”-controlled Karlo-Marksove (39km north-east of Donetsk), 11 APCs near “LPR”-controlled Yuvileine (10km west of Luhansk), and one APC in Luhansk city on 13 May.

The SMM observed the marking of mined areas, demining activity and the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM observed five mine hazard signs in the fields around a checkpoint in a government-controlled part of Leninske (39km north-east of Donetsk), on 13 May. In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM noted that a piece of UXO (possible multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rocket, 220mm) previously observed on 13 May in a residential area (see SMM Daily Report 13 May) had been removed. In a government-controlled part of Zolote, the SMM observed meadows clearly marked with mine hazard signs (red signs with white Cyrillic letters, on 1.5m sticks), on 14 May. In “LPR”-controlled Smile (30km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM noted a poster, without any official logo, on the local shop wall with mine awareness information. In government-controlled Troitske, a resident told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had cleaned his back yard from trip wires; however, other residents said that the pastures along the river were still mined and they were afraid to use them.

The SMM monitored the situation affecting civilians near the contact line. The SMM observed, on 13 May, a large number of houses with broken windows in Leninske, which the SMM assessed as a consequence of the shelling that had occurred throughout last year and the first months of 2016. In government-controlled Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk), a 42-year-old man who said he had hit a mine with his tractor on 24 April 2015 told the SMM that after the incident the emergency services had inspected the 80-hectares field and assessed it as still littered with over 200 mines and/or UXO. He said that, in total, around 300 hectares were not cultivated because of the presence of explosive devices. The SMM observed no marking of the area with mine hazard signs. The SMM contacted the emergency service, but they were unavailable. In government-controlled Donske (42km north-east of Mariupol), a group of residents (approximately 20 women aged 45 or older and ten men aged 25-60) told the SMM that 500 employees from the Donske chemical factory had been laid off without notice on 12 May and production at the factory had ceased. They said that the factory supplied the entire town of Donske (population of 5,500 and 500 internally displaced persons) with water, gas and heating, thus, they were concerned of an interruption of the supply. On 14 May, residents (women in their seventies) in “DPR”-controlled Rozsypne (56km north-east of Donetsk) and in “LPR”-controlled Frunze (40km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that they lived only on humanitarian aid provided by the “LPR” as, due to their age and health conditions, they could not go and collect the pensions in government-controlled areas and they had no relatives to help them. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Klunykove (75km south of Luhansk) residents told the SMM that Ukrainian authorities had stopped paying them pensions since March 2016.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints on both sides of the contact line. On 14 May, at a government checkpoint in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed 14 civilian cars waiting to travel west and 38 cars queuing to travel east. At a “DPR” checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed 16 civilian cars waiting to travel west, and 20 cars waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 15 pedestrians waiting to cross into government-controlled areas and none queuing on the other side. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed no pedestrians waiting to walk north, while it noted 100 pedestrians waiting to walk south. The following day, at the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed about 100 pedestrians waiting to walk north and some 30 pedestrians queuing to walk south. The SMM noted that crossing procedures in both directions were quick, with a constant flow of people crossing in both directions. Based on separate statements by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and “LPR” members at the checkpoints, the SMM assessed that on 14 May some 2,000 people had travelled in both directions (some 800 into government-controlled areas and 1,200 in the opposite direction) and on 15 May, some 500 people had crossed in both directions. The SMM observed, in total both during 14 and 15 May, 352 people (322 waiting to travel north and 30 waiting to travel south). At a checkpoint in government-controlled Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel loading a military truck with office equipment, abandoning the checkpoint. They told the SMM that they had orders to leave the checkpoint, but that other personnel would arrive in a week.

The SMM monitored border areas, four in government- and three in non-government-controlled areas. On 13 May, at the border crossing point in government-controlled Milove (108km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM noted six private cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) and several pedestrians waiting in line to cross into the Russian Federation. Three civilians told the SMM that in general, on different days, the waiting time varied from one to eight hours. On 14 May, at the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 30 civilian cars, mainly with Ukrainian and some with Russian licence plates, queuing to cross into the Russian Federation. The SMM also observed 42 commercial trucks waiting in line, all with Ukrainian licence plates and the majority transporting coal. Two civilians told the SMM that they had been waiting for 40-90 minutes. At the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 80 civilian cars, mainly with Ukrainian and some with Russian licence plates and 35 commercial trucks (33 with Ukrainian and two with Belarusian licence plates). At the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (53km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed ten civilian cars (four with Russian licence plates), nine long civilian trucks (four with Russian licence plates), and three civilian cars inside the border crossing point, all heading to the Russian Federation; as well as three civilian cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. On 11 and 12 May the SMM visited the three crossing points of Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (95, 90 and 178km south-east of Kherson, respectively) at the administrative boundary line with Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 14 May, armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from accessing a heavy weapons holding area.

Delay:

• At a government checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers told the SMM on 14 May that they had to ask permission from their commanders to allow the SMM to proceed. They allowed the SMM to pass the checkpoint after 26 minutes.
• On 14 May, an armed “LPR” member prevented the SMM from entering a compound in “LPR”-controlled Komisarivka (60km south-west of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed a written permission from their superiors in Debaltseve. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and almost one hour later, the SMM was allowed to enter the site.  

Other impediments:

• On 12 and 13 May, the SMM long-range UAV experienced constant jamming of its Global Positioning System (GPS) while flying over “LPR”-controlled Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk), Luhansk city, Petrivske (44km south-west of Luhansk) and Sofiivskyi (51km south-west of Luhansk).

[1]Pease see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.