Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 11 May 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted a decrease in the number of recorded ceasefire violations compared with the previous day. In Luhansk region it continued to note a low level of ceasefire violations. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair to essential infrastructure. The Mission observed mine hazard signs near an entry-exit checkpoint and continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. It monitored an area close to the border not under government control and was prevented from monitoring in another*. The Mission monitored the situation affecting civilians in areas near the contact line.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations registered in Donetsk region compared to the previous day.[1] While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, between 19:00 and 22:35 on 10 May, one explosion assessed as incoming mortar round, 22 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, eight bursts of automatic grenade launcher, over 50 bursts of small-arms fire, 16 shots of BMP-1 cannon fire and 38 bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) fire all 0.5-6km south-east of its position.

Whilst positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions, ten 1-3km south-south-east with the remainder 3-10km north, north-north-east and north-east of its position.

While stationary in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire and saw two airbursts of anti-aircraft gunfire 2-5km west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard - between 11:03 and 11:34 - four undetermined explosions, some bursts of heavy-machine gun and small-arms fire and saw one airburst, all 4-6km east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire near government-controlled Troitske (70km west of Luhansk).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites and observed that 39 tanks (T-64) were missing (31 since 28 February 2016; eight since 9 April 2016) and three mortars (2B9, 82mm) were missing (since 19 April 2016). Eight anti-tank guns (D44, 82 mm) remained missing, as they have been since 28 February 2016.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 12 mortars (seven 2B11, 120mm; five PM38, 120mm); 42 anti-tank guns (36 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; and six D-48, 85mm); 34 howitzers (18 self-propelled 2S1 Gvozdika,122mm; and 16 towed 2A65 Msta B, 152mm); two additional towed howitzers (2A65 Msta B, 152mm) were missing from one area but were observed in another area 3km away. At one site the SMM observed three self-propelled howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152mm) whose serial numbers did not match those on the inventory provided. All 18 previously observed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152mm) continued to be absent from this area as they have been since 30 March 2016. Three sites were abandoned with eight tanks (T-72) missing since 17 March, 24 towed howitzers (six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm missing since 17 March; and 18 2A65 Msta B, 152mm missing since 22 April 2016). Twenty-five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were also missing from one site.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such an area and observed six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles within the security zone. At a checkpoint near “LPR”-controlled Smile (32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1). The SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 11 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and 55 military-type trucks in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 17 armoured vehicles in Luhansk city within 600m of the security zone on 10 May. The SMM UAV also spotted nine armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on media reports that an explosion wounded workers at the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). At the plant the SMM spoke with an employee responsible for security who said that on 10 May at approximately 15:35, the third floor of the building was struck by a grenade (AGS-17, 30mm). According to him, one worker had sustained severe shrapnel injuries and two others (all men) light injuries. He told the SMM that all were brought to the hospital in Shchastia for treatment; that one was subsequently released, but two remained in hospital, with the severely injured worker in a critical condition. The SMM saw the alleged impact on the floor next to a north-west facing wall with multiple broken windows. A pool of blood was clearly visible. The SMM assessed that the impact was caused by a projectile not larger than 30mm calibre.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance and mines. A group of six residents (men and women aged between 30 and 60) in government-controlled Troitske (70km west of Luhansk) showed the SMM booby traps located in the vicinity of residential areas, and said that one had been triggered on 10 May but had caused no injuries. The SMM relayed the residents’ complaints to the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander in the area who said he would make arrangements to remove the booby traps. Later, the SMM spoke with one of the residents by phone who said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had begun to remove the booby traps. In “DPR”-controlled Rozsypne (56km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed the unexploded remnants of an MLRS BM-30 Smerch rocket (300mm) in the yard of a house. Approximately 1.5m of the rocket’s tail was visible above the ground. A resident told the SMM that the village had been shelled with Smerch rockets in September 2014, and that residents had not received any assistance in removing them. After witnessing a young boy playing with ammunition and remnants of rockets and mortars, the SMM spoke with his family about mine awareness.

The SMM observed newly placed mine hazard signs in the vicinity of the government checkpoint near the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). The SMM observed that the area was fenced (with a two metre tall metal fence) with 90-100 mine hazard signs placed at 20-30m intervals on both sides of the road. Along the destroyed bridge, the SMM observed a further 100 mine warning signs placed at 20-30m intervals on both sides. The signs were red with white text (“Danger mines!”) in Ukrainian and English. A Ukrainian Border Guard commander told the SMM that although demining had been carried out in this area, there was no guarantee that the area has been cleared.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair to essential infrastructure. Positioned on opposite sides of the contact line in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (31km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored the ceasefire (which was facilitated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination) as a repair team from the Luhansk water company fixed damaged pipes in an “LPR”-controlled area.

The SMM monitored one area, and was prevented from monitoring in another area close to the border not under government control.* At the border crossing point in “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) on 10 May the SMM saw nine commercial trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and 67 cars (with different plates: one “DPR”, one Polish, two Georgian and about equal numbers Russian and Ukrainian) queued to cross.

The SMM monitored the situation affecting civilians in areas near the contact line. In “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM spoke with a group of seven civilians (five women and two men, aged 30 to 60) at the health clinic who said that shelling was frequent and that the situation was tense. One employee told the SMM that nothing had been done to repair the damage to the clinic caused by the 27 April shelling (see SMM Daily Report, 30 April). According to him, the clinic was still without running water as it had been since the shelling.

In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on reports from the regional Ministry of Interior of an explosion at the base of the ministry’s Special Forces unit “Eastern Corps” in the city centre during the early hours of 11 May. At the scene, the SMM observed no obvious damage. An interlocutor from the Ministry told the SMM that no one had been injured but that one vehicle had been damaged. He said the device had contained 400g of TNT. According to the interlocutor, a criminal investigation had been opened on charges of hooliganism (article 296 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• On 10 May, in an area 7km west of Dibrivka (92km south-east of Donetsk), an armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM on their way to the border and told them to leave the area – which is less than 4km from the border - immediately. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was informed.

Conditional:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier stopped the SMM near government-controlled Sukha Balka (35km north-west of Donetsk) and requested the passports of monitors. The SMM initially refused but the soldier insisted and the SMM handed over passports. After two minutes the passports were returned and the SMM proceeded. The JCCC was informed.

Delay:

• An armed “LPR” member denied the SMM entry to a military-type compound near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). After discussion with another “LPR” member, the SMM was given access.

Other impediments:

• The SMM long-range UAV experienced constant jamming of its global positioning system (GPS) and communication links while flying over government-controlled Svitlodarsk and Marinka, “DPR” controlled-Donetsk and “LPR”-controlled Luhansk.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.