Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 6 May 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted a lower number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous day, with over 120 explosions recorded. In Luhansk region it noted a low level of violence with five explosions recorded. The Mission observed the presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. It continued to observe civilians travelling across the contact line. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on 12 occasions, including five denials of access, all but one in areas not controlled by the Government.*

The SMM observed a lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous day, with 126 explosions recorded.[1] The vast majority of ceasefire violations including 123 explosions were observed during night hours. On the night of 5 May, whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 7-10km west-north-west of its location. The following day, from a position at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and two single shots of small-arms fire 2.5-6km north-north-west of its position.

During the night hours of 5 May, positioned in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 61 undetermined explosions and 220 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at locations 5-10km south-east of its position.

On the night of 5 May, positioned in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 59 undetermined explosions and one salvo of outgoing multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fire at an undetermined distance north-north-east.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) between 09:50 and 13:30, the SMM heard four single shots of small-arms fire 3.5km south-south-east of its position. While stationary in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) between 08:10 and 13:55, the SMM did not observe any ceasefire violations.

During the night of 5 May, the SMM camera positioned south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 12 rounds of undetermined indirect fire at an undetermined distance north and north-east of its position. The SMM assessed that the first four rounds were fired from north-easterly to south-westerly directions, forty minutes later three rounds were fired in the opposite directions and subsequently five rounds were fired again from north-easterly to south-westerly directions.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a low number of ceasefire violations including five explosions. Whilst in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 100m east of its position, and assessed it as caused by a land mine. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and Border Guard officers at a checkpoint confirmed that the explosion had been caused by a land mine or a booby trap set off by an animal. Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5km south or south-west of its position.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and found the site abandoned as had been noted on 17 March, with all 18 tanks (seven T-72 and 11 T-64) and two mortars (2B9, 82mm) previously observed at the site, absent. 

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed 12 tanks at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (32km south-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and observed that two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: in government-controlled areas, six towed howitzers (2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Dmytrivka (56km south-west of Donetsk) on 5 May and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk); in “LPR”-controlled areas, seven MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) in Luhansk city.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM visited such locations and observed: 12 MLRS (four BM-27 Uragan, 220mm and eight BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 14 self-propelled howitzers (nine 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and five 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 122mm), 19 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 14 Addendum-regulated mortars (four 2B9, 82mm and ten 2B11, 120mm). It noted that ten MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm), one self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm),  two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), seven  Addendum-regulated mortars (two 2B9, 82mm and five PM-38, 120mm)  were missing.  

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM visited such locations and observed: six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and two Addendum-regulated mortars (PM-38,120mm).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware within the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted: one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2), one multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicle (MT-LB) and armoured vehicle near Netailove (21km north-west of Donetsk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM noted: seven armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) and seven IFVs (BMP-2) in Luhansk city, and one IFV (BMP-1) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas and presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM observed an improvised mine hazard sign on a wooden board written in red letters, located approximately 150m east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Karlivka (26km north-west of Donetsk). On the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw one UXO assessed as 82mm mortar shell located 2m from the main road. The SMM informed armed “LPR” members.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints near the contact line. In the morning hours, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted 412 civilian cars and 47 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and no cars in the opposite direction. In the afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed a queue of 258 civilian cars and 25 pedestrians to travel west and no cars queuing to travel east. In the morning hours, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed 150 people waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas. At the Government checkpoint north of the bridge the SMM observed 500 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas and 200 people waiting in the opposite direction. At noon, at the Government checkpoint the SMM observed a queue of 70 people waiting to travel to government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored border areas in government- and non-government-controlled areas. At the government-controlled Milove (108km north of Luhansk) border crossing point, the SMM observed a couple of pedestrians waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. A representative of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service told the SMM that after re-opening of the checkpoints in Stanytsia Luhanska, there were no queues at the crossing point. The SMM had noted at the same crossing point a queue of around 50 civilian cars and 15-20 pedestrians waiting to cross into the Russian Federation on 29 April – before re-opening the checkpoints in Stanytsia Luhanska (see: SMM Daily Report 30 April).

At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 50 civilian cars (35 with Ukrainian licence plates and 15 with Russian Federation licence plates), five busses (all with Ukrainian licence plates), and 50 pedestrians in a queue waiting to cross to the Russian Federation. Over the course of one hour, the SMM observed three or four cars crossing into the Russian Federation and four civilian trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) crossing into Ukraine. A young couple (in their early twenties) with their four-months baby, waiting at the crossing point, told the SMM that they were returning back to the Russian Federation after visiting their relatives in Luhansk city during Easter holidays.

The SMM monitored the situation of internally displaced persons (IDP) children in a school. In government-controlled Bohoiavlenka (47km south-west of Donetsk), the deputy head of a school told the SMM that there were currently 116 pupils, including 13 internally displaced persons (IDP) children, enrolled in the school. She added that the school had received 80 IDP children in 2015 and 14 IDPs children so far in 2016, while most of them had moved with their families to other towns or returned home, due the lack of job opportunities in the village.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• On 5 May, at a checkpoint at the entrance of “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), armed men did not allow the SMM to proceed further to the village, stating that they had not received “order” from their “superiors”. 
• In the afternoon of 6 May, armed men denied the SMM passage through a “DPR” checkpoint 17km south-west of Donetsk, when the SMM declined to allow them to copy the data of national passports of its members. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• Near “DPR”-controlled Dmytrivka (84km east of Donetsk), armed men stopped the SMM and prevented it from proceeding north-east, citing on-going demining activities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “DPR” checkpoint at the south-eastern entrance to “DPR”‑controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members again demanded to see the passports of the SMM monitors and denied passage when the SMM refused to show the passports. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the commander of Ukrainian Armed Forces refused the SMM access to a railway area close to the contact line.

Conditional access:

• On 5 May, at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (62km west of Luhansk), an armed man prevented the SMM from launching its unmanned aerial vehicle in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Near “DPR”-controlled Dmytrivka (84km east of Donetsk), two armed men stopped the SMM and escorted it to a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed guards allowed only two SMM monitors to enter a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, an armed man did not allow the SMM to proceed further south, when coming from government-controlled areas. The SMM contacted the JCCC and after two hours one of its monitors was allowed to pass the checkpoint, while other monitors were refused to proceed.   

Delay:

• On 5 May, at a “DPR” checkpoint at the western entrance of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), armed men delayed the SMM to enter the village for 19 minutes.
• In the morning hours of 6 May, at a “DPR” checkpoint 17km south-west of Donetsk, armed men delayed the SMM for 20 minutes, while trying to demand that SMM members show their national passports. After one of the armed men made a phone call, the SMM was allowed to proceed further west. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Impediment:

• The “commander” of a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that he had received an instruction from his “superiors” not to provide any information to the SMM. He also asked the SMM not to park in the vicinity and not to talk to people at the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed document for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.