Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 May 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similarly low number of ceasefire violations as the previous day, with 50 explosions recorded in Donetsk region and four in Luhansk region. The SMM observed firing incidents which were attributable to a live-fire exercise in an area outside of the security zone. It observed the presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. The Mission continued to observe civilians travelling across the contact line in both directions. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on both sides of the contact line.*

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted a similarly low number of ceasefire violations as the previous day with 50 explosions recorded.[1] For the third consecutive night, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations whilst in Donetsk city centre. Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions, 67 bursts and 12 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from north-west to north-east 2-8km of its position.

On the night of 2 May, positioned in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at locations 6-10km south-east of its position. During the evening of 2 May, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east), the SMM heard eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 6-9km north-west of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) between 10:00 and 17:45, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 7-10km west of its position. While stationary in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), between 10:00 and 13:15, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as caused by the impact of recoilless-gun (SPG-9) round 2.5km east-north-east and one explosion assessed as caused by the impact of mortar (82mm) round 3km south of its position.

In the night hours of 2 May, the SMM camera positioned south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 15 incoming mortar rounds (four assessed as fired from west to east, nine assessed as fired from east to west and one – undetermined direction of fire), two unidentified rocket-assisted projectiles, and eight bursts of tracer rounds of small-arms fire (all assessed as fired from east to west), and one explosion assessed as caused by outgoing mortar round to the north-east at an undetermined distance.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded several ceasefire violations. Whilst at “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire 2-4km north of its position. Positioned at an “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and saw smoke rising 500m to the south. An armed “LPR” member and civilian man separately told the SMM that the explosion had been caused by a booby trap in the “summer houses” area – in “LPR”-controlled areas south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Other firing incidents observed in the region were assessed as live-fire exercise at a training ground outside the security zone – in the vicinity of government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that 56 tanks (24 T-64 and 32 T-72), seven mortars (2B9, 82mm) and one anti-tank gun (D-44, 85mm) were absent. The SMM found one of those sites was empty as it had also noted on 9 December 2015.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city. On 2 May, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted the presence of one anti-tank gun (D-44, 85mm) in government-controlled Luhanske (60km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, on 1 and 2 May, an SMM long-range UAV observed six towed howitzers near government-controlled Druzhkivka (71km north-west of Donetsk). On 2 May aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 23 towed howitzers and 25 tanks near “LPR”-controlled Yasne (25km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: in government-controlled areas, an anti-tank guided missile (9K111 Fagot, 120mm) covered with fabric in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 120mm) mounted on an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1); in “LPR”-controlled areas, seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) in Luhansk city. On 2 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted: one anti-tank missile mounted on an APC in government-controlled Luhanske; four self-propelled howitzers in government-controlled Kostiantynivka (58km north of Donetsk); and six self-propelled howitzers in “DPR”-controlled Novoselivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM visited such locations and observed: 26 anti-tank guns (18 2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm and 8 2A19/T-12 Rapira, 100mm), 12 towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm) and seven Addendum-regulated mortars (2B9, 82mm). Eighteen self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 16 towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm), six anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six Addendum-regulated anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) previously observed were missing. On 2 May, at one of those areas, an armed guard – introduced himself as a member of Aidar volunteer battalion under the Ministry of Defence and the SMM saw the battalion’s patches on his uniform – denied the SMM access to one of the weapons (anti-tank guns; 2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) present* to check its serial number, although the area commander requested him to stand down.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware within the security zone: in government-controlled areas:  one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) near Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) and one APC (BTR-70) near Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk); in “LPR”-controlled areas: seven APCs (BTR-80) and seven IFVs (BMP-2) in Luhansk city; one multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicle (MT-LB) near Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk).  On 1 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five APCs near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and four APCs near government-controlled Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk). On 2 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted: one APC near government-controlled Dacha (49km north-west of Donetsk); 26 APCs in areas between government-controlled Luhanske and “DPR”-controlled Lozove (54km north-east of Donetsk); 27 APCs in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (59km north-east of Donetsk); one APC near government-controlled Artemove (42km north-east of Donetsk); two APCs near government-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk); four APCs near government-controlled Shumy (43km north of Donetsk). On 3 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted: four APCs near government-controlled Toretsk (43km north of Donetsk) and five APCs near government-controlled Novhorodske (35km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints near the contact line. On 2 May, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka the SMM observed 71 civilian cars, one bus and more than 50 pedestrians waiting to travel west and ten civilian cars and one bus queuing to travel in the other direction. The following day, at a government checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars, two buses and 40 pedestrians waiting to travel to government-controlled areas, and eight civilian cars  queuing in the opposite direction. In the morning hours, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed some 500 people waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge the SMM observed some 700 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas. In the early afternoon, the SMM observed a queue of 200-250 people waiting to travel to government-controlled areas and a queue of 20 people in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that the number of civilian travellers from both sides had radically decreased by 17:30.

The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas in the security zone. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces logistic base in the vicinity of  Kidrashivkska-Nova railway station in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw some ten mine hazard signs (20-100m between each other), stating “danger, mines” (in Cyrillic letters) on boards, wall of buildings and infrastructure.

The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government. At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Chervonopartyzansk (65km south-east of Luhansk), over the course of one hour, the SMM observed 30 civilian cars (23 with Ukrainian licence plates and seven with Russian Federation licence plates), one bus and three trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) crossing into the Russian Federation and 10 civilian cars crossing into Ukraine.

The SMM monitored border crossing points in government-controlled areas and noted a calm situation. On 2 May, at the Porubne border crossing point (37km south of Chernivtsi), the SMM saw ten trucks queuing to cross into Romania and another ten trucks parked nearby. The following day, at the Shehyni border crossing point (78km south-west of Lviv), the SMM observed some 100 cars (10 with Ukrainian licence plates an 90 with Polish licence plates) in two lines waiting to cross into Poland.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• On 2 May, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, an armed guard did not allow the SMM to check the serial number of one of the weapons present. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)
• In the morning hours, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), armed men did not allow the SMM to proceed further east after the SMM declined to present national passports of its members. The SMM informed the JCCC and left the area.
• In the late morning, “DPR” members again denied the SMM passage through the aforementioned checkpoint, when the SMM refused to show national passports of its members. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other restriction:

• The SMM long-range UAV was subject to continuous jamming of its Global Positioning System while flying over “DPR”-controlled areas.

[1] Please see the annexed document for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.