Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 1 May 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a low number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, and none in Luhansk region. It observed the re-opening of the crossing route at Stanytsia Luhanska, the continued closure of the one in Olenivka, and high numbers of people crossing elsewhere. The Mission attempted to monitor in border areas outside government control but was prevented from doing so. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. It observed the presence of numerous weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It was restricted in its freedom of movement, including at one heavy weapons holding area and at a border crossing point, both in areas not controlled by the Government.*

In keeping with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a relatively low number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on both 30 April and particularly so on 1 May.[1] The sides had earlier re-iterated their commitment to maintaining the ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter weekend. Positioned in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position in the evening of 29 April. The following day, whilst at a “DPR”-controlled location 6km north-west of the city centre, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions, two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and at least 57 single shots and one burst of small-arms fire 3-8km north-north-east, north-west, and north-north-west of its position. Whilst at the same location on 1 May, the SMM heard five explosions from undetermined weapons, one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, plus 18 bursts and 166 single shots of small-arms fire 2-10km west, north-west, north-north-west and north of its position. Positioned in nearby government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) between 16:48 and 17:12 on 1 May, the SMM heard, inter alia, 25 explosions, assessed as two 82mm mortar impacts and 23 explosions caused by automatic grenade launchers, 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) in the evening of 29 April, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions, six explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-10km south-east and south-west of its position. At the same position the following day between 15:04 and 15:18, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 7-8km south-east of its position. Later that day between 17:51 and 19:45, the SMM heard 65 explosions assessed as 82 and 120mm mortar, two explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm cannon (BMP-1) fire, as well as 12 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and an uncountable number of single shots of small-arms fire 4-8km south, south-west, east and south-east of its position. At nearby “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 3km north-west of its position at 16:50.

The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM observed, in violation of the respective withdrawal lines, seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city on both 30 April and 1 May.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed three tanks north of government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk; 67km north-east of Donetsk) on 30 April.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city, both on 30 April and 1 May; seven tracked vehicles (MT-LB) mounted with surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) in Luhansk city on both 30 April and 1 May; four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near government-controlled Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol) on 1 May; and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near government-controlled Smolianynove (60km north-west of Luhansk) on 30 April.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). Twelve self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and seven Addendum-regulated mortars (five PM-38, 120mm and two 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) previously observed were missing.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations* and observed six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), two towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and two towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). Six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) previously observed were missing. 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) on 30 April.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles within the security zone. The SMM observed: three armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-60) and one MT-LB in a compound, 90m from a hospital, in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city on 30 April; and seven APCs (BTR-80), and seven infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) in Luhansk city on both 30 April and 1 May.

The SMM continued to monitor long queues at crossing routes near the contact line. At Ukrainian Armed Forces entry/exit checkpoints near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM on 30 April observed at various times in total 500 cars, 19 buses and 430 pedestrians moving west; and 975 cars, six buses and 650 pedestrians moving east. On 1 May, the SMM observed reduced traffic through the same checkpoints, noting only two buses heading west and 140 cars moving in the opposite direction. On 1 May the SMM observed no vehicles waiting at the “DPR” checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk). Armed “DPR” members present told the SMM that the checkpoint was closed to all traffic due to the fatal shelling incident on 27 April (see SMM Spot Report 28 April 2016).

On 30 April, the SMM observed the re-opening of Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” checkpoints at the crossing route over Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). The SMM observed as approximately 200-250 people waited at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge to leave areas not controlled by the Government, and approximately 350 people at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the river, waiting to go south. By 17:00, the queues had been cleared with only a few people crossing in either direction. On 1 May, an armed “LPR” member at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge told the SMM that approximately 3,500 people had crossed the bridge the previous day, divided almost equally between those going north and those going south.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas outside government control, but was prevented from doing so.*

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• On 30 April, armed “DPR” members only allowed two SMM monitors – out of an intended four – to access a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• On 1 May at the Border Crossing Point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), an armed “LPR” member insisted that the SMM leave the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 1 May near government-controlled Vilkhove (22km north-east of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refused to allow the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint. No explanation was provided.

Conditional access:

• On two occasions on 30 April, armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint 17km south-west of Donetsk insisted on seeing the passports of SMM monitors, refusing to accept OSCE identification. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this  report.