Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 April 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed a lower number of ceasefire violations on 2 and 3 April respectively compared to 1 April, with similar levels recorded on both days in Donetsk region, but an increase was noted on 3 April in the area of Yasynuvata. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. The SMM visited border areas not controlled by the Government. The Mission encountered freedom of movement restrictions in areas not controlled by the Government, including in border areas.*
The number of ceasefire violations observed in Donetsk region declined on 2 and 3 April.[1]
The areas between “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Avdiivka (government-controlled, 15km north of Donetsk) remained the most kinetic in Donetsk region. On 2 April, between 10:35 and 15:00hrs, positioned near Yasynuvata, the SMM recorded 23 undetermined explosions, one airburst and uncountable intermittent bursts of heavy-machinegun fire 1-3km west, south-west and south-south-west of its position. Whilst positioned near Avdiivka, between 10:00 and 15:00hrs, the SMM heard one outgoing 82mm mortar, one airburst of 120mm mortar and one impact of recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire 3-5km south and south-east of its position. On 3 April, positioned near Yasynuvata between 10:00 and 15:00hrs, the SMM registered 123 undetermined explosions, 99 single shots, 22 bursts of small-arms fire and intermittent bursts of heavy machine-gun fire 2-10km north-west and west of its position.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city between 18:00hrs on 1 April and 08:00hrs on 2 April, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions, three bursts and two single shots of small arms 3-10km north and north-north-west of its position. In the evening hours of 2 April, from the same position, the SMM registered 26 undetermined explosions 7-10km north and north-north-west of its position. Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) between 08:45 and 16:30hrs on 2 April, the SMM observed 12 airbursts, eight shots of small-arms fire and two undetermined explosions 2-4km north-north-east and north of its position. On 3 April, at the same position between 08:45 and 13:20hrs, the SMM recorded four undetermined explosions 5-8km north of its position.
While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) between 17:00-and 20:30hrs on 1 April, the SMM heard 36 mortar impacts (17 assessed as caused by 82mm mortar and 29 by 120mm mortar) 3-5km south-west of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), between 19:20 and 22:00hrs on 1 April the SMM heard at least 56 impacts of artillery, mortars and automatic grenade-launcher, 29 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by mortar, 15 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by 152mm artillery rounds and 38 bursts of heavy machine-gun fire 10-12km north-west of its position. In the evening hours of 2 April whilst at the same position, the SMM registered three explosions, assessed as caused by artillery 10km south-south-west.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations on 2 and 3 April.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled Leninske (24km north-east of Mariupol) on 3 April, the SMM observed damage to residential buildings, which local residents claimed had been caused by mortar shelling of the village during the night of 31 March. The SMM saw that the windows of six houses had been shattered, the roof of one building had collapsed and the roof of another was damaged. The SMM analysed one fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by an 82mm mortar fired from a west-north-westerly direction.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site and found that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 39 towed howitzers (27 D-20, 152mm and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm); 26 anti-tank guns (19 2A29/MT Rapira, 100mm; and seven 2A19/T, 100mm) and four mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm). The SMM noted that eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) first observed on 26 January were absent.
In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such a location and observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).
In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed at least six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in the backyard of a civilian building in the village of Mokroielanchyk (61km south-east of Donetsk).
In “LPR”-controlled areas beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw: a military-type truck and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV, BTR) travelling north and a military-type truck and an ACV (BTR) travelling south whilst positioned at the Donetsk central railway station; two ACVs (BMP-1) near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint west of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol). In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: a convoy of five vehicles mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) when traveling on the main road towards the north-east from Kramatorsk (government-controlled, 83km north of Donetsk); five ACVs (MT-LB) mounted with anti-aircraft systems in Solodke (government-controlled, 33km south-west of Donetsk) hidden in vegetation on the side of the road; a convoy consisting of eight ACVs (MTLB), with soldiers on top, accompanied by four military trucks heading north on the T-1302 road near the junction leading to government-controlled Popasna (70km west of Luhansk).
Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed on 1 April the presence of six ACVs in “DPR”-controlled Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 2 April in Kominternove, a local resident showed the SMM a piece of UXO in his garden. The SMM assessed that it was a controller block of an anti-tank missile. On 3 April near “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (43km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw three mines attached to trees approximately 3m above the ground, which were connected by a wire.
The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas within the security zone. On 2 April, the SMM noted that a previously observed mine hazard sign at a secondary road leading from a “DPR” checkpoint near Horlivka to Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) was not in place any longer. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time the presence of mine hazard signs and fences in the field next to the road, in an area where civilians wait for buses to the Zaitseve checkpoint (government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk). Also for the first time, the SMM saw: mine hazard signs on both sides of the secondary road leading from the Maiorsk checkpoint to the Zaitseve village (50km north-east of Donetsk); at the outskirts of Maiorsk, on the main road heading towards Horlivka, a mine hazard sign (in Cyrillic) partially obscured by vegetation at the entrance to a brick-fenced installation. The stretch of road between the Maiorsk and Horlivka checkpoints lacks any marking or fencing indicating the presence of mines.
In the vicinity of Yasynuvata, on highway M04, the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign on the west side of the road. It was yellow, reading ‘Mine’ in red Cyrillic letters. Further along the H20, in the direction of Donetsk city between the “DPR” and Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoints, the SMM saw some 15 mine hazard signs between the lanes of the road: 1.5x2m billboards with red writing in Russian, English and Ukrainian on white background. Along the same stretch of road, the SMM noted some signs that were 20x30cm with red letters on white background reading ‘Mines’ in Ukrainian and Russian. The SMM saw ten mine hazard signs placed every 25 metres on both sides of the road leading west of the Oleksandrivka checkpoint (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) towards a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the H15, and 30 mine hazard signs on the western side of the road heading north to Oleksandrivka. On the main road in government-controlled areas of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM noted the mine hazard signs it had previously observed along the road were not visible.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation affecting civilians. In Dokuchaievsk (“DPR”-controlled, 32km south-west of Donetsk) on 3 April the SMM noticed for two consecutive days that there is no mobile phone coverage in the village. On 2 and 3 April the SMM observed that the checkpoints in Zolote on both sides of the contact line were closed (see SMM Daily Report 1 April 2016).
The SMM visited border areas not controlled by the Government facing impediments to its monitoring in all four areas.* On 2 April, in the area of the Marynivka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 70 civilian vehicles in line to cross into the Russian Federation. One vehicle had “DPR” plates, and ten had Russian Federation plates, while the rest had Ukrainian plates. Also on 2 April, the SMM visited the Uspenka border crossing point (“DPR”-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk) where it observed a total of 20 civilian vehicles (cars and minibuses) and eight trucks waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. All trucks had Ukrainian registration plates. Four of the civilian vehicles had Russian Federation plates, the rest had Ukrainian plates.
On 2 April, at the “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi border crossing point (84km south of Luhansk) the SMM observed that within 20 minutes ten civilian vehicles (eight with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation registration plates), three trucks with unknown cargo and Ukrainian plates, and three civilian busses with Ukrainian plates and boards indicating their destinations crossed into the Russian Federation. In the wider border area, the SMM saw seven more civilian busses heading towards the border crossing point with boards indicating destinations in the Russian Federation.
On 3 April, the SMM visited the “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi pedestrian border crossing point (50km south-east of Luhansk). The SMM observed approximately 15-20 people crossing on foot into the Russian Federation within 20 minutes. The SMM spoke to four of them - two women, approximately 30-35 years-old and a man and woman, approximately 55-60 years-old. The interlocutors said that they faced no problems crossing and that people preferred using this crossing point instead of the one at nearby Izvaryne (54km south-east of Luhansk), because crossing procedures at the latter could take as long as 12 hours.
The SMM observed the situation at railway stations in areas not controlled by the Government. At the railway station in Ilovaisk (“DPR”-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM spoke with a female member of staff in her 40’s, who said only few trains regularly passed through the station on a daily basis compared with prior to the conflict. The SMM saw one stationary cargo train loaded with coal. At the railway station in Khartsyzk (“DPR”-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk) a female member of staff in her 40s who was on duty refused to speak to the SMM and no trains were observed.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- On 2 April, at the Marynivka border crossing point armed “DPR”-members did not allow the SMM to enter the “customs area” stating there had not been an “official agreement between OSCE and authorities he worked for”. The conversation was interrupted when the interlocutor was ordered (by radio) to “stop talking to OSCE”.
- On 2 April, at the Uspenka border crossing point, an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to the customs area, without giving a reason and refused to speak to the SMM.
Delay:
- On 3 April armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint at the entrance to “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) and demanded the SMM waited while they informed their ‘supervisor’. The SMM was allowed to proceed after 15 minutes.
Other impediments:
- On 2 April, an armed “DPR” member told the SMM at a checkpoint in Olenivka (“DPR”-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) that SMM monitors had to have their national passports and undergo ‘registration procedures’ as all other civilians when entering “DPR”-controlled areas, otherwise access would be denied.
- On 2 April at the Dovzhanskyi border crossing point an armed “LPR” member demanded to see the SMM patrol plan. The SMM did not comply and the armed man recorded the names of monitors and vehicle registration plates.
- On 3 April at the Sievernyi border crossing point, armed “LPR” members demanded to see the SMM patrol plan. The SMM did not comply and the men recorded the name of the patrol leader and vehicle registration plates of the SMM.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.